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ABSTRACT 
United Nations reform debates have tended to focus on how to change the 
organizational structure of the United Nations in order to make it more efficient. 
The central question addressed by this thesis is one that has received little 
attention in these reform debates: "what can the UN, and only the UN, add to 
our efforts to control conflict?" This thesis examines the hypothesis that the 
United Nations is unique in its potential ability to build international consensus 
and to bring international legitimacy to collective response efforts. The goal of 
this thesis is to show that while the U.N. is ineffective, organizational reforms 
such as providing the UN standby forces, improving its ability to command 
forces, or creating an Inspector General will not solve the most critical threat to 
the organization - its declining legitimacy in the world. This thesis reveals that 
new problems in a changing world require collective response, hence, the need 
for a legitimate UN. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM: UN REFORM DEBATES MISS THE CENTRAL ISSUE 
Reform of the United Nations has been a topic of discussion ever since the 
organization was created in 1945. During the Cold War, however, the principal obstacle 
to UN reforms was the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which 
stalled any attempts to make it work or to improve it. It should not be surprising, 
therefore, that the end of the Cold War has produced a vigorous debate over the evolving 
international security system and over how best to reform the United Nations in that 
system. As United Nations peacekeeping missions have floundered in Somalia and 
Bosnia in the 1990s, the United Nations' military ineffectiveness has resulted in a 
growing UN reform debate over how best to improve the organization. The central focus 
of this debate has been the United Nations and "making it work the way it was supposed 
to. "1 The problem with the reform debates, however, is that they have failed to grasp 
the central issue that will help the United Nations deal with the world of tomorrow: 
what can the United Nations, and only the United Nations, add to the resolution of 
conflict in the world? 
In the post-Cold War era, the world needs something at the political level to deal 
with a fragmenting world. There is a critical need, therefore, for the United Nations to 
help pull the world together to reestablish order. The success of the United Nations and 
collective responses depend on the perceived legitimacy of the United Nations. All 
proposals for reforming the UN, however, have tended to focus on changing the 
organization to improve efficiency. All proposals must be balanced against how they 
affect the United Nations' ability to build consensus. Reforming the organizational 
capability of the UN before improving its legitimacy and consensus building will pull the 
world and the UN apart. Therefore, UN reforms must first build UN decision making 
and consensus building before any organizational reforms will be successful. 
1 John M. Lee, Robert von Pagenhardt, and Timothy W. Stanley, To Unite Our 
Strength (Lanham, Maryland: University Press, 1992). 35. 
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The success of any UN reforms will depend on the support of the U.S. for the 
organization. The U.S. must, therefore, act toward the UN as if it mattered. The UN 
as an organization matters to the U.S. because it builds habits and expectations of 
dialogue and cooperation between states. The existence of the United Nations has 
changed the way nation-states think about their relations with each other. By providing 
a world a forum for dialogue, the UN is much more than an instrument or tool of nation-
states. It is that, of course, but it also establishes a framework that states can use to deal 
with problems beyond the scope of their own capabilities. The UN is not designed or 
equipped for commanding military forces and is not likely to acquire this capability in 
the near term. The world does need a sheriff to drive belligerents into negotiations. 
Since the UN is better suited to play the role of the "good cop," the U.S. may need to 
be willing to either be the sheriff, or at least use its leadership and influence in the world 
to build coalitions to pressure belligerents. The bottom line is that for the UN to be 
successful, it must be considered legitimate, and the U.S. can contribute to this by 
making a commitment to building up the United Nations' ability to build consensus. 
The current UN reform debate centers on either making the UN powerful and 
efficient or forgetting it, thereby focusing on problems of yesterday. The central 
problem that this thesis will address is understanding the limitations of the proposed UN 
reform efforts in addressing the problems of tomorrow. This chapter will explore the 
reasons for the post-Cold War optimism about the United Nations' future and the key 
arguments on both sides of the UN reform debate. As the Cold War thawed in the late 
1980s, the increased cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union produced 
growing optimism in many circles for the United Nations' problem-solving potential. 
The United Nations proved surprisingly resilient and successful as it became evident that 
the era of confrontation was drawing to a close. By 1990 the five Permanent Members 
of the Security Council had begun to work regularly together for the solution of major 
problems, and it seemed that the UN was beginning to fulfill some of the promise it had 
held in 1945. The Iran-Iraq war came to an end in August 1988 on the basis of a 
Security Council resolution devised by the five Permanent Members; Soviet forces 
withdrew from Afghanistan under a plan negotiated by the Secretary General; Cuban 
2 
forces staged a withdrawal from Angola in 1989; Namibian independence was fmally 
achieved in March 1990; and UN Peacekeeping and good offices were employed with 
growing effect in Central America to end conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua.2 
The overwhelming victory by UN-mandated, and U.S.-ledcoalition forces, in the 
Persian Gulf War appeared as a watershed between past and future, a test of whether the 
possibilities for peace and justice in international relations that had been created by the 
end of the Cold War could be realized and even institutionalized. With a strong, 
congenial Security Council for the first time ever, it now seemed feasible to establish a 
global security system of the sort envisaged by President Woodrow Wilson when he first 
proposed the League of Nations at the end of the First World War.3 President George 
Bush even borrowed a phrase from President Wilson in proclaiming the possibility of a 
"New World Order" at the end of Gulf War. Unfortunately for world stability, the 
period of superpower leverage and U.S. leadership from 1988 to 1991 proved transitory 
when the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991. The end of the Cold War and the 
subsequent decline in U.S. world leadership was reflected in the slow and uneven 
Security Council response to growing internal conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, 
Somalia, Haiti, and by the resumption of violence in Angola. Even the limited success 
of the massive UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia (UNT AC) in supervising 
elections and setting up a Cambodian government is seen by most analysts as an unlikely 
model for future UN operations due to its size and cost. 4 
The UN reform debate has therefore been complicated by the realization that the 
collapse of the Soviet threat has not resulted in a new world "order," but rather a new 
world "disorder" fueled by a host of new and challenging problems for which the UN 
2 Brian Urquhart, "Security After the Cold War," in Adam Roberts and Benedict 
Kingsbury, eds., United Nations. Divided World (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1993), 81. 
3 Richard Falk, "In Search of a New World Order," Current History 92, no. 573 
(April 1993): 145. 
4 Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," Foreign Affairs 73, 
no. 6 (November-December 1994): 29. 
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was not designed. The superpower rivalry that threatened the world with nuclear 
destruction for four decades has been replaced by the fragmenting of states throughout 
the world, the breakdown of state authority, the rise of ethnic/nationalist violence, and 
the growing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to developing 
countries. International wars of aggression, for which the UN was designed, have been 
replaced by new problems which were not even envisioned by the UN founders in 1945. 
The post-Cold War era has by no means been free of the threat of armed conflict, 
as demonstrated by continuing warfare in areas as diverse as Afghanistan, Angola, 
Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, the Caucasus, and the former Yugoslavia. 
On 7 February 1993, the New York Times listed violent conflicts in 48 countries. 5 The 
world community, particularly the United Nations, is now facing increasingly violent 
civil wars that were hardly imagined by the framers of the UN Charter. According to 
Kim R. Holmes, behind much of the new disorder today are three trends causing 
geopolitical upheavals around the world: ( 1) the collapse of large empires - the Soviet 
Union is a case in point, but China or India may be next; (2) the rise of post-modern 
nationalism, which is partly a consequence of the first trend; and of course, (3) the 
revival of religious fundamentalism as a potent force. 6 These trends have resulted in a 
decline in the number of interstate wars while dramatically increasing the risk of 
intrastate wars around the world. 
B. THE REFORM DEBATE 
The gap between the opportunity for UN reform presented by the end of the Cold 
War and the inability of the UN to build consensus for concerted international responses 
to these new problems has produced a heated debate over the shape of the post-Cold War 
international security system. The vast majority of critics of the UN have tended to 
5 Gaddis Smith, "What Role for America," Current History 92, no. 573 (April 
1993): 151. 
6 Kim R. Holmes, "New World Disorder: A Critique of the United Nations," 
Journal of International Affairs 46. no. 2 (Winter 1993): 323-341. 
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assume that UN legitimacy is unproblematic, and see the UN as merely needing 
organizational tinkering to make it more militarily effective and efficient. Opponents 
have been just as adamant in opposing a stronger United Nations. This side of the debate 
has been split between those who fear a strong world government - which shows a strong 
presumption that the UN is legitimate - and those who say that the UN is unimportant 
and can be ignored. On both sides of this debate, the focus has been either on what 
reforms are necessary to make the UN capable of military action, or on whether the UN 
should be allowed to take on such a role. What both sides of the debate have failed to 
understand is that UN legitimacy is neither automatic nor unimportant. Neither side of 
the debate has approached the problem of UN ineffectiveness by asking the question 
"what makes the UN unique?" In other words, not how or whether to make the UN 
stronger, but rather, taking a broader strategic planning look at the UN system to try to 
find out how it can be reformed to handle the new demands of the next century. 
1. Supporters 
So far, pro-UN reformers have tended to approach the problem of UN 
ineffectiveness by "organizational tinkering" with the UN. The UN reform debate has 
focused on sharpening the tool developed by the founders - the United Nations - and not 
on their goal - saving the world from the scourge of war. UN reformers have tended to 
see the UN as the right tool, but merely in need of modification. Cyrus Vance, former 
U.S. Secretary of State and currently Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General, 
expressed this view rather succinctly: 
... strengthening the United Nations' capacity for peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, and peace enforcement should be a top priority for the U.S. 
in the post-Cold War world. Nothing could more directly serve 
America's interests, or that of the larger international community, than 
fulfilling the goal of collective security laid out in the UN Charter forty-
seven years ago. 7 
Lee, von Pagenhardt, and Stanley, To Unite Our Strength, iii. 
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The UN is therefore seen as the right tool to respond to conflict around the world. The 
problem with this view is that it assumes that the UN system, designed for a different 
world and different threats in 1945, merely needs some modest organizational reform, 
when new challenges and problems in the world are placing strains on an organization 
already weakened by the slow but steady decline in its legitimacy. 
The pro-UN reformers include a wide range of influential politicians, policy 
makers, and academics, all of whom tend to focus on the organizational structure and 
processes of the UN. Their reforms range from calls for the creation of a standing UN 
army or standby forces; the expansion of the definitions of security threats to include 
environmental and humanitarian concerns; the increase of the United Nations' powers to 
intervene in the internal affairs of states; and the creation of what has been referred to 
as the New World Order, in which the UN would be the world's main body for not only 
keeping the peace, but enforcing it. 8 Bruce Russett, a political scientist at Yale, and 
James S. Sutterlin, a fellow at Yale's International Security Program, argue that the 
"Security Council should be able to mobilize a force to serve under UN command for 
enforcement purposes. "9 Harvard University's Joseph S. Nye Jr., has even suggested 
a rapid deployment force of 60,000 troops built around a professional core of 5000 UN 
soldiers. 10 
Support for a stronger UN has not been limited merely to academics. President 
Clinton set the tone for how his administration viewed the United Nations in a major 
foreign policy address of his campaign in 1992, when he pledged his support for the 
8 Holmes, 323: See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (1992); Brian 
Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (1987); Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN 
Military Operations," Washington Quarterly (Winter 1993): 51-66; Richard Gardner, 
"The Case for Practical Internationalism," Foreign Affairs 66, no. 4 (1988); and Robert 
Johansen, "Lessons for Collective Security," World Policy Journal (Summer 1991): 561-
73. 
9 Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World Order," Foreign 
Affairs 70, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 91. 
10 Joseph S. Nye Jr., "What New World Order," Foreign Affairs (Spring 1992): 
93. 
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creation of a U.N. military force. A Clinton administration, he promised, would "stand 
up for our interests, but we will share burdens, where possible, through multilateral 
efforts to secure the peace, such as NATO and a new, voluntary U.N. Rapid Deployment 
Force. 11 Proponents of a stronger UN, therefore, see the end of the Cold War as 
offering the members of the UN the chance to fmally play the collective security role 
intended by its founders in 1945. Their answer to the question of how the UN can deal 
with a more violent world has been to give the UN the military forces, command 
structure, and training to permit it to enforce its wishes. 
One of the most influential and outspoken proponents of a stronger United Nations 
has been the current Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. At the first-ever Security 
Council Summit meeting at the head-of-state level in January 1992, the members of the 
Security Council recognized the new possibilities of the UN and requested that the 
Secretary General evaluate ways for strengthening the United Nations' capacity for 
preventive diplomacy, peace making, and peace-keeping. 12 His subsequent report, An 
Agenda for Peace, was most notable for making a number of proposals and suggestions, 
addressed to member states, for enhancing UN capacity to respond to the challenges of 
the post-Cold War world. In addressing future crisis situations, the Secretary General 
proposed to bring into being the special arrangements "foreseen" in Articles 42 and 43 
of the Charter, including: assurances that member states would undertake to make armed 
forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council "not only on an ad hoc 
basis, but on a permanent basis." 13 His proposed plan aimed at establishing a de facto 
UN army, with each member state making available up to 1,000 troops for peace-
enforcement and deterrent operations under the command of the Secretary General. The 
11 Jeffrey R. Gerlach, "A U.N. Army for the New World Order?" Orbis (Spring 
1993): 224. 
12 Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," Survival 35, no. 
2 (Summer 1993): 4. 
13 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," Foreign Affairs (Fall 
1992): 92. 
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Secretary General's proposals therefore sought to remedy the problems that new 
peacekeeping ventures were revealing about the United Nations' peacekeeping system-
namely, an inefficient command structure; ad hoc machinery for mobilizing forces for 
UN operations; and the lack of a UN enforcement capability to support its resolutions. 
The debate over the United Nations usually starts from an assumption that the UN 
can add two things to conflict management: international legitimacy and the capability 
to take military action. Both sides of the debate, however, have assumed away the 
legitimacy side of the problem. Pro-UN reformers have tended to assume that any action 
taken by the UN would be seen as legitimate, and focus on insuring the United Nations' 
ability to effectively coordinate action. They tend to base their argument on several 
factors. 
First, the end of the Cold War and the end of the Soviet veto in the Security 
Council are seen as opening the way for the UN to send forces around the world to 
respond to aggression or threats to peace. Thus, since the world is assumed to be more 
like that envisioned by the UN framers in 1945, these reformers call for giving the UN 
the enforcement forces called for in the UN Charter. Since the Charter called for such 
forces, the argument tends to assume that they would be considered legitimate by the 
members of the UN. A second factor is the inability of standard UN peacekeeping forces 
to handle the expanding number and scope of missions being accepted by the United 
Nations. Pro-UN reformers argue that increased demand for UN peacekeepers and 
broader missions necessitate stronger standby forces in order to solve the UN 
overcommitment problem and to give the UN a rapid deployment capability. 14 
Supporters point to the astonishing number of new "peacekeeping" missions assigned to 
the UN in recent years as proof of the legitimacy of an expanded UN role in the 
worldY Lastly, the end of the Cold War and cuts in military forces of the U.S., 
Russia, and the European powers due to budgetary constraints have increased the 
14 Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intra-State Conflict," Foreign Policy 96 
(Fall 1994): 18. 
15 Lee. Pagenhardt, and Stanley. 12. 
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attractiveness of a UN military force to relieve these powers of having to shoulder the 
fmancial burden of policing the world. The common theme in all of these reasons for 
making the UN more effective is that UN action is assumed to be legitimate, and is 
therefore not problematic. 
2. Opponents of UN Reform 
Opponents of UN reform tend to either fear a stronger UN or to disregard the UN 
as unimportant. Opponents such as Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury of Oxford 
University, do not question the legitimacy of the UN, but doubt its capability to handle 
more demanding military ventures. 16 Some opponents fear a stronger UN because it 
might become a world government and infringe on state sovereignty, thus presuming that 
such a world government would be legitimate. While proponents of UN reform are 
passionate in their calls for "finally making the UN work as its founders intended," 
opponents of a stronger UN have been just as adamant in opposing a stronger United 
Nations. Part of the problem lies in the rapid expansion of UN initiatives in the areas 
of election monitoring, nation-building, peace-making, humanitarian missions, and peace-
enforcement in intra-state conflicts. For these new military initiatives outlined by the 
Secretary General, there is virtually no UN track record and even less consensus among 
governments." Two arguments therefore dominate the anti-UN reform literature: it 
infringes on national sovereignty and is unconstitutional; and since the UN is incapable 
of effectively commanding military forces, it can be ignored. 
The first argument objects to putting national forces under UN control because 
this would infringe on national sovereignty and is, in the U.S., unconstitutional. In the 
U.S., the question of the constitutionality of providing U.S. troops for standby UN forces 
16 Roberts, "United Nations and International Security," 6; See also Jeffrey 
Gerlach, "A U.N. Army for the New World Order?"; and James Schlesinger, "Quest For 
A Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 1 (America and the World, 
1992/93): 17-28. 
17 Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing 
an Agenda for Peace." Washington Quarterly 16, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 58. 
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can be traced back to the debate over ratification of the UN Charter treaty before the 
U.S. Senate in 1945. John Foster Dulles, a member of the U.S. delegation to the San 
Francisco conference at which the Charter was signed, told the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that "an agreement with the United Nations on the provision of troops should 
be regarded as a treaty requiring approval of a two-thirds majority of the Senate. "18 
The willingness of member states to commit themselves in advance to provide 
troops and facilities at the request of the Security Council for enforcement purposes has 
never been tested, but has been controversial since the creation of the UN. The lack of 
consensus among the Pennanent Five members of the Security Council over the issue of 
United Nations control over national forces was one of the key factors preventing the 
creation of Article 43 forces and a Military Staff Committee for the UN following the 
Second World War. Among the Pennanent Five members, basic divergences emerged 
from 1946 to 1949 over what guidelines to establish regarding the scope, reach, and 
automaticity of Article 43 with respect to the provision of "on call" forces. Virtually all 
of the Pennanent Five members entertained objections on the matter of automaticity 
because war-making decisions were reviewed as sovereign prerogatives to be jealously 
guarded. 19 From the beginning of the United Nations, therefore, there was opposition 
among its members to the idea of granting the UN its own military powers. 
The gradual slide of peacekeeping missions into peace-enforcement operations has 
increased concerns in the U.S. Congress over the question of control of forces by 
Congress. Members of Congress have asserted that putting U.S. forces under UN 
control for peace-enforcement operations represents a derogation of U.S. national 
sovereignty, a challenge to the Constitution - and the War Powers Act - and an erosion 
of the responsibilities of the President as Commander-in-Chief.2° Senator Robert Dole 
18 Russett and Sutterlin, 78. 
19 Ibid, 29. 
20 William H. Lewis, "Peacekeeping: The Deepening Debate," Strategic Review 
(Summer 1993): 27. 
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has even gone so far as to call for legislation placing limits on when and where the 
President can provide forces to the United Nations.21 
The reluctance of the U.S. government to allow foreign command of U.S. forces 
for peacekeeping missions was reinforced by the killing of 18 U.S. Army Rangers on 
peacekeeping duty in Somalia in October 1993. Following the death of these U.S. 
Servicemen in what had become, for all practical purposes, a war zone, the U.S. 
administration and Congress reevaluated U.S. involvement in such peace-enforcement 
operations and withdrew the majority of U.S. forces from Somalia. The U.S. 
governments' reappraisal of its role in UN peacekeeping was revealed by a revised 
Presidential Decision Directive 25 which, according to Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Edward L. Warner III, put limits on when U.S. forces would take part in a UN 
peacekeeping mission, and most important, required that U.S. forces always be under 
U.S. command _22 
The second argument by opponents of UN reform asserts that since the UN is 
incapable of effective military command, the UN can be ignored, therefore its legitimacy 
is unimportant. When the UN founders designed the UN, the power to respond to 
aggression was concentrated in the Permanent Five powers in the Security Council, not 
in the Secretariat. Proposals for reforming the UN structure focus not on increasing the 
ability of the Security Council to create strong coalitions to stop aggression, as the 
Founders originally envisioned, but rather to increase the power and responsibilities of 
the Secretary General by merely expanding his existing command of peacekeeping to 
include peace-enforcement. John F. Hillen III, a veteran of Operation Desert Storm now 
at the department of war studies at King's College in London, argues that "you need 
narrowly defined objectives, unity of command, a small narrow-based interest, to make 
the tough decisions and the tough calls. The U.N. has just too much plurality of opinion 
21 Robert Dole, New York Times, 10 October 1993, p. A18. 
22 Stanley Meisler, "Keeping the Peace: U.N. Gets Mixed Reaction to Goal," Los 
Angeles Times, 3 May 1994, C1. 
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- - -------- ----------- -------------------------------. 
to accomplish that. "23 Its basic structure hinders the ability of the UN to be able to take 
on the responsibility of military command in enforcement operations. 
The second part of this argument asserts that the Secretary General and the 
Secretariat lack the military infrastructure, knowledge, and professional wherewithal to 
oversee effectively an operation like the second phase of the UN Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM II), enforce safe havens in Bosnia, or react appropriately to renewed civil 
war in Angola or ethnic massacres in Rwanda. Thomas Weiss, a Canadian expert on UN 
Peacekeeping, asserts that although efforts to establish a Situation Room and the Task 
Force for Standby Agreements may be fledgling steps in the right direction, they would 
hardly make the sophisticated militaries of major powers feel at ease about placing the 
UN in charge of large-scale and dangerous operations in the Balkans and Somalia.24 
The ability of the UN to handle the dramatically increased demands that would be placed 
on it if given its own military forces is questionable as well. Adam Roberts of Oxford 
University points out that the United Nations' military machinery has not kept pace with 
the dramatically increased demands of the UN operations in Cambodia, Somalia, and the 
Balkans. 25 Its capacity to plan. suppon, and command peacekeeping, let alone 
enforcement, is scarcely greater now than during the Cold War. 26 
The problem with both the pro- and anti-UN refonn arguments is that UN 
legitimacy is neither automatic nor unimponant. While concentrating on whether to 
make the UN stronger, both sides of the debate have failed to address the larger question 
of "why is the UN having trouble coping with new problems?" Is the UN that was 
created in 1945 still considered legitimate by all its member nations? These are questions 
that any refonns designed to help the UN cope with future challenges must answer. 
23 David C. Morrison, "Make Peace- Or Else!" National Journal, 3 October 1992, 
p. 2254. 
24 Thomas G. Weiss, "Intervention: Whither the United Nations," Washington 
Quarterly 17, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 120. 
25 Adam Robens. "The United Nations and International Security," 14. 
26 Ibid. 118. 
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3. Why Bother Trying to Reform the UN? 
The problem with focusing on making the UN stronger is that it is the wrong fix 
to the problem of UN ineffectiveness. Ignoring the United Nations, however, will only 
delay, and may exacerbate the world's problems. The tendency to focus debate on the 
UN as an organization, to focus on the details of reform or on propriety of cooperation, 
bas obscured the central question: Why bother with trying to reform the United Nations? 
In the language of organizational development, this question can be reframed as "what 
is the uniqueness of the UN?" If the UN has no unique capability to foster international 
peace and security, then U.S. policy is clear: withdraw or at least do not worry about 
it. If the UN does have a unique capability, then the policy prescription is equally clear: 
focus on maintaining and extending the UN's uniqueness and avoid doing anything that 
might compromise it. 
Unfortunately, the existence of the UN as an organization has led to an obscuring 
of the fundamental distinction of the founders' vision- saving the world from the scourge 
of war - and the mechanism that the founders chose, the particular organization of the 
UN in the Charter. The reform debate has focused on the tool, and not on the goal. 
Refonners have necessarily assumed that the UN is the right tool, while opponents have 
labeled it an incompetent or immoral tool. Neither, however, has addressed the question 
of what the UN, and only the UN, can add to efforts to control conflict in the world. 
The focus of the debate has remained on how to make the UN more capable of dealing 
with aggression around the world. The legitimacy of the UN bas been either taken for 
granted or downplayed as insignificant. The question of why the UN is worth refonning 
has received little attention in the refonn debate. 
What can the UN, and only the UN do? There are two options: it could 
command UN military forces, or it could provide a world forum for consensus building 
and debate. In this thesis I shall argue that powerful, efficient military forces, capable 
of responding to aggression better than any UN military force, already exist in the 
military forces of the Pennanent Five members of the Security Council and several other 
states. The Security Council, although not representative of all of the major powers in 
the world. does possess the military power to intervene around the world. The ability 
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of these nations to build coalitions through the Security Council also already exists, as 
witnessed by the successful building of international coalitions of forces under U.S. 
leadership in Korea and Desert Storm. Many nations also possess the ability to use 
military force to protect their interests unilaterally as well. The United Nations, 
therefore, is not unique in its ability to command military forces, and national 
governments and regional alliances like NATO possess the military power and resources 
to respond to aggression far better than the UN could hope to in the near future. 
What can the UN uniquely add to the resolution of international conflict and how 
do we avoid compromising it? The United Nations is unique because it is the only 
universal, representative world forum in the world. In these attributes, it differs from 
its predecessor, the League of Nations, which was hamstrung by the absence of the 
United States, and was far from universal since most of the developing countries today 
were still colonies. What national governments lack and the UN can add is the ability 
to develop the international political consensus for action necessary to give a military 
operation the legitimacy and political will necessary to persevere. 
What is legitimacy? Webster's defines the term as "giving legal status or 
authority to, or to affirm to be justified, lawful, or true. "27 In political terms, 
legitimacy is the political acceptability of a government or organization. A government 
is therefore considered legitimate if it has a legal status, has authority over an area, and 
is perceived as justified. In order to be an effective world forum and successfully 
coordinate international response to aggression, the UN must be considered legitimate 
by all, or at least a vast majority of its member nations. During the debate over the 
future of the United Nations in the early 1960s, Raymond Moore asserted "the United 
States does not rely on the United Nations to do anything which some other 
instrumentality can do better. The greatest achievements of the United Nations for peace 
and security - the Suez, Lebanon, the Congo, and even Cambodia - have been 
27 Webster's New World Dictionary (Cleveland, Ohio: William Collins, 1980). 807. 
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achievements for which no really valid alternative means existed. "28 Part of the United 
Nations' legitimacy derives from whether its actions are seen as justified by its member 
nations. Attempting to give the UN enforcement powers threatens the legitimacy of the 
UN because such actions may be seen as unjustified by many nations. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the importance of the United Nations' unique 
qualities has increased rather than decreased. Some have even written that there are no 
viable alternatives to the United Nations system, given: the fragmentation and political-
economic crisis in the former Soviet Union; Europe's preoccupation with both deepening 
and widening its Community integration; Japan's resistance to any increased military 
role, which is also widely opposed elsewhere in Asia; and - not least - the growing 
disinclination and inability of the United States to play world policeman.29 The 
tremendous explosion in the use of UN peacekeepers in the world provides some 
indication of the value that is placed on the organization by its members. If we did not 
have the UN, we would have to have something else to replace it, or else fall back upon 
techniques of an older kind that have often been successful, but far too often resulted in 
stalemate, bitter misunderstanding, and devastating war. 
As a universal forum for the world, the United Nations was created, envisioned, 
and continues to be first and foremost, an instrument of negotiation and persuasion. 
Lord Halifax, acting chairman of the British delegation at San Francisco, like most 
delegates saw that Conference primarily as an experience in global negotiation, requiring 
tact, sincerity, determination, and patience. 30 The UN Charter reflected the hopes of 
a war-weary world and the realities of international power politics. The framers did not 
endow the United Nations with any of the powers of a world government or parliament 
28 Raymond A. Moore, Jr., The United Nations Reconsidered (Columbia, South 
Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1963), 22. 
29 Lee, Pagenhardt, and Stanley, 12. 
30 Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the UN Dream 
and What the U.S. Can Do About It (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1985), 
18. 
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in 1945, but rather built the organization as an international forum through which 
peaceful settlements of disputes could be encouraged. The UN was designed, therefore, 
as a framework for diplomatic operations that depended on the cooperation of its member 
governments. 31 
An essential element of the United Nations has always been its dependence on the 
support of its member nations for its legitimacy. Lacking its own territory, a central 
bank, or its own military, the UN is completely dependent upon its members for its 
survival. Dag Hammarskjold, the UN Secretary General who invented the peacekeeping 
idea in 1956, stressed that "the United Nations Charter does not endow the organization 
with any of the attributes of a super-state or of a body active outside the framework of 
decisions of its member governments. The United Nations is, rather, an instrument for 
negotiation among, and to some extent for. governments. "32 Even today, the UN is still 
principally an instrument of persuasion, acting with the consent of its parties. Although 
UN reformers want to give it coercive powers, Sir Anthony Parsons notes that the 
coercive powers of the UN have not proven to be effective: it can impose mandatory 
sanctions, but the Gulf crisis and its aftermath, and the crises in Somalia and Yugoslavia, 
confirm the skepticism of previous doubters regarding the effectiveness of this 
instrument. 33 
Another key role of the United Nations has been the importance of building 
international consensus for action. This was exemplified by the inclusion of the veto 
power of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council. The founders believed 
that a consensus of these powers would be essential to the success of any United Nations' 
31 Harold Courlander, Shaping Our Times: What the United Nations Is and Does 
(New York: Oceana, 1960), 13. 
32 Max Ascoli, "The Future of the U.N." in Raymond A. Moore, ed., The United 
Nations Reconsidered (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 
1963), 89. 
33 Anthony Parsons, "The UN and National Interests of States," in Adam Roberts 
and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., United Nations. Divided World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 119. 
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action, therefore the veto was included to ensure that any decisions by the Security 
Council would be made by consensus. Benjamin Cohen, former U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations, stated that "it was not the Charter which limited the successes of the UN 
during the Cold War, but a lack of working consensus among its member states. "34 
While it is undeniable that there is more agreement among states about 
international security issues now than there was during the Cold War, there remain 
fundamental differences between states of both interest and perception. Whether these 
differences stem from clashes between civilizations, 35 tensions between the developed 
and less developed countries, 36 or the lack of any single, overriding threat, the result 
remains the same -building consensus in the UN will be more, not less difficult in the 
post-Cold War era. These may not be enough to prevent the Security Council from 
reaching decisions on key issues, but they can frustrate efforts to tum decisions into 
actions in fast changing situations. While the UN operations in Desert Storm, Somalia, 
and Bosnia faced very real organizational, command, and logistics difficulties, the 
fundamental challenge was political, not logistical. The main challenges in all of these 
operations was building a consensus for international action that would give it 
international legitimacy. The lack of international consensus about both Somalia and 
Bosnia has greatly limited what the UN could accomplish in both of these conflicts 
because it prevented the organization from providing its peacekeeping forces with a clear 
mandate, a united international front, the will to persevere in the face of casualties. 
Although violent secessionism in Europe and Eurasia, destabilizing regional 
conflict, and proliferating weapons of mass destruction are a threat to international peace, 
members of the international community will never be equally affected by such 
34 Benjamin V. Cohen, The United Nations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1961), 30. 
35 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 
(Summer 1993): 22-48. 
36 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st 
Century (Boston. Mass.: Little, Brown and Co .. 1993). 
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phenomena. This complicates the challenge of building domestic and international 
support for collective action more problematic, but it certainly would be more difficult 
without the UN. 37 Without the single threat to galvanize support for action, the UN is 
faced with an increasingly diverse multipolar world of competing national interests, 
perceptions, and priorities which needs a common forum to settle differences peacefully. 
The growing fragmentation of the world is exacerbated by the expansion of UN sanctions 
and peacekeeping, especially in the area of humanitarian interventions like Somalia and 
Bosnia. As the difficulties in these operations have shown, it is difficult to find 
agreement among the Permanent Five for action, let alone among the rest of the world's 
nations. The inability of the U.N. to build a consensus for action despite the end of the 
Cold War deadlock should provide UN reformers with a clear indication of the real 
challenge to the United Nations - how to improve the organization's ability to build 
consensus for international action in a fragmented with religious, cultural, and regional 
(North-South) divisions. 
C. FOCUS ON LEGITIMACY 
The implications of this analysis are clear: although reorganization of the UN to 
increase its efficiency and effectiveness may be needed, it does not directly address the 
central challenge faced by ongoing and proposed operations. This thesis argues that the 
central challenge facing the United Nations today is not its inability to coordinate 
effective military action, but rather the declining legitimacy of its institutions and its 
operations, and hence, its ability to build consensus. 
While opponents of UN reform tend to ignore the significance of the United 
Nations in the world system, pro-UN reformers ignore an equally severe problem. 
Focusing on how to make the UN more militarily effective, they obscure the critical 
tradeoff between the UN' s ability to build legitimacy for an action and its ability to 
effectively command military forces in an enforcement mission. In doing so, pro-UN 
37 Peter J. Fromuth, "The Making of a Security Community: The United Nations 
After the Cold War," Journal of International Affairs (Winter 1993): 342. 
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reformers overlook a critical characteristic upon which the success of the United Nations 
depends - the support of its members. UN legitimacy is neither automatic or 
unimportant. While the United Nations may have been considered legitimate when it was 
created in 1945, the world has changed dramatically in the nearly half a century since. 
With the number of nations more than tripled and power diffused around the world, the 
Permanent Five members of the Security Council no longer possess a preponderance of 
the population, world trade and military power in the world. 
The United Nations does not exist in a historical vacuum. The history of the Cold 
War and the breakup of the colonial empires since its creation have helped shape its 
missions, perceptions, and capabilities in a way unforeseen by its founders. Although 
initially conceived as a collective security organization, the Cold War forced the 
organization to stress the other half of its Charter, becoming a forum for peaceful 
negotiation and building world consensus, and creating the peacekeeping concept. The 
legitimacy of the UN has come to be associated with its impartiality, its neutrality, and 
its ability to build consensus among states. The institution most closely associated with 
these attributes is the Secretary General. The General Assembly made it quite plain 
during the earliest days of the United Nations when it was considering the organization 
of the secretariat that the secretary-general should be looked upon as a confidant of 
governments, a man of trust and impartiality who could aid in communication and in the 
production of ideas for solving problems. 38 Since the Secretary General's institution 
does not carry with it an army or a central bank, its strength and effectiveness derive 
mainly from the lack of traditional vested interests and from credibility. Former UN 
official Giandomenico Picco points out that the key role played by the Secretary General 
in the UN successes in El Salvador, Afghanistan, Namibia, Lebanon, and Cambodia did 
38 Leon Gordenker, "The Secretary General," in James Barros, ed., The United 
Nations: Past. Present. and Future (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 117. 
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not involve the use of force, but was solely that of providing impartial mediators and a 
forum for negotiation.39 
The key drawback with attempting to give the UN strong military forces under 
the command of the Secretary General is that it would damage the impartiality of the 
institution that has proven so essential to its legitimacy. Transforming the institution of 
the Secretary General into a pale imitation of a state would have three negative 
consequences. First, it would risk ineffectiveness because of the limited tools at the 
Secretary General's disposal. Second, it would undermine the Secretary General's 
impartial negotiating role, thus depriving the international community of a further 
instrument that it sorely needs. Finally, it would forfeit the inherent strength that the 
institution of the Secretary General derives from having no traditional vested interests of 
its own. 40 
Proposals for giving the Secretary General strong military forces for enforcement 
operations therefore suffer from the same fatal flaws that have plagued attempts to make 
UN peacekeepers carry out enforcement operations. In carrying out their mandates, the 
Secretary General and peacekeepers have benefited from the legitimacy that the 
impartiality of the UN provides. 41 Lessons from the Congo (1960-64) and Beirut (1982-
83) peacekeeping operations have shown that once a peacekeeping force crosses the line 
from impartiality to offensive enforcement missions, there is no turning back. In 
carrying out an offensive use of force, UN soldiers, identified aggressors, and civilians 
might all be casualties. The authority to order killing, far from strengthening the 
institution of the Secretary General, would render it no different in the eyes of suspicious 
39 Giandomenico Picco, "The U.N. and the Use of Force," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 
5 (September-October 1994): 14. 
40 Ibid, 15. 
41 Sally Morphet, "UN Peacekeeping and Election-Monitoring," in Adam Roberts 
and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., United Nations. Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon. 
1993). 228. 
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combatants than major nation states and their alliances.42 Instead of solving the 
problem, UN peacekeepers become part of the problem if their mission changes to an 
enforcement operation. 
Efforts to increase the United Nations' ability to act efficiently and effectively in 
military operations, therefore, will come at substantial cost to its ability to build 
legitimacy, consensus, and the collective will to act and persevere. UN reforms must 
proceed from an understanding that no actions by the UN or other international bodies 
are likely to succeed over the long term unless rooted in the acceptance of the parties 
themselves, and supported by a broad political base in the world community _43 No 
reforms of the UN command or logistical structure are likely to improve the 
organization's ability to cope with conflict in the world unless they enhance the 
organization's perceived legitimacy and ability to build consensus. The United Nations 
remains a instrument of nation-states, and its success or failure depends, as always, not 
mainly on the United Nations itself, but on the degree to which sovereign nation-states 
believe that international cooperation suits their national interests. The UN is more than 
an instrument, however, because it helps foster a common view of the world among 
nation-states. The UN cannot do that as merely one more military player in the world. 
D. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
In this chapter, I have explored the UN reform debate to show that it misses the 
critical issue that will help the United Nations deal with the world of tomorrow - why 
bother with the United Nations? The importance of this is that the current reform debate 
overlooks the critical decline in the legitimacy of the UN at a point in history when the 
United Nations' legitimacy will be essential for it to successfully cope with challenging 
new problems. In Chapter II, this thesis will examine the origins of the UN to show 
42 Ibid, 18. 
43 Brian Urquhart, "The United Nations, Collective Security, and International 
Peacekeeping," in Alan K. Henrikson, ed., Negotiating World Order (Wilmington, DeJa: 
Scholarly Resources, 1984), 65. 
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how the United Nations was created to fix the problems of the world in 1945. It will 
examine the views of the founders and the missions they foresaw for the United Nations. 
Finally, this chapter will show that while the UN founders assumed that legitimacy would 
not be problematic, the small and middle powers in the world at that time had problems 
with the structure and design of the organization. Next, Chapter m will examine how 
the Cold War affected the legitimacy of the United Nations. Specifically, this section 
will explore how the legitimacy of the UN began to be challenged during this period by 
the rapid growth in states, the stalemate within the Security Council, and the Cold War 
competition. 
Building on the gradual decline of the UN during the Cold War, Chapter IV will 
then show how the new post-Cold War security problems facing the world today make 
a legitimate United Nations essential in the world today. The purpose of this chapter is 
to show that new problems such as declining state authority, ethnic/nationalist violence, 
and WMD proliferation increase the need for an international organization that is 
perceived as legitimate in the future. Chapter V will then address the key challenges to 
the legitimacy of the UN and to its ability to build legitimacy and consensus for 
international action in the world today. In this chapter, I will show how issues such as 
Security Council representation, state sovereignty, and the overextension of UN 
peacekeeping have resulted in a downward spiral in the legitimacy of the United Nations 
which must be stopped if the UN is to be able to cope in the future. Chapter VI will 
conclude with an analysis of the United Nations' strengths and weaknesses and 
recommendations for maintaining and improving UN legitimacy and its ability to build 
consensus for action in the world community. 
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D. U.N. FOUNDERS' VISION 
When the United Nations was created in 1945, its founders presumed that the new 
organization would be legitimate. While the founders recognized that the UN was 
politically problematic, they felt that the reason for needing a United Nations was 
apparent to most countries. Their desire and focus was, therefore, on maintaining the 
mechanism for cooperation between the U.S. , Great Britain, and the Soviet Union of the 
Second World War. Legitimacy was not the focus, nor was it seen as posing an 
insurmountable hurdle. The kind of international organization that was established in 
1945 was determined to a large extent by political conditions and expectations existing 
at the time the Charter was being prepared during the Second World War. 44 The 
experience of two world wars, the failure of the League of Nations to stop the second, 
and the rise to worldwide political and military prominence of the United States and the 
Soviet Union all influenced the nature and shape of the United Nations created at San 
Francisco in 1945. The United Nations' design was, therefore, strongly influenced by 
the failure of the League of Nations and was designed to fix the problems of the post-
World War II world. The founders did not foresee the problems that would face the 
world a half century later. Yet even from the start, the legitimacy of the UN structure 
and design was questioned by some of the small and middle powers who disliked the 
dominance of the organization by the Permanent Five. This chapter will examine why 
the UN was created, how it was designed to operate, what missions the framers 
envisioned for it, and the basic assumptions made by the framers about the world. 
A. FOUNDATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
The origins of the United Nations can be traced back long before the actual 
thinking about the organization began during the Second World War. The stage on 
44 Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1955), 
p. 23. 
23 
which the drafters of the UN Charter performed was a product of a long historical 
process through which human inquisitiveness, restlessness, and acquisitiveness produced 
ever increasing contacts among human settlements, across ever longer distances. The 
results of this historical process presented opportunities at San Francisco evolving out of 
growing experience in peaceful cooperation among peoples. 
Inis L. Claude considers the century bounded by the Congress of Vienna (1815) 
and the outbreak of World War I (1914) as the "era of preparation for international 
organization. "45 Claude discerns two prime sources of the League of Nations: the 
Concert of Europe and the Hague System. The balance of power system was fairly 
successful at preventing major wars in Europe for nearly a hundred years, but began to 
break down after the Austro-Prussian War (1868) and Franco-Prussian War (1870) as the 
great powers of Europe turned to competing alliance structures in an attempt to ensure 
their security. 46 The Concert of Europe was so weak by 1914 that Lord Edward Grey, 
the British Foreign Minister, was not able to convene it to head off World War I, and 
Jed to his determination and that of others to establish an international institution that 
could call together a meeting of major powers on short notice to prevent war. 47 
The First World War had a profound effect on the balance of power system 
between the great powers. The enormous casualties and economic costs of the war not 
only discredited the balance of power system as a means of preventing aggression, but 
also provided the impetus for creating a new international organization, the League of 
Nations. to help prevent future wars. Richard Falk points out that if we look back in 
time from San Francisco, we readily see that the United Nations was a child of the 
45 Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations," 
in Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., The United Nations and 
a Just World Order (San Francisco, Calif: Westview, 1986), 88. 
46 See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 137-
212. 
47 Amos Yoder, The Evolution of the UN System (New York: Taylor and Francis. 
1989). 4. 
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League of Nations.48 It incorporated important institutional developments of the 
League, such as an international secretariat and the growth in importance of economic 
and social activities. In the days before the Second World War, there were widespread 
discussions of the weaknesses of the League of Nations and of a multitude of proposed 
reforms or substitutes for it. In planning for the future, the pattern of necessity had to 
follow much the same approach, for behind all thinking on the problem of maintaining 
peace in the future was the need to avoid the errors of the past.49 
As the organization on which the United Nations was based, the League of 
Nations was important because it provided the UN founders with a model from which 
they could Jearn from its successes and failures. While the League is usually known 
today for its failure to prevent aggression in the 1930s, it was important to the 
development of the UN system for several reasons. First, and perhaps most important, 
its creation helped establish the precedent for a truly international body of nations 
working together for common goals. Second, as the first international organization 
designed for the purpose of worldwide collective security, it provided a working model 
for attempts at international organizations to build upon. Finally, the weaknesses 
exposed during the 1930s provided valuable lessons about what an international 
organization needed to be effective. 
The rise of aggressor powers and the outbreak of war in Europe and Asia in the 
1930s magnified the weaknesses that had limited the success of the League from the 
outset. From the experience of the interwar years, the drafters of the UN Charter appear 
to have concluded that the League system, as conceived and as it developed in practice, 
had shown deficiencies that needed to be remedied in the new organization. 50 The 
League had two key weaknesses which the founders of the United Nations attempted to 
48 Richard Falk, The United Nations and a Just World Order (San Francisco, Calif: 
Westview, 1986), 88. 
49 Ruth B. Russell and Jeannette Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1958), 216. 
50 Ibid, 208-212. 
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avoid when they wrote the UN Charter: the lack of universal membership and the lack 
of enforcement powers. The weakness that proved to be the League's "Achilles heel" 
from the start was the absence of the U.S., Germany, and the Soviet Union. The failure 
of the U.S. Senate to ratify the League treaty deprived the organization of its driving 
force and strongest proponent in Woodrow Wilson and of the fmancial, moral, and 
military resources of the United States. F.P. Walters, former Deputy Secretary General 
of the League, noted the effect of the loss of the U.S. on the League: 
The immediate loss in power and influence of the Council and Assembly, 
due to the absence of the United States was great. .. The indirect effects 
were no less calamitous ... Again with the United States outside the 
League, any dissatisfied member could henceforth make effective use of 
the threat to withdraw. To leave the League was not to isolate oneself, 
but to follow an illustrious example. 51 
The damage to the League of the U.S. absence was not lost on future statesmen, 
especially the founders of the United Nations. As part of the U.S. government's 
campaign to build support for the UN in the 1940s, Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
declared in July 1942 that the U.S. was at war because "we ignored the simple but 
fundamental fact that the price of peace and the preservation of right and freedom among 
nations is the acceptance of international responsibilities. "52 
Another major weakness of the League that the founders of the UN tried to 
improve upon was the lack of enforcement powers. During negotiations at Versailles 
after World War I, France had unsuccessfully pressed the United States and Great Britain 
for an international army or an automatic enforcement mechanism in case Germany 
abrogated the Versailles settlementY A key concern for President Wilson in 1919, 
however, was the constitutionality and lack of Congressional support for any type of 
international standing military force: 
51 F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University 
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A substantial objection to such a provision is that it would be void if 
contained in a treaty of the United States, as Congress under the 
Constitution had the power to declare war. A war automatically arising 
upon a condition subsequent, pursuant to a treaty provision, is not a war 
declared by Congress. 54 
The founders of the League, therefore, dealt with the same constitutional issues over the 
control of U.S. forces and their commitment into overseas wars that arose during the 
Senate UN ratification debates in 1945, and have arisen since the end of the Cold War. 
When the founders of the United Nations began examining ideas for a new international 
organization during World War II, the inability of the League to enforce its decisions was 
seen as a weakness that had to be remedied. 
B. EARLY IDEAS ON THE DESIGN OF THE UN 
Given the failure of the League to stop aggression in the 1930s, it is useful to 
examine where the sources of ideas for the UN to see the reasons behind its design. 
Probably no other major governmental policy has ever been the product of so many 
minds as the American proposals for an international organization. The sources of ideas 
for a new international organization that would avoid the mistakes of the League were 
incredibly broad, ranging from the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. 
government and the State Department, to other governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations across the U.S. and its allies. The proponents of the new organization 
were not about to repeat the political mistakes made by President Wilson in 1919. The 
earlier president had dramatically outlined a Fourteen-Point peace plan, then neglected 
to build a base of solid domestic support for it. Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull 
avoided clear-cut statements to the point of equivocation. But the administration 
successfully cultivated bipartisan political involvement in the negotiations on the UN, and 
during 1944 laid the groundwork for a public relations campaign to insure public support 
54 See Woodrow Wilson's adviser, David H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant 
vol. 1 (New York: G.P. Putnam. 1928). 49. 
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for the new organization. 55 This shift in approach by the founders of the UN reflected 
not only their perception of the lack of consultation and popular support behind the 
League idea, but also the emergence of the U.S. from its isolationism into a world power 
during World War II. 
1. President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Much of the credit for the creation of the United Nations has been given to 
Franklin Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. The combination of Hull's 
persuasive arguments for a universalist international organization and Roosevelt's 
political savvy at gaining the support of Congress and of the other Allies provided the 
key impetus to the creation of the United Nations. President Roosevelt tended to begin 
his thinking on postwar security problems with the fact - demonstrated to his satisfaction 
by recent history - that small nations under conditions of modern warfare were incapable 
of defending themselves against powerful aggressors. 56 Consequently, they might as 
well remain unarmed after the war, thus relieving their people of a heavy economic 
burden. Even after the Declaration of the United Nations was signed in Moscow by the 
U.S., the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China in January 1942,57 Roosevelt remained 
convinced that the police power for curbing aggression should reside in the hands of the 
few powerful nations. Thus, the early years of the war saw the development of his idea 
of the "Four Policemen" by which the four most powerful nations would bring about and 
guarantee global peace. 
Roosevelt's scheme of the "Four Policemen" represented a compromise between 
Churchill's traditional balance of power approach and the unconstrained W ilsonianism 
55 Thomas M. Campbell, Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy 1944-1945 
(Tallahassee, Fl: Florida State University Press, 1973), 6. 
56 Russell and Muther, 96. 
57 See Russell and Muther, p. 96; also Norman Bentwich and Andrew Martin, A 
Commentary on the United Nations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1950), p. 
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of Secretary of State Hull.58 Roosevelt wanted some form of collective security, but 
knew from the experience of the 1920s that collective security required enforcers, and 
that was to be the role of the Four Policemen. By 1942, however, Roosevelt was 
beginning to display greater interest in a more comprehensive system of international 
organization. Pearl Harbor bad shown that even the strongest powers were not immune 
to attack from a determined aggressor. The President therefore felt that disarmament of 
the proven aggressors should be accompanied by some effective system of collective 
security, in which the police action of the greater powers would in some fashion be 
brought within a broader international framework. 59 By 1944, after three years of close 
wartime cooperation with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, Roosevelt had come to 
accept Hull's concept of a more broadly based international system. 
An important issue in the wartime debate over the structure and authority of the 
new international organization was how it would enforce its wishes upon the rest of the 
world. Debates about the existence of an international force under the command of the 
UN raised the same constitutional questions in the 1940s that they had in 1919, and 
would again in the 1990s. Few politicians were willing to commit the U.S. to respond 
automatically to events around the globe, and even fewer supported the idea of an 
international force which could commit U.S. forces to conflicts without Congressional 
approval. Congress reflected the attitudes within the U.S. during World War II. 
Support for the war effort was basically that of survival and victory; there agreement 
stopped. Thomas Campbell notes that while opinion polls showed that Americans 
believed firmly in postwar cooperation with other nations, there was no agreement on 
basic strategy. 60 This division indicated a fundamental weakness in the extent of public 
commitment in the U.S. to world involvement. 
58 Kissinger, 397. 
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Congressional concerns reflected strong opposition within the United States to any 
type of world government or superstate that might infringe upon national sovereignty. 
U.S. leaders opposed such supranational institutions and felt assured that public opinion 
was also unwilling to accept any fonn of world government.61 In June 1944, Roosevelt 
responded to rumors that the new international organization would be some kind of a 
superstate, saying: 
We are not thinking of a superstate with its own police forces and other 
paraphernalia of coercive power. We are seeking effective agreement and 
arrangements through which the nations would maintain, according to 
their capacities, adequate forces to meet the needs of preventing war and 
of making impossible deliberate preparation for war, and to have such 
forces available for joint action when necessary. 62 
The founders of the UN, therefore, envisioned not a world organization with its own 
police forces, but rather, that the major powers of the world would provide the forces 
necessary to respond to aggression. This idea was based on the model of joint 
cooperation between the allies during the Second World War. 
2. Winston Churchill 
The approach of Great Britain's Prime Minister, Winston Churchill to the 
question of a postwar world order was shaped by Britain's historical experience and by 
the devastation that country had undergone as the sole European power opposing 
Gennany after the fall of France in June 1940. For centuries, Great Britain had helped 
to maintain a balance of power in Europe, always seeking to prevent any single state 
from dominating the continent. For Churchill war strategy and foreign policy were 
closely linked. He therefore favored reconstructing the balance of power in Europe after 
the war, rebuilding Britain, France. and even a defeated Gennany, in order to 
counterbalance the Soviet colossus to the east. 63 
61 Russell and Muther, 207. 
62 U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 10 (June 1944), 552-53. 
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When consulted about ideas for a new international organization, Churchill tended 
to support regional solutions to the world problems as opposed to global solutions. 
Churchill stressed the regional principle because the League of Nations had demonstrated 
that "it was only the countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute who 
could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigor to secure a settlement. "64 
Churchill originally envisaged a world council of the United States, Great Britain, and 
the Soviet Union to which three regional councils for Europe, the Orient, and the 
Western Hemisphere would be subordinated. Roosevelt initially accepted Churchill's 
plan, though he wanted to add China to the world council, while Hull strongly opposed 
against the proposal, since it contradicted his preference for a universal security 
organization. 65 Eventually, Britain's dependence on the U.S. militarily and 
economically and Roosevelt's persuasiveness influenced Churchill to accede to Hull's 
ideas about a more universal international organization. 
3. Joseph Stalin 
A study of the approaches to foreign policy and international security of Joseph 
Stalin and Franklin Roosevelt reveals both contrasts and similarities. Whereas Roosevelt 
assumed the possibility of harmony in the world and sought to implement a Wilsonian 
concept of collective security, Stalin's ideas of foreign policy were a product of the 
bloody Communist Revolution and civil war in Russia, and the traditional Russian desire 
for a security buffer zone. Henry Kissinger notes that "Stalin defined the requirements 
of peace in the same way that Russian statesmen had for centuries - as the widest 
possible security belt around the Soviet Union's vast periphery. "66 
64 Winston Churchill, Hinge of Fate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), 807. 
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The Soviet leaders, by their willingness to discuss and assume commitments with 
respect to the handling of postwar political issues in the Declaration of the United 
Nations, and the conferences in Moscow (October 1943r, Tehran (November 1943)68 , 
and Dumbarton Oaks gave some support to the idea that postwar unity of the victorious 
powers was an assumption on which the future peace might with some confidence be 
organized. Although Stalin's views of the United Nations were influenced by his 
negative perception of the League of Nations, he was willing to agree to the 
establishment of the organization since the Soviet Union would be able to protect its 
interests as a permanent member of the Security Council. The Soviet views were 
captured welJ by Foreign Minister Molotov at the San Francisco Conference to create the 
United Nations, where he stressed the effective authority of the international organization 
rather than its responsibility. He dwelt on the incapacity of the League of Nations to 
prevent World War II, and on the need for giving the new organization adequate military 
force that could be used promptly against an aggressor. 69 Stalin therefore viewed the 
United Nations much as Roosevelt had initially - as a concert of great powers in the 
Security Council who would police the world against aggression. Where Stalin and 
Roosevelt differed were in their motivations. Roosevelt sought to prevent war and 
aggression, while Stalin sought security for the Soviet Union first and foremost. 
4. Cordell Hull, the State Department, and Congress 
Taken as a whole, the Roosevelt administration's preparation for a strong U.S. 
postwar role was impressive and thorough. According to most historians, much of the 
credit belongs to the leadership of Cordell Hull, the U.S. Secretary of State during most 
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of the war, and the State Department. 70 Hull was an internationalist who viewed the 
failure of the League of Nations not as a weakness in concept, but the result of the U.S. 
ignoring "the simple but fundamental fact that the price of peace and of the preservation 
of right and freedom among nations is the acceptance of international responsibilities. "71 
Cordell Hull's vision of the United Nations was based on the economic and military 
predominance of the United States. The image of the United States at the apex of the 
global hierarchy of power was much more deeply anchored in the mind of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. For him the United States was unequivocally an instrument of the U.S. 
policy to build up a preferred world order. 72 The principal contribution of Hull to the 
origins of the United Nations was his ability to convert Roosevelt from his initial support 
for his "Four Policemen" idea to a more universalist idea. 
With Hun as the driving force, the State Department led the way within the U.S. 
government in its study of ideas and options for a postwar international organization. 
The State Department also brought in experts from around the country and from the 
government, including opening a dialogue with Congress to broaden support for the new 
organization. In January 1943, Hun announced the formation of an Advisory Committee 
to develop a complete program based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter.73 Its 
membership included officials of the Department of State and other executive 
departments, members of Congress, and a number of expert individuals. In addition to 
the Advisory Committee, Hun worked with Senator Thomas Connally (D-Texas), 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to build bipartisan support for a 
UN plan. Connally formed a "Committee of Eight" senators which raised and dealt with 
several key congressional concerns that might have derailed the UN plan, including 
concerns over the enforcement power of the new organization. After extensive debate 
7
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in the committee and Congress, the committee stated a preference for military contingents 
coming from national forces, rather than a standing UN force.
74 The tremendous 
Congressional concerns about the enforcement powers of the new organization reveals 
their presumption that the UN would be legitimate. 
5. Dumbarton Oaks Conference - August 1944 
The ideas which formed the basis for the United Nations were fmally formalized 
at a conference between the U.S., Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China held at 
Dumbarton Oaks, near Washington D.C., between August 21 and October 7, 1944. The 
primary security issues to be resolved at Dumbarton Oaks were the structure of the new 
organization and the question of enforcement powers. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposal 
which came out of the conference was a tentative charter for an international security 
organization. 75 
With the experience of both World Wars and the failed League on their minds, 
the representatives at Dumbarton Oaks were much more concerned with security issues 
than the League Covenant had been. Under the Covenant, the Assembly and the Council 
of the League had each been competent to deal with any matter within the sphere of 
action of the Organization. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals advocated a radical change. 
The Security Council was to carry "primary responsibility" for the maintenance of peace 
and security, and the functions of the General Assembly were, in that sphere, to be 
reduced to discussion and, within certain limits, to recommendations.
76 Those who 
worked on the Dumbarton Oaks document and those who worked on the same subject 
at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco in April 1945 were very definitely of 
the opinion that experience had shown that it was well to separate the functions of the 
Council and the Assembly. While the Security Council's function would be that of 
74 Edward Stettinius, DO Diary, 29 August 1944. 
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maintaining peace and security, the General Assembly would have the equally important 
function of creating conditions which would be conducive to the maintenance of peaceful 
relations among nations, which would make for stability, friendship, and good 
neighborliness. 77 
It was in the area of enforcement powers that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 
reflected the attempt by the allies to continue their wartime alliance structure and success. 
The British proposed a Military Staff Committee composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the 
five permanent members of the Security Council. This staff would be a continuation of 
the Allied agency, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which had proven so effective in the 
waging of World War II. 78 
The provisions for the use of force by the United Nations organization represented 
a compromise between the views of those who insisted that a nation should use its armed 
forces only to protect itself, and those who urged that all national armed forces should 
be used only by an international organization for the protection of any nation that is a 
victim of aggression. This topic was discussed at length, the U.S. holding the position 
that there should not be any standing armed forces belonging to the United Nations, but 
that countries would make forces available to the Security Council should the need arise. 
The Soviets proposed a standing air force to respond to threats to peace, but U.S. 
constitutional concerns and allied concerns over the effectiveness of air power for 
deterrence raised opposition to this proposal. Under the Dumbarton Oaks arrangement, 
then, every nation would retain control of its armed forces, but would sign agreements 
by which they would undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call, 
specified armed forces, facilities, and assistance. 79 It was determined to leave 
77 Leland M. Goodrich, "The U.N. Security Council," in James Barros, ed., The 
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negotiation of specific forces for a later time. In practice, the proposals called for an 
arrangement similar to the pattern of military cooperation worked by the allies during the 
war. 
C. WHAT MISSIONS WERE ENVISIONED FOR THE UNITED NATIONS? 
The United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) was held 
in San Francisco from April 15 to June 26, 1945, by 50 nations which had declared war 
on Germany or Japan, or both, and had signed the Declaration on the United Nations. 
They met to draft a UN Charter on the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals of 
October 9, 1944. This conference had a two-fold character. First, it was a gathering 
of technical experts whose task was to draft the constitution of a world organization. At 
the same time, it was a meeting of political leaders of countries in five continents whose 
thoughts, especially after V-E Day (Victory in Europe) were inevitably focused on the 
problems of the approaching peace settlement. 80 The most encouraging aspect of the 
conference was that, in spite of profound divergences among fifty nations differing 
widely in historical development, political traditions, and economic and social systems, 
it proved possible after nine weeks of intensive work to reach agreement on a Charter 
of ~he United Nations organization. 
1. Principal Missions of the UN 
When the United Nations set about its task, the basic purpose of the organization, 
as described in the first paragraph of Chapter I, was to "maintain international peace and 
security. "81 That was what it was for. That is why the Security Council was to consist 
of the great powers at the time, acting then in free alliance with each other. The Earl 
of Home pointed out that the Security Council was to be the cabinet of the world, 
80 Ibid, 53. 
81 See Russell and Muther. Appendix A. 
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preserving peace and security. 82 The Charter prescribed two principal approaches to 
the achievement of this purpose: collective measures for preventing or removing threats 
to the peace and suppressing acts of aggression and breaches of the peace; and adjustment 
or settlement of international disputes or situations by peaceful means. 83 It is important 
to the current UN reform debates that the intent of the founders is clear. 
One of the most critical questions is "what type of aggression did the founders 
envision the organization suppressing?" Although the Charter did specify that only 
international aggression would be responded to, an examination of the historical 
conditions that shaped the United Nations and the type of wars with which the founders 
had experienced, gives ample evidence that the founders assumed that threats to peace 
would be international - i.e. state versus state. This thinking was a product of the state-
based system which had dominated world politics since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, 
and the interstate violence that had produced two world wars in the first half of the 
twentieth century. With no recent experience of internal civil wars, a small number of 
states, and military power held by a small number of states, it is understandable why 
internal conflicts were not envisioned by the founders. 
Further evidence of this focus on preventing international wars and not internal 
ones can be found in the Charter's stricture against the UN intervening in the internal 
affairs of member nations stated in Article 2, paragraph 7. Of all the controversies 
concerning Charter interpretation, the most persistent has been that surrounding the effect 
of this section of the Charter: 
Nothing contained in this present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
82 The Earl of Home, "The United Nations," in Raymond A. Moore, Jr., ed., The 
United Nations Reconsidered (Charlottesville, South Carolina: University of South 
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matters to settlement under the Charter, but his principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 84 
This provision, which sought to protect the sovereignty of nation-states against 
interference from the international organization, was clearly aimed at the domestic 
audiences of the member states, especially the United States. With the failure of the 
U.S. Senate to ratify the League of Nations Treaty in 1919 present in the minds of the 
founders, they attempted to forestall any possible domestic opposition to the Treaty on 
constitutional grounds. The founders' thoughts concerning intrastate affairs were 
reflected by French President Charles DeGaulle who stated that "as for the Charter, it 
was designed to prevent the Organization from interfering in the affairs of each State and 
it could intervene only on the explicit request of a government. "85 Since recent history 
indicated that threats to peace tended to be across international borders and nations were 
sensitive about their sovereignty, the founders focused on curbing "international" 
aggression, explicitly avoiding "internal" affairs as too politically sensitive in 1945. In 
1961. former U.S Ambassador to the United Nations, Benjamin Cohen, warned that "like 
the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter 
in effect affirms that the authority of the United Nations does not extend, and should not 
be construed to extend, beyond the powers enumerated in the Charter. "86 
The core of the Charter was the section that gave the new organization 
enforcement power - Chapter VII. When the Charter was written, it was the promised 
effectiveness of the new organization in maintaining international peace and security, in 
contrast to the discredited League of Nations, which was made a principal argument in 
its support and lent it international legitimacy. It was emphasized that the United 
Nations, by virtue of its power to take collective military measures, if necessary, to 
84 See U.N. Charter in Russell and Muther, Appendix A. 
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enforce its will, had a capacity for effective action which the League had lacked. 87 The 
means by which the UN would enforce its wishes was to be through the mobilizing of 
collective forces from national armies. Although there has been debate over whether the 
founders actually meant to create a collective security system in 1945, Inis Claude points 
out that "in its restriction of the right of states to resort to force, its espousal of the 
principal of collective action to repress illegal violence, and its provision for an organ 
to preside over the arrangements pertaining to the use of force, the UN scheme exhibits 
some of the essential characteristics of a collective security system. "88 The Charter 
established an organization through which sovereign states could voluntarily cooperate, 
with a view to harmonizing their ideas and uniting their strength to achieve common 
ends. The United Nations was based, therefore, on a belief that the a community of 
nations with common values and goals did, in fact, exist. 
For international enforcement of peace, it was readily agreed that all states, great 
and small alike, would have to accept the premise that a threat or act of aggression 
anywhere in the world was a concern to all nations. If the collective system was to 
work, they would also have to accept as binding the decisions of the organization in 
enforcement matters. It was recognized that, in practice, the great powers would not put 
their armed forces at the disposal of any organization for enforcement purposes unless 
they retained a controlling voice in the employment of those forces. 89 The central issue, 
then, was to not only provide a means whereby the decision to use force could be made 
by the great powers, but also to ensure that the United Nations was perceived as 
legitimate by both the nations needed to provide forces and by those nations upon which 
UN resolutions would be enacted. 
The issue of the nature of the armed forces to be used by the UN in enforcing its 
decisions was not a simple one to solve. By 1943, it had been assumed that if the 
87 Goodrich, 16. 
88 Claude, 151. 
89 Russell and Muther, 228. 
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organization was to be capable of maintaining the peace, the availability of armed forces 
was of paramount importance. Proposals for dealing with the problem of making armed 
forces available to the United Nations, therefore, began early in the war. According to 
historian Ruth Russell, three possible ways in which forces could be made available to 
the Council were examined by the founders: 
1. by an ad hoc coalition of national forces, 
2. by a system of national contingents placed at the disposal of the 
international organization, or 
3. by the creation of a permanent, internationalized force. 90 
A close study was especially made of the third possibility. It was re-explored by the 
Department of State officials in terms of the possibility of establishing an international 
air force, which was initially judged to be less difficult to organize and more acceptable 
politically than internationalized land and sea forces. As the war progressed, however, 
the indiscriminately destructive nature of air bombardment caused some second thoughts 
about its appropriateness for policing purposes. Eventually, the Big Three agreed upon 
the national contingents proposal as the most politically acceptable compromise between 
the military effectiveness of coalition forces and the independence of an international 
forces. 91 
The Charter plan outlined in Chapter VII, Article 43, 92 reflected the acceptance 
of the national contingent idea for making forces available to the Council. It directed the 
Council as soon as possible to negotiate agreements by which member states were to 
make available to the Security Council armed forces, assistance and facilities, including 
rights of passage. These agreements were to determine the amount of forces, their level 
of readiness, and the type of facilities and assistance that would be made available to the 
United Nations. The founders also attempted to establish a Military Staff Committee 
90 Russell and Muther, 235. 
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with Article 4 7 based on the successful Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff concept during 
World War II. Again, the legitimacy of the UN was presumed by the founders and the 
statesmen of the U.S., the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China who were negotiating 
the details for the new organization. 
The second approach to the UN mission of preserving peace, that of mitigating 
or resolving disputes by peaceful means, has often been overlooked in discussions about 
reforming the United Nations. The enforcement measures mentioned above were seen 
by the founders as a last resort after attempts at peaceful resolution of disputes had 
failed. Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping, 
pointed out that "it is now seldom recalled that the original Charter idea was that the 
collective security system of the UN would provide the sense of security and mutual 
confidence which would allow disarmament and arms control to proceed under the 
auspices of the Security Council. "93 Peace was not envisioned as being dependent upon 
the use of force, so much as on the potential for international forces which could be 
called upon by the UN. Peace was not to be merely enforced, but was to depend on the 
ability of the UN to foster close relations between nations, resolve disputes peacefully, 
and in the last resort, to be able to guarantee the security of nations around the world 
using great power forces. If it failed at these tasks, the ability of the UN to maintain 
peace and security would be greatly decreased. 
2. Legitimacy of the UN Structure 
The widespread desire to give the new world organization effective power to 
maintain peace was evident in the readiness of the governments at San Francisco to 
accept the core of the security system embodied in the Dum barton Oaks Proposals. Its 
main structure was adopted almost without debate. There would be a small and selective 
Security Council, the core of which would be the coalition of victorious great powers 
from World War II. In the Council, the major powers were conceded a preferential 
93 Brian Urquhart, "The Role of the UN in Maintaining and Improving International 
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position in return for their burden of special responsibilities.94 Understandably, the 
Security Council reflected the balance of power that existed at the end of World War II, 
with the three victorious allies who had designed the UN, the U.S. , Great Britain, and 
the Soviet Union, along with China, being given special privileges as permanent 
members of the Council, with France being added at San Francisco. The adoption of 
these provisions at San Francisco marked a return to the nineteenth century idea of the 
"Concert of Great Powers," with an important modification. Under the Charter, the 
"concert" was to function within a larger association of states and with the smaller states 
having clearly defmed rights and responsibilities. 95 
Although the basic structure of the UN was accepted at San Francisco, this did 
not mean that all aspects of the new organization were unanimously supported by the rest 
of the nations attending. From the start of the UN at San Francisco, there was tension 
between the developed industrial countries of the North and the lesser developed 
countries of the South. Despite accordance in principle, the small and middle states, who 
felt they had been unfairly excluded from the negotiations at Dumbarton Oaks, showed 
considerable dissatisfaction with the precise terms of the Proposals, and attempted to 
modify them in various ways intended to diminish the controlling power of the Security 
Council. The most serious indirect attempts to diminish the authority of the Security 
Council sought to break down the basic differentiation between it and the General 
Assembly, and the special position of the permanent members in the Council. This was 
such a fundamental part of the proposed plan, however, that the major powers were not 
prepared to accept any substantive alterations in the primary role of the Council. 96 Only 
the advent of World War II made it possible to get the United Nations Charter approved 
at the end of the war. The United Nations began its history, therefore, with less than 
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unanimous support for the legitimacy of its fundamental structure and premise - that the 
dominant great powers on the Security Council should police the world. 
The General Assembly, on the other hand, was designed to be a world forum 
containing all countries. In the circumstances, its one nation-one vote formula produced 
little relationship between calls for action and the responsibility and capacity to act, nor 
was it intended that it should. The General Assembly was supposed to serve primarily 
for the expression of the opinions and conscience of the nations of the world, where all 
could be heard, even if they could not act.97 The Charter did not give the General 
Assembly or the Secretary General any enforcement powers, since the founders sought 
to link the decision to enforce UN resolutions with the power to act found in the Security 
Council. 
3. Security Council Veto 
The wisdom of the Security Council veto power of the permanent five members 
has been the topic of debates since the creation of the United Nations. The Charter 
provision that the Council must operate on the basis of unanimity of its Permanent 
Members, however, was not the product of impractical idealism. The memoirs of some 
of those who helped frame the Charter confirm that they knew what they were doing. 
The provision reflects the highly realistic belief that UN action would not be possible if 
one of the great powers seriously dissented from it.98 The veto, therefore, grew out of 
two realistic assumptions. First, peace depends on the unanimity of those who have the 
power to wage modem war; and second, those who have the power to wage modem war 
will not agree to create an organization with the power to coerce them.99 Thus, from 
97 Bourke B. Hickenlooper and Mike Mansfield, "Observations on Changes Within 
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its inception the veto was believed to be a positive thing by the framers. With the bulk 
of the military power in the world resting in the permanent five, the veto was seen as 
simply reflecting the realities of the world. 
Another consideration behind the support for the veto by the U.S. was the 
overriding importance of producing a Charter treaty that would be ratified by the U.S. 
Congress. Henry Cabot Lodge recalled that "it must be remembered that it was the 
United States which insisted on the existence of the veto power so as to make certain that 
American forces could not be ordered into action against the will of the United States 
government. "100 The veto therefore reflected strong concerns in Congress over the 
control of U.S. forces and the Congressional prerogative over declaring war. The 
founders of the UN did not overlook the potential use of the veto, but rather, based their 
support for it on domestic considerations and the hope for postwar great power unity. 
Although the Soviet use of the veto was seen as crippling the UN during the Cold 
War, it was actually used as the founders knew it might be - to protect the interests of 
one of the great powers. lnis Claude notes that during the San Francisco Conference, 
the U.S. delegation declared that "the veto rule means that if a major power becomes an 
aggressor, the Council has no power to prevent war. "101 The key prescription of the 
Charter for dealing with the potential crises of greatest international importance - those 
involving antagonism or aggression by one of the permanent five powers - was placed 
in Article 51, which recognized the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense 
in response to an armed attack. 102 The problem with the United Nations from the start, 
therefore, was that its legitimacy was presumed by the great powers, but questioned by 
the smaller countries who felt compelled to provide for their own defenses since the UN 
was seen as unable to protect them. Although the roots of the current decline in UN 
100 Henry Cabot Lodge, "The United Nations: Its Founding, Its Performance, and 
Its Future," in E. Berkeley Tompkins, ed., (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 
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legitimacy can be traced to the United Nation's beginnings, the UN did prove that it 
could adapt to solve some problems during the Cold War. 
45 
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m. EFFECTS OF THE COLD WAR ON UN LEGITIMACY 
When ties are loose between presumed influence and actual influence, 
between decision and responsibility between word and deed, respect will 
wane. In the end nations wholesale - as some are already doing - may 
well ignore the decisions of the United Nations, not only in regard to 
financial contributions but over the whole range of international problems 
and conflicts on which the United Nations might be expected to bring a 
constructive influence. And in the end, whatever real capacity the 
organization still possesses to move the flow of events toward peace and 
justice may well disappear. 
Senator Mike Mansfield (1963)103 
Debates about the legitimacy of the United Nations are not a new phenomena. 
The above quote by Senator Mansfield is indicative of the debate over the United Nations 
and its role in the world which occurred over the controversial UN peacekeeping 
operation in the Congo (1960-64). Those debates focused on the shift in power from a 
stalemated Security Council to the General Assembly, the attempts by the Secretary 
General to use peacekeepers in a civil war (an early example of peace-enforcement), and 
the dramatic change that had occurred in the membership of the General Assembly. 
What these debates revealed was a noticeable decline in the legitimacy of the United 
Nations, and the dangers to this legitimacy of attempting to make the UN carry out 
missions for which it was ill-prepared and lacking of support. Thus, in 1963 there were 
already questions about the legitimacy of the UN unforeseen by the founders. This raises 
the question "How did the changes in the world and United Nations during the Cold War 
affect the United Nations' legitimacy? 
103 Mike Mansfield, "Speech to the U.S. Senate on the UN bond issue," in Raymond 
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A. CHANGES IN THE OPERATION AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE UN 
1. Stalemate in the Security Council 
The alliance relationship established between the great powers during the Second 
World War continued, though with frictions, until 1947. In 1946-47, both the Iranian 
issue and the Greek civil war, which became the catalyst to the Truman doctrine, were 
debated in the Security Council. The United Nations was thus a relevant organization 
during this period, and could in fact act successfully in crises connected with the early 
process of decolonization. In 1947 both the U.S. and the Soviet Union issued their own 
versions on the division of the world into two camps and on the containment of 
expansion by the other side (the Truman Doctrine and the speech by Zhdanov in the 
meeting to establish the Cominform. 104 Thus ended the brief period of great power 
cooperation that the UN founders had hoped would sustain the organization. 
The Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent Soviet use of their Security Council veto began the erosion in the Council's 
legitimacy around the world. In the early postwar years, the Soviet Union set the 
patterns of behavior and procedure which brought the UN into disrepute and disuse 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Senator Mansfield noted that because of Soviet 
intransigence, "the Security Council became, not an instrument for the solution of 
situations of international tension, not for the possible reconciliation of great power 
disputes, but rather a center for exacerbating them. 105 The resulting stalemate in the 
Council had two negative effects on its legitimacy. First, the use of the veto reinforced 
and validated concerns by the smaller states that the great powers would use the veto to 
merely protect their own interests, thus eroding the Council's credibility as an 
international body. Second, the stalemate in the Council resulted in a reputation for 
inaction in the face of aggression, encouraging countries to play one superpower off 
against the other and destroying the credibility of the UN as a deterrent or shield against 
104 Vayrynen, 227. 
105 Mansfield. 114. 
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aggression. In the Hyderabad case in the 1950s, India successfully prevented UN 
intervention by playing off the superpowers against each other. In the end, Washington 
and London were more concerned with preventing a pro-Moscow "tilt" by India than 
with implementing the Charter's prohibition on the use of force. 106 
The Council's failure to prevent aggression also greatly weakened the United 
Nation's restriction on the use of force, thereby encouraging countries to provide for 
their own self-defense by building up their militaries and discouraging the use of the UN 
to settle disputes. Thomas Franck argues that no principle is as fundamental to the 
system predicated on the UN Charter as the prohibition on the use of force by one state 
against another (Article 2(4)). One measure of the United Nations' success or failure, 
Franck notes, is the extent to which a majority of its members have upheld these 
principles. 107 When fighting broke out between India and Pakistan on 29 November 
1971, the Secretary General urgently asked the Council to give serious consideration to 
the steps it might take. Not until six days later, well after the surrender of the Pakistani 
army in the eastern province, did the Soviet Union permit the Council to pass a 
resolution. 108 That performance must have shattered whatever hopeful illusions were 
still cherished by small- and middle-sized states -that the United Nations could guarantee 
their safety, either by imposing pacific settlement procedures at an early stage of a 
dispute or by providing collective security once the dispute had ripened into an armed 
attack. By 1978, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim voiced in public the shortcomings 
of the organization, in particular "its failure to enforce its decisions ... the practical result 
has been that some small States no longer tum to the United Nations as the protector of 
their sovereign rights. "109 He acknowledged a lack of confidence in the Security 
Council's "wisdom, objectivity, and capacity for even-handed action." From its 
106 Franck, 51. 
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beginnings, then, the UN created expectations that it was not matched to. During the 
period of the Cold War, therefore, the nations of the world were back almost to where 
they were in 1939. Since the UN was unable to provide the collective security promised 
in its Charter, nations turned to their own security through military buildups and 
alliances. Thus, countries learned to think of the UN in a limited way, and discounted 
its security role. Such perceptions of the UN have carried over into the post-Cold War 
era, setting up the problems that the world is faced with today. 
In addition to encouraging nations to ann in self-defense, thereby dooming any 
disannament efforts, the Security Council stalemate also led to moves within the United 
Nations to sidestep the Council in order to allow the UN to respond to aggression. An 
important development in the UN was sparked by the Korean War, to which the Security 
Council, in the absence of the Soviet Union (which had walked out), decided on 25 June 
1950 to send UN forces. Although the United Nations was important to the resolution 
of the Korean conflict only in a limited sense, since the U.S. commanded the operation 
and supplied the majority of the forces, the conflict was very important to the United 
Nations. The crisis eventually prompted a significant shift in responsibility from the 
Security Council to the General Assembly. Following the return of the Soviet 
representative to the Security Council in August 1950 after an absence of six months and 
the consequent blocking of further action by the Council, the Assembly took an important 
step in November 1950 by approving the U.S.-inspired "Uniting for Peace" resolution 
or Acheson Plan. Under this resolution, questions pertaining to international peace and 
security could be transferred by procedural vote to the General Assembly if the Security 
Council was stalemated by a veto, and the General Assembly could then recommend 
collective measures, including the use of force against an aggressor.
110 
In practice, the collective measures envisaged in the Uniting for Peace Resolution 
have never been invoked, though other provisions of the resolution contributed to the 
General Assembly's handling of the Suez crisis in 1956, the Hungarian crisis in the same 
year. the Lebanese crisis in 1958, and the Congo in 1960. Only parts of the resolution 
110 Goodrich. 57. 
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were in reality observed, for example, those concerning the transfer of a security issue 
to the General Assembly and the capacity to convene it for emergency sessions.lll The 
Uniting for Peace Resolution, therefore, produced two important developments. The first 
was to provide the General Assembly and the Secretary General with a legal tool to get 
around the stalemated Security Council, thereby inducing a shift in power and influence 
from the Council to the General Assembly. The second contribution was that it led to 
the creation by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in 1956 of "UN peacekeeping 
forces," under the command of the Secretary General, as another way of getting around 
the Security Council. The result was a mismatch by the early 1960s between the calls 
for action by the General Assembly and the responsibility to act which was supposed to 
lie with the Security Council. This mismatch between decision to act by the General 
Assembly and the responsibility to act in the Security Council was one of the principle 
issues in the UN reform debates of the early 1960s. 
In the development of the United Nations, the period from 1964 to 1974 was an 
era of transition. The veto in the Security Council was still used by the Soviet Union, 
but to an increasing degree by the United States, Great Britain, and France, as the 
General Assembly became dominated by newly independent states. The world 
organization became involved in more conflicts than in any previous period, but its rate 
of success remained low. One reason for this, according to Raimo Vayrynen, was that 
the Third World countries were not prepared to resort to collective measures to deter, 
manage, or settle their mutual confrontations. 112 Part of the reason for this lay in the 
damage done to the credibility of the Council during the 1950s, but another reason lay 
in the changing character of the General Assembly with its explosion of new states. This 
will be discussed below. Although the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to 
shift power back to the Security Council in the 1960s, the damage to the legitimacy of 
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the Council and the collective security credibility of the UN had already been done. The 
key benefactor of this shift of influence from the Security Council to the General 
Assembly was the Secretary General. 
2. Increase in the Role of the Secretary General 
During its nearly half century of activity, the position of the Secretary General 
has developed far beyond what was envisaged at San Francisco in 1945. Under the 
Charter and especially under Article 99, the Secretary General is given the opportunity 
for public initiatives which his predecessors in the League lacked. If the Secretary 
General of the United Nations is active behind the scenes and in public, this is due not 
so much to the added constitutional power that he has under the Charter as to the 
political configuration of the world since 1945. The political division of the world 
during the Cold War and the growth of bipolarity, as well as the emergence of the Afro-
Asian or nonaligned world, has led to a greater delegation of authority and power to the 
Secretary General by the constituent organs of the United Nations. 
The Cold War deadlock helped push the Secretary General into prominence 
because the UN as a way to sidestep the Council to get things done and because the use 
of the veto within the Security Council weakened its claim of impartiality. Two de facto 
missions assumed by early Secretary Generals were conflict mediation and peacekeeping. 
Over the past fifty years, the Secretary General has been more successful, and certainly 
more active, than the Security Council in efforts to resolve conflicts and deter 
aggression. This role is largely self-determined. Thomas Franck points out that the 
Charter does not endow his office with authority to be a global mediator and 
troubleshooter, although various incumbents have claimed that these functions are his by 
implication. 113 The Secretary General's role as a global mediator remains useful when 
a dispute threatens to disrupt peaceful relations among nations. The function of world 
mediator and fact-finder has become so important a part of the office that every 
incumbent has given it top priority. 
113 Franck. 117. 
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The second de facto mission assumed by the Secretary General has been control 
of peacekeeping forces. Brian Urquhart, former UN Undersecretary General for 
Peacekeeping, recounted that "the technique of Peacekeeping is a distinctive innovation 
by the United Nations. The Charter does not mention it. It was discovered, like 
penicillin. We came across it, while looking for something else, during an investigation 
of the guerrilla fighting in northern Greece in 1947. "114 The first deployment of UN 
Peacekeepers was during the Suez crisis of 1956. After the Anglo-French-Israeli 
invasion of the Suez in October 1956, an emergency special session of the General 
Assembly invited Dag Hammarskjold "to submit within forty-eight hours a plan for the 
setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international U.N. 
force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. "115 This resolution has been 
described as "a crucial turning point for the United Nations, "116 but was in reality more 
a triumph for the Secretary General. Hammarskjold created a large military force - the 
UN Emergency Force (UNEF) - whose command was under his supervision. The 
Charter makes no provision for any such functions, least of all ones authorized by the 
General Assembly and executed by the Secretary General. 117 Success invites 
replication, and since the success of UNEF, the UN has authorized thirty-three 
peacekeeping missions, some successful and some not. The importance of peacekeeping 
is that peacekeeping was created as a result of the inability of the great powers to come 
to a consensus and the need for a neutral. impartial force to separate two competing 
forces. Since peacekeepers were created by the General Assembly, they rely on the 
support of nation-states for their legitimacy. 
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As Secretary Generals have engaged in more and more successful mediations, 
their hoard of effectiveness has increased, which in tum, has increased the demand for 
their services. As Thomas Franck points out, "this can invoke Parkinson's Law, as the 
Secretary General's role expands beyond its functionally optimal limits. The office of 
Secretary General has become the black box of the United Nations, into which, for lack 
of agreement on any particular course of action, the members deposit their most pressing 
and intractable problems, in the hope that, through the operation of some ineffable but 
ineluctable process, a solution will emerge. "118 Combined with a zealous acceptance 
of difficult tasks by Secretary Generals, this has resulted in the current situation where 
the UN, under the leadership of the Secretary General, has become a catch-all for any 
problems that arise in the world. The danger is that in the end, as Senator Mansfield 
asserted, "nations may well ignore the decisions of the United Nations" if the UN 
attempts to do too much. 
3. Change in Size and Character of General Assembly 
Another factor influencing the development of the Security Council's role and the 
legitimacy of the UN has been the change in character of the General Assembly with the 
rapid increase in membership starting in 1955, including changes in geographical 
distribution of membership and the nature of the interests and attitudes of the new 
members. The organization started with a membership of fifty-one, predominantly 
Western and primarily concerned with issues of war and peace following the Second 
World War. Once the membership deadlock was broken in 1955, a major influx of new 
members occurred, mostly from Asia and Africa. Increasingly, the membership came 
to be dominated by new states with different backgrounds and concerns than those of the 
original members. These newly independent states had less in common with each other 
and with the original members. Under the impact of the membership explosion, which 
tripled the membership by the end of the 1960s, questions of decolonization, economic 
118 Ibid. 134. 
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development of the underdeveloped territories, and elimination of racial discrimination 
came to be the principal concerns of the organization. 119 
As these new members quickly became the majority within the General Assembly, 
that body shifted from supporting U.S. and Western positions towards pursuing 
developing world interests. The rapid explosion in the number of nation states 
strengthened their belief in the principle of sovereign equality of nation-states, while 
producing in them a different view than that of the founding members of what the UN 
missions should be. Leland Goodrich points out that the Asian and African members 
have emphasized the role of the United Nations as an instrument of political, social, and 
economic development and change. They are not as inclined as much as the West to 
stress the role of the United Nations in guaranteeing the status quo against violent 
change. 120 Depending on their different historical experiences, some states view 
colonial domination and imperialism as the most serious problems in international 
relations; others see civil war as the most dangerous threat to international security .121 
The change in expectations for the UN and the growing North-South split in the UN was 
exemplified by the Non-Aligned Movement led by India and Indonesia which proclaimed 
devotion to what was loosely called pacifist neutralism. 122 The explosion in the number 
of new members of the General Assembly, therefore, produced a UN dominated by a 
large majority of newly independent states who opposed the status quo, and saw the 
United Nations' role as redistributing world wealth, helping developing countries, and 
not so much the prevention of war. 
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This influx of new UN members has resulted in a crisis of authority bet
ween the 
developing countries and the UN system. Lacking an understanding 
of and a shared 
belief in the UN as a collective security system, these new states h
ave based their 
acceptance of the United Nations and the international system on wheth
er it meets their 
economic and political goals and interests. The combination of a much
 larger General 
Assembly and a stronger Secretary General produced much greater exp
ectations among 
developing nations of a voice in world affairs. Unfortunately,
 not only did 
· decolonization result in the proliferation of actors in the state-centric 
world, but it also 
infused a greater rigidity in the hierarchy of the state-centric worl
d. The newly 
established states of the Third World acquired sovereignty and internati
onal recognition 
even though they lacked the internal resources and consensual foundation
s to provide for 
their own development. This led the states themselves into a deep resen
tment over their 
dependence on the industrialized world. 
123 
Today's international system is dominated by the industrialized world, c
onsisting 
of about 30 countries. Thus, the developing world nations which make 
up a majority in 
the General Assembly, have tried to use their voting power to challeng
e the status quo 
and to alter the United Nations' agenda and priorities. The UN has thus
 become a major 
site of the authority crisis as the Third World has challenged the legitima
cy of its actions 
and as the First World, fearful of dominance by the Third World, has
 also questioned 
its legitimacy by periodically failing to meet its financial obligations to
 the UN. 124 As 
James Rosenau points out, "for many Third Worlders the UN is an int
egral part of the 
system of domination that marks global structures, and thus many would
 doubtless react 
to proposals for making the UN a more effective agent of change as si
mply more of the 
same, as misplaced idealism that amounts to little more than techniques 
for maintaining 
123 James N. Rosenau, The UN in a Turbulent World (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
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their subordination. 125 In the context of the UN reform debates, attempts to make the 
UN stronger likely to be seen by many developing countries as a new form of 
colonialism if their demands for greater voice in the UN are not addressed. 
B. DIFFUSION OF POWER AWAY FROM PERMANENT FIVE 
Another change in the world which dramatically changed the perceived legitimacy 
of the United Nations system and the Security Council in particular, has been the 
diffusion of power away from the Permanent Five members of the Council after 1945. 
When the United Nations was designed during the Second World War, the choice of 
which countries would have permanent seats on the Security Council was not a difficult 
one. As allies in the victorious alliance which won the war and thus had the most say 
over the structure of the new organization, the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
Great Britain were obvious choices, while France and China were added at the insistence 
of the British and the U.S. In 1945, the five Permanent Members of the Security 
Council (the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom) 
more closely approximated the world's top tier in population and power in its various 
manifestations than they do today. 126 Vera M. Dean, writing in 1946, expressed the 
commonly held view held in the West: 
Many people express the fear that the Security Council could easily 
become a dictatorship of the great powers .. .it is true that the permanent 
members could, if they wanted, transform the Security Council into a 
Concert of the World, on the pattern of the Concert of Europe ... We have 
to face the fact that the Big Five control among them about 60 percent of 
the population of the world, and a large part of the world's resources, 
industrial potential, and military power. 127 
As the only member of the Big Five which was not devastated by the war, the U.S. 
emerged from the Second World War with the largest economy, a monopoly on atomic 
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weapons, and as the leader of the world politically. Since the economies of both Britain 
and France had been devastated during the war, and China was in the throes of a civil 
war, only the Soviet Union also retained the military and economy power to compete 
with the U.S. at the conclusion of the war. 
The hegemony of the U.S. in the economic, military, and political spheres 
coincided with the upturn of the economic long cycle after the Second World War. 
Robert 0. Keohane has suggested that the period from 1948 to 1963 was a "long 
American decade" when the norms and institutions imposed by the U.S. provided a sort 
of hegemonic stability for international relations .
128 Yet, as historic periods of 
international prominence go, this one was short-lived. Almost from the beginning of the 
United Nations, the policies of Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, and 
Mexico gave notice that a "third world" existed with interests identical with neither those 
of the U.S. nor those of the Soviet Union. What could not have been anticipated in 1945 
was the mercurial speed with which the Belgian. British, Dutch, and French empires 
would decline, producing a hundred new "third world" states, almost none of which 
looked to the U.S. for leadership. Between 1945 and the UN reform debates of the early 
1990s, the world underwent a dramatic diffusion of political, military, and economic 
power. The world in 1994 was a very different one from that of 1945. Although great 
power cooperation was restored with the end of the Cold War, this diffusion of power 
changed the balance of power in the world dramatically while the structure of the United 
Nations failed to keep pace, causing a further eroding of the legitimacy of the 
organization in the world. 
1. Political Diffusion - Breakup of Colonial Empires 
Often overlooked by contemporary historians is the magnitude of change which 
occurred in Africa and Asia between 1945 and 1960. No fewer than 40 countries and 
one-quarter of the world's population revolted against colonialism and won independence. 
128 Vayrynen, 228. 
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The rapidity of change was unprecedented in human history .129 The United Nations, 
as mentioned above, was not immune to this explosion, growing from fifty-one nations 
in 1945 to 174 in 1993. While the founders, especially Roosevelt, had pushed for the 
breakup of the colonial empires and envisioned a subsequent increase in the number of 
nations in the UN, none could have foreseen the scope of the expansion or the dramatic 
effects that this would have on the United Nations. With the number of states more than 
tripling in just over a decade between 1955 and 1965, the new states soon had a majority 
within the General Assembly with which to pursue their own interests and goals. 
Although the Permanent Five, particularly the two superpowers, still held overwhelming 
military power, the democratic process and structure of the United Nations contributed 
to the diffusion of power to blocs of smaller states within the organization, increasing 
their importance and power. 
Along with this expansion in the number of states was a consequent explosion in 
population in the developing world. Perhaps most compelling of all is that while the 
industrial democracies accounted for more than one-fifth of the earth's population in 
1950, that share had dropped to one-sixth by 1985, and is forecast to shrivel to less than 
one-tenth by 2025. By that time, only two of them (the United States and Japan) will be 
among the top twenty most populous countries, and the rest of the industrial democracies 
will almost be regarded as "little countries. "130 
The combination of decolonization and the Cold War also increased the 
importance of the new states as each superpower sought to expand its sphere of 
influence. The Great Powers, by competing for the support of the new Afro-Asian states 
in the years after 1955 and encouraging these states with their permissive policies 
towards admission to the United Nations produced a General Assembly whose 
composition and character was radically changed from that which had passed the Uniting 
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for Peace Resolution in 1950. 131 While each superpower gained its share of allies 
within the UN, a majority of the new states preferred to remain nonaligned, instead 
forming blocs with other new states to further increase their voting leverage in the UN. 
The rise of Third World blocs indicated a growing understanding by the leaders 
of the developing countries of their added power. India took the lead in forming the 
Non-Aligned Movement, and voting within the United Nations turned sharply against the 
U.S. which was more closely associated with the former colonial powers. The increased 
dependence of the industrialized economies of the West on Arab oil and the formation 
of OPEC dramatically increased the influence, power, and wealth of the Middle East oil 
producers, especially after the 1974 oil embargo. 
With the explosion in the number of new states in the world through the 1970s, 
this diffusion of power away from the two superpowers began to slowly affect the Cold 
War world. In 1977, Rajni Kothari predicted "the main sources of tension in the 1980s 
will be precisely the diffusion and proliferation of power in the world - a largely uneven 
process, subject to a variety of uncertainties and idiosyncracies of national character, but 
clearly moving away from the neatness of the bipolar world; towards one in which the 
superpower detente is continuously disturbed by happenings beyond the control of either 
of the two giants. 132 Another author. from India, asserted in 1988 that the U.S. 
hegemonic power was already in decline, with the developing nations presenting the 
major political challenge and Japan and Germany the major contenders in the realm of 
technology and trade. 133 Thus, the political power diffusion further decreased the 
perceived legitimacy of a Security Council based on a 1945 power structure. 
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2. Military Power Diffusion 
The most worrisome aspect of the increasing diffusion of global political and 
military power is the accompanying spread of high-technology weaponry. The 
availability of the most modem weapons and the growth of indigenous arms industries 
add a new dimension to the security calculations of these regional powers and to those 
of the Security Council. In 1990, then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carlisle Trost 
described the threat of military proliferation, stating that "41 Third World nations 
collectively possess more than 250 attack submarines, 102 have antiship cruise missiles, 
41 have a sophisticated naval mining capability, and 40 are arms producers. "134 The 
proliferation of conventional weapons, both horizontally, to an increasing number of 
states, and later vertically, as states modernized their arsenals with more advanced 
aircraft, ships and submarines, missiles, and weapons of mass destruction, began during 
the Cold War. This diffusion of military power is significant to the UN reform debate 
because the expansion of military capabilities beyond the Permanent Five members has 
increased the potential for conflicts while making it more costly and difficult for the UN 
to respond to them. This section will look at the reasons for the military power 
diffusion, its extent, and the sources of the weapons. 
The sources of the global proliferation of weapons are manifold, and it is not 
possible to explain them only by reference to only one factor. The primary causes of the 
militarization of the developing states were decolonization, the Cold War struggle, 
regional insecurity, and the increased prices and demand for Middle East oil. In the 
1950s and 1960s, decolonization was an important source of increased demand for 
weapons. primarily in Africa and Asia. Once the new states had achieved their 
independence, the problem of defending the new status quo became paramount. Given 
the degree of tension within the Third World, between North and South and East and 
134 Carlisle A.H. Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s," Naval Institute 
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West, and the interface between the three, defense became a paramount concern. 135 
As countries became independent, they created armed forces where none existed 
previously. In the early 1970s, SIPRI reported that "quantitatively, the establishment of 
armed forces had been the major factor responsible for the growth of major weapon 
imports to Sub-Saharan Africa. "136 Related to decolonization was the psychological 
support said to be provided by arms purchases for the nation-building process. The 
armed forces, equipped with as modem weapons as possible, came to be regarded by 
many governments in the Third World as a symbol of unity and independence. 137 
A second cause of the militarization of the developing countries was the Cold War 
and the struggle between the two superpower for influence in the newly independent 
states. In both Africa and Asia, each superpower used military aid and arms sales to 
gain allies or attempt to balance military assistance by the other. This quickly led to 
competition and defense buildups in Korea, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the hom 
of Africa, Pakistan, India, and all across Africa. Thus, the military buildup and 
competition between the two superpowers played a key role in providing arms to the 
newly independent states, encouraging their militarization, and supporting armed 
opposition groups. It has been estimated that, of the 120 conflicts that took place in the 
developing countries between 1945 and 1970, there was direct or indirect intervention 
by the developed world in two-thirds of them. 138 This further weakened the credibility 
of the UN restriction against the use of force since the two most powerful countries in 
the world ignored it with their own military arms race. 
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The increase in defense expenditures of the developing countries up to 1980 was 
much more than could be explained by decolonization. This could be partly explained 
by the fact that the super-imposition of great power rivalry on the developing world 
coincided with the decolonization process. One author wrote in 1988 that "the more 
important reason is the problems of security arising internally and externally in the 
developing world out of the process of nation-state building, consolidation, and 
development." 139 The problem of regional conflicts and insecurity plagued the 
developing world from the beginning of the United Nations. More than 160 major intra-
and inter-state conflicts out of around 170 that took place in the world between 1945 and 
1988 took place in the developing countries. 140 Of the 26 developing countries which 
spent more than $1 billion on defense annually in 1986, all except Brazil, Chile, Peru, 
and Venezuela had been involved in major wars, were situated very close to war zones, 
had to fight a major civil war, or had to face a threat from a great power. 141 The sense 
of insecurity of developing nations which had been involved in wars in the past, or were 
threatened by wars in the future was contrasted with the sense of insecurity among rival 
blocks of industrialized nations which had not had a war for more than 40 years. The 
gap between what the UN was supposed to stand for and the reality of a world full of 
conflicts and great power confrontation further reduced the credibility of the UN with its 
idealistic calls for disarmament and peaceful settlement of disputes. 
While the military buildup in the Middle East between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors began during the late 1940s with Israel's independence, the proliferation of 
advanced conventional weapons got a boost in the mid-1950s when the Soviet Union 
began supplying Egypt with more modem weaponry. With a U.S. -backed Israel facing 
Soviet-backed Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya, weapons continued to flow into the Middle 
East. The increase in the price of petroleum during the 1970s enabled several OPEC 
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member states to equip arsenals with a large quantity of high-quality weapons and to 
subsidize the purchases of other states. This led to a sizeable increase in weapon imports 
recorded by Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Venezuela, and Iraq after 1973 as these 
countries sought the best weapons from western suppliers. 142 
When compared to the overwhelming dominance in the size and quality of 
weapons of the U.S. and Soviet militaries at the end of the Second World War, the 
extent of the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons is remarkable. The U.S. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reported that of the 120 countries which 
participated in the arms trade in 1989, ninety-three were less developed countries, and 
they accounted for three-quarters of an arms imports. 143 The arms imported by Third 
World countries from 1983 to 1989 was estimated by the Congressional Research Service 
at $339.5 billion (in constant 1990 U.S. dollars) - which translates into some 13,010 
tanks and self-propelled guns, 27,430 pieces of heavy artillery, 2,920 supersonic combat 
aircraft, 38,430 surface-to-air missiles, and 53,790 surface-to-surface missiles. 144 
These weapons sustained the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 and other regional conflicts, and 
swelled the arsenals of emerging powers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
The militarization of the developing world has been far from uniform, in either 
quantity or quality. Any study of Third World arms control has to focus on 26 countries 
- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, 
North Korea, South Korea, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and 
Vietnam - which spend more than $1 billion each on annual defense expenditures. 145 
A look at military expenditures by region gives an even clearer picture of which 
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countries were major weapons importers during the Cold War. According to SIPRI 
Yearbook 1986, the industrial market economies (20 nations) accounted for 53.1 percent 
of the world's military expenditures, and the non-market economies (12 nations) for 29.6 
percent. The share of the major oil-exporting countries (11 nations) was 8.2 percent, and 
that of the rest of the world (116 nations) was 9.0 percent. In the last category of 
nations, the military expenditures of 12 nations (Egypt, Syria, India, Pakistan, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru) accounted for 
55 percent of that share. 146 Therefore, the majority of the Third World military 
expenditures during the 1980s can be attributed to the 11 oil-exporting nations and 12 
developing nations. 
While the Middle East was the leading anns importing region throughout the 
1980s, Africa underwent its militarization earlier. During the 1970s it became clear that 
a process of militarization was consolidating itself in Africa. The military spending of 
the continent as a whole and of most individual countries within it greatly increased over 
the decade. Up to 1980, African anns imports rose faster than in any other region of 
the world. Towards the end of the 1970s, the rises in military spending and anns 
transfers flattened out, and indeed began to decline in the early 1980s. 147 Nevertheless, 
the legacy of expansion has remained. This military buildup produced only seven states -
S. Africa, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and Nigeria - that can be said to possess 
an all-around conventional military capability today. Between them, these seven 
countries amassed 84 percent of the continent's imports of major weapons during 1980-
1983.148 A further seven to nine countries (Somalia, Angola, Kenya, Tunisia, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Mozambique. and potentially Zimbabwe and Zaire) have what can be 
described as a sub-regional military capability - being in principle well enough equipped 
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to fight a conventional military campaign outside their own boundaries. 149 
Significantly, the most central development in West Africa was the emergence, after the 
1967-1970 Nigerian civil war, of Nigeria as a regional military power, with an army and 
military spending several times larger than its pre-war level; and exceeding those of all 
the other countries of West and Central Africa put together. 150 
While some of the proliferation of weapons to developing countries can be 
attributed to the Cold War, growing sources of weapons around the world has also 
played a role. The annual value of the production of major weapons in the Third World 
has grown fairly constantly from 1950 to 1984. In 1950 production was valued at $2.3 
million. In 1984 this value was almost 600 times larger, although growth in production 
had leveled off. 151 All types of conventional weapons are now produced in Third 
World countries, ranging from pistol ammunition to highly sophisticated jet aircraft and 
missiles. Although the share of Third World producers in total arms production remains 
below 10 percent, Third World arms production is a most dynamic aspect of weapons 
proliferation. 
Despite the growth of arms production capabilities in the Third World, developing 
countries remain dependent on imports for the balance of their weapons. 152 On the 
supply side, the trend towards more producers - and thus more exporters - continues. 
Supply-side competition is more fierce than ever. With many arms-producing countries 
placing fewer weapons orders with their domestic arms industries as a result of economic 
restrictions, these producers are promoting their arms exports even harder as competition 
has increased. As military spending in NATO and the former Warsaw Pact has fallen, 
arms manufacturers in these countries have been increasingly disposed to export their 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid, 285. 
151 Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, "Arms Production in the Third World," 
in Thomas Ohlson, ed., Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), 55. 
152 Ball. 46. 
66 
products to the Third World, where the demand is high. The stockpiles built up by the 
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies during the Cold War era constitute a vast 
reservoir of surplus arms that are increasingly being sold at "fire-sale" prices to Third 
World countries, as well as fmding their way into the black market- and thence into the 
hands of terrorists, guerrillas, separatist forces, and other irregular formations that 
threaten the peace. 153 
Despite the steady climb upward of the world's arms trade during the 1966-1980 
period, arms trade experts such as Edward J. Lawrence have noted that the overall levels 
of arms trade to the Third World began to decline in the early 1980s.154 The explosion 
of petrodollars had been spent and replaced by an international debt crisis as the price 
of oil dropped radically. The bulk of the arms trade continued to be exported to the 
developing world. As a result, the international debt crisis and decline in GNP growth 
that gripped the developing world throughout the decade had a major impact on the arms 
trade. 155 Despite the recent decline in the arms trade, the legacy of weapons 
proliferation has produced a world where a much larger number of countries can wield 
substantial military capabilities than was possible in 1945. The proliferation of weapons 
has also raised the expectations of these states for a "voice" in the UN since weapons are 
seen by many in the developing world as making them "real states." Combined with the 
shift from inter-state to intra-state conflicts. this has greatly reduced the ability of United 
Nations to settle disputes, whether by mediation, peacekeeping, or through enforcement. 
3. Growth of Other Economies Relative to U.S. 
The diffusion of political and military power away from the United States and the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War was accompanied by the absolute growth of national 
economies around the world, thereby decreasing the relative dominance of the U.S. 
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economy in the world. While the Soviet Union economic decline culminated in its 
collapse in 1991 , the U.S. has experienced a gradual, but steady decline in the position 
of its economy relative to the other industrialized countries, especially Japan and 
Germany. In 1950 America accounted for around half of world output. By 1994, the 
American share was less than a quarter. 156 The reasons for this relative decline have 
been heavily debated within the United States, revolving around the question of whether 
it was a natural result of the world's recovery from the Second World War, 157 or an 
indication of a decline in U.S. economic competitiveness. 158 While both of these 
reasons are important, the rapid development and economic growth of the developing 
countries is equally important. With the growth in economic power of Japan, Germany, 
China, and a large number of developing countries, the world has begun to see the shift 
of power from the victors of the Second World War to a new group of states. It is this 
shift in power and influence in the world and within the world that makes economic 
power diffusion significant. 
While optimists in the United States look at the sheer size of the U.S. economy 
(the largest in the world at 20 percent of world GNP)159 and see the relative decline of 
the U.S. as a natural result of the recovery of the world from the Second World War, 
pessimists look beyond this expected recovery to the continued erosion of the American 
position relative to other nations since the 1960s in new technologies, manufacturing, 
financial assets and current account balances, and international purchasing power. In 
Paul Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, he identifies one measure of the 
relative U.S. economic decline, noting that "rates of growth in the United States have 
slowed considerably in the final third of this century from 4 percent annually in the 
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1950s and 1960s to less than 2 percent in the 1990s.160 He goes on to assert that a 
prolonged period of slow growth compounds existing problems, making it unlikely that 
the U.S. can continue to fund the same level of military security and attend to its social 
needs and repay its debts. 
One of the most obvious and worrisome signs of U.S. economic decline has been 
its ballooning national debt. Since 1971 -when the U.S. recorded its frrst merchandise-
trade deficit in over a century - it has consistently bought more than it sold on the world 
markets. The U.S. now pays its way by borrowing from foreigners roughly $100 billion 
each year. 161 In 1991 , the federal deficit reached over $300 billion, while the national 
debt itself approached $4 trillion. 162 Once the world's largest creditor, the U.S. has 
by some measures become the world's largest debtor nation within less than a decade. 
With other countries, particularly those in East Asia, having much higher growth rates, 
Kennedy warns that "the leading Great Power simply cannot maintain its status 
indefinitely if its economy is in relative decline. "163 
While the decline of the U.S. economic strength is part of the story, a greater 
factor in the relative decline of the U.S. has been the economic growth of the rest of the 
world. From the immediate post-World War II period until sometime in the 1950s, 
America's industrial advantage was largely unchallenged by the Western European 
economies or Japan. However, within the framework of a relatively stable international 
economy protected by the U.S. nuclear and conventional umbrella, the diffusion of 
economic power began in the 1950s and 1960s when the western European countries, 
especially Germany, and Japan began to recover from the devastating effects of World 
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War II, and many Third World nations secured their independence. 164 Sheltered under 
an American strategic umbrella which allowed it to spend only 1 percent of its GNP on 
defense after 1945, Japan's economy benefited greatly. 165 Japan's GNP, one-third of 
Britain's and a mere one-twentieth that of the U.S. in 1951 , is now about three times 
Britain's GNP and close to two-thirds of the American total, with larger growth rates 
than either country .166 With an annual growth rate of 7. 7 percent between 1950 and 
1990, Japan's remarkable postwar boom vaulted it from a devastated economy into an 
economic superpower by the end of the Cold War. 167 
Besides the rapid resurgence of the Japanese and German economies after World 
War II, the emerging new states of the developing world, particularly in East Asia, 
gradually made an impact on the world economy. By the end of the Cold War, 
according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) developing countries accounted for 
43% of world output, 30% of world trade and 45% of foreign-exchange reserves. 168 
The change in the economic hierarchy of the world had as much to do with changes in 
the structure of the developing countries as with mere size. By the end of the 1980s, 
manufactured goods accounted for almost 60% of their exports, up from 5% in 1955. 
The third world's share of world exports of manufactures jumped from 5% in 1970 to 
22% in 1993. 169 Paul Kennedy points out that "however useful the expression -"The 
Third World" might have been in the 1950s, when poor, non-aligned, and recently 
decolonized states were attempting to remain independent of the two superpower blocs, 
the rise of super-rich oil-producing countries a decade later already made it questionable. 
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Now that prosperous East Asian societies possess higher per capita GNPs than Russia, 
Eastern Europe, and even Western European states like Portugal, the word seems less 
suitable than ever. "170 
In East Asia, the four economic "tigers"- South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore - forged the fastest industrial revolution the world has ever known, while 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and China are getting close to the point of industrial 
takeoff. China and South Korea, the two largest economies in the group, grew on the 
average of three times faster than the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries during the 1980s. 171 The remarkable growth of the 
East Asian economies is dramatically emphasized when the region's current share of 
world GNP is compared to that of 1962. In 1962 the Western Pacific accounted for 
around 9 percent of world GNP, North America for 30 percent, and Western Europe for 
31 percent. Twenty years later, the Western Pacific share had climbed to 15 percent, 
while North America's had fallen to 28 percent and Europe's to 27 percent. By the year 
2000, it is predicted that the Western Pacific will account for around one-quarter of the 
world GNP. 172 
In addition to the economic resurgence of Europe and the Asian boom, the 
increasing dependence of Western economies on Middle East oil and the large price 
increases during the 1970s produced large oil revenues for many Arab states. Although 
their dependence on a single commodity made the oil producing countries susceptible to 
price decreases in the 1980s, the oil revenues have proved a major boon to their 
developing economies, giving them far more economic and political influence than the 
level of their economies would normally provide. One drawback has been that the 
uneven location of oil in the Middle East created a dichotomy between the super-rich and 
dreadfully poor societies that has increased the potential for instability in the region. 
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Countries like Kuwait (2 million people), the United Arab Emirates (1.3 million), and 
Saudi Arabia (11.5 million) enjoy some of the world's highest incomes, but exist 
alongside more populous neighbors one-third (Jordan, Iraq, Iran) or one-tenth as rich 
(Egypt, Yemen). 173 
Looking to the future, all indications are that the economic diffusion in the world 
will accelerate over the next few decades. If output is measured on the basis of 
purchasing-power parities, then the developing countries and the former Soviet block 
already account for 44 percent of world output. At current growth rates of 2. 7 percent 
for the rich industrial world and 5 percent for the developing world (including the former 
Soviet block), the industrial economies will account for less than half of world output by 
the end of the decade. 174 One problem with the present international economic system 
is that the world's international structures are still dominated by the older industrial 
nations. The Group of Seven (G7: America, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Britain, and 
Canada) which is supposed to represent the world's top economies, excludes six 
economies which are already bigger than Canada's - China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and 
Indonesia. 175 
While the challenges to the legitimacy of the United Nations were small and 
somewhat limited to a few countries when the organization was created, the events of the 
Cold War generated strong changes in the world which accelerated the decline in the 
perceived legitimacy of the UN around the world. Most critical, perhaps, was the 
explosion in the number of new members within the United Nations, raising the 
expectations of the new developing countries which now make up the majority of the 
General Assembly for a voice in the world organization. The inevitable diffusion of 
political, economic, and military power without a concomitant increase in the "voice" and 
influence of newly powerful nations laid the seeds for challenges to the legitimacy of the 
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United Nations during the Cold War. This was especially true in the economic sphere. 
In a world where economic power is growing increasingly important, the growing 
unrepresentativeness of such international institutions decreases their legitimacy and 
therefore their usefulness and effectiveness. 
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IV. POST -COLD WAR SECURITY PROBLEMS 
While the Cold War and the breakup of the colonial empires dramatically changed 
the balance of power and structure of the state-based international system, the post-Cold 
War world presents the United Nations with a host of new problems for which it is ill-
prepared. Three problems are of particular importance for understanding the role of the 
United Nations in the post-Cold War world: (1) a crisis of state authority and 
legitimacy; (2) the resurgence of ethnic/ nationalist violence and intrastate wars; and (3) 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The common element in 
all of these problems - fragmentation - is making it increasingly difficult to come together 
to achieve compromises. A continuation of "external" conflict and fragmentation at the 
state level is accompanied by "internal" conflicts and fragmentation within states. 
Reconstructing world order is therefore becoming more difficult in the post-Cold War 
era. The UN reform debate has tended to focus on the end of the deadlock in the 
Security Council and its rejuvenated potential for solving conflict around the world. The 
weakness of this approach is that it assumes that organizational tinkering on a United 
Nations designed for the world in 1945 will make it capable of dealing with the powerful 
new sources of fragmentation and conflict in the post-Cold War world. 
A. CRISIS OF STATE AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY 
To a degree not previously experienced since the end of the Second World War, 
governments are experiencing challenges to their power to govern. This may be 
relatively mild (e.g., the declining popularity of centrist coalitions in Germany, Japan, 
Italy, or France) or severe (such as Russia), but the impact is the same: governmental 
legitimacy is weakened. The crisis of state authority is most severe in the developing 
world and the former Soviet Union where governments rest with decreasing stability on 
top of restive populations who are decreasingly willing to comply with governmental 
actions. 
From Haiti in the Western Hemisphere to the remnants of Yugoslavia in Europe, 
from Somalia. Sudan. and Liberia in Africa to Cambodia in Southeast Asia, a disturbing 
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new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state utterly incapable of sustaining itself 
as a member of the international community. Although the details of different analyses 
of the crisis in state authority may vary, the central theme can be summed up in a single 
word: fragmentation. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner have pointed to the 
overemphasis on "self-determination" without due regard for long-term survivability of 
newly independent states after the Second World War as the root causes for these failed 
states. 176 Although this argument may be true, a more useful explanation is proposed 
by James Rosenau: 
Viewed from the perspective of vulnerabilities, the growing populations, 
the globalization of national economies, the constraint of national debts, 
and the challenge of subgroups, it seems that world politics lessens the 
capacity of states to be decisive and efficient. Their agendas are 
expanding, but they lack the will, competence, and resources to expand 
correspondingly. 177 
These sources of instability in the Third World are not a totally new phenomenon. In 
1977 an Indian author predicted that these sources would cause the disintegration of 
social and political cohesion in Third World countries. 178 Since then, the inability of 
states in the developing world to deal with the multiple challenges to their authority has 
resulted in a consequent shift of authority downward to the subgroup level, and in some 
cases poses the risk of national disintegration. This is not to say that the state has 
become irrelevant on the world scene, but rather, that several key developments in the 
world are weakening the ability of states to exercise their authority, especially internally. 
1. Population Explosion in Developing World 
The critical problem that faces the world going into the twenty-first century is the 
population explosion in the developing countries, especially in Africa and Asia. In 1825, 
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when Thomas Malthus wrote his famous Essay on Population about the dangers of 
overpopulation, about 1 billion human beings occupied the planet. In the following 
hundred years the world's population doubled to 2 billion, and in the following half 
century (from 1925 to 1976) it doubled again, to 4 billion.179 By 1990 the figure had 
passed five billion and it continues to grow at a rapid rate, meaning a stabilization of 
numbers is still decades away, if possible. By United Nations, World Bank and other 
estimates, the world's population will soar from 5. 7 billion in 1994, to 7. 6 billion by 
2025, which many regard as unsustainable. 180 This demographic explosion lies at the 
heart of many of the world's problems and is also a continual source of the complexity 
and dynamism that have overwhelmed the global system. Ever greater numbers of 
people have meant larger, more articulate, and increasingly unwieldy publics. They have 
contributed to the unmanageability of public affairs that have weakened states and 
hastened the advent of paralyzing authority crises. 
The crux of the population problem is that these increases are taking place 
overwhelmingly in developing countries. In fact, between now and 2025, around 95 
percent of all global population growth will take place in them. While in 1950, Africa's 
population was half of Europe's, by 1985 it had drawn level (at about 480 million each), 
and by 2025 it is expected to be three times Europe's (1.58 billion to 512 million). 181 
The largest populations in the world today, China and India, are forecast to grow from 
1.13 billion and 853 million, respectively, to 1.5 billion each by 2025. 182 In addition 
to these demographic giants, other developing countries will contain unprecedented high 
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populations by the third decade of the next century: Pakistan with 267 million, Indonesia 
with 263 million, Brazil with 245 million, Mexico with 150 million, and Iran with 122 
million. 183 
These population explosions strain the ability of countries to provide services, 
food, and jobs. Since they are occurring in developing countries with limited resources 
and weak governmental authority to start with, the challenges to state authority could 
become critical. Consider the burdens that will be placed on developing world cities' 
already inadequate housing, sanitation, transportation, food distribution, and 
communication systems if their populations double and treble in size. In many of these 
countries a disproportionate amount of the nation's limited wealth is owned by the 
governing elites, who will find it difficult to buy off the discontents of the fast-growing 
masses. 184 The overwhelming challenge to state governments to provide food, jobs, 
housing, and education for growing populations is already straining the abilities of many 
developing countries' governments, causing widespread unrest in the Middle East, Sub-
Saharan Africa, and South Asia. India is a case in point. Given that by 2025 India's 
population could be close to 1.5 billion. that much of the economy rests on a shrinking 
natural resource base, including dramatically declining water levels, and that communal 
violence and urbanization are spiraling upward, some authors question the ability of the 
Indian state to survive. 185 
An equally serious problem associated with these demographic changes is the 
growing percentage of the population that is young and educated but unable to find jobs. 
As things stand now, many states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are not able to 
provide for burgeoning numbers of young people, and will be even less so in the future. 
The consequences include a rising incidence of hunger and malnutrition, increased 
migration from the impoverished countryside to urban shantytowns, soaring 
183 World Resources 1990-91 (New York/Oxford: 1990), 254. 
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unemployment, and the growing appeal of extremist movements. 186 We already seeing 
such dangerous developments in countries like Egypt, Peru, India, and in countries all 
across Africa. With population pressures building up in various parts of the globe, the 
struggle for resources intensifying, and the communications revolution often fueling 
ethnic animosities rather than producing world citizens, the challenges to national 
authority - especially in the poorer parts of the world - may well intensify .187 
2. Economic Breakdown of Third World States 
As mentioned above, most of the population growth in the world is occurring in 
the poorest regions of the world, whereas developed societies have slow-growing or 
declining populations containing a rising share of older people. The result is a growing 
mismatch between where the world's riches, technology, good health, and other benefits 
are to be found and where the world's fast-growing new generations, possessing few, if 
any benefits, live. In view of the demographic trends between the "have" and the "have 
not" societies, it seems unlikely that there will not be great waves of migration from the 
poor South to the rich North in the twenty-first century. The real danger is that 
intolerable tensions will arise between the impoverished majority of mankind and the 
affluent, industrially advanced majority, unless the poor countries develop more 
successfully. As Paul Kennedy notes, a population explosion in one pan of the globe and 
a technological explosion on the other is not a good recipe for a stable, international 
order. 188 
The major problem in many developing countries, with the exception of those 
with booming economies in East Asia, has been chronically weak economies producing 
the worst of industrialization (urbanization, slums, unemployment) without the benefits. 
Most Third World countries are not in good economic shape to provide a decent and 
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dignified life for all or most of their people - the kind that would maximize the prospects 
of loyalty transfer to the state and government. Population growth outstrips economic 
growth, infrastructural deficiencies create a situation where adequate food is grown but 
cannot be distributed, and dizzying inflation robs the poor of their buying power. 
189 
The condition of sub-Saharan Africa- "the Third World's Third World," as it has been 
described190 - is even more desperate. Recent reports upon the continent's plight are 
extraordinarily gloomy, describing Africa as "a human and environmental disaster area," 
and having so many intractable problems that some foreign development experts are 
abandoning it to work elsewhere. In the view of the World Bank, virtually everywhere 
else in the world is likely to experience a decline in poverty by the year 2000 except 
Africa, where things will only get worse. 191 
While the pressure of exploding population growth has certainly exacerbated their 
economic problems, the central problem for developing world economies has been their 
debt crisis. One of the major indicators of this crisis is the debt overhang in those 
African and South American countries which became heavily indebted in the 1970s. In 
spite of major rehabilitation efforts made since the beginning of the debt crisis, the total 
shock of debt and the concomitant obligations to service the debt have had a crippling 
effect on such poor economies. The nominal value of outstanding debt in 1991 was 
around $1.28 trillion, or almost 40 percent of the combined Gross Domestic Product of 
all low- and middle-income countries. 192 This enormous debt and the enormous weight 
of servicing that debt remains a critical drain on these developing countries as new 
disbursements to the South are less than repayments of principal and interest payments 
made. 
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One of the consequences of the economic breakdown of many of the poorest 
developing countries bas been a rise in violence, anarchy, and intrastate war. 
Throughout what has been called the "zone of conflict, "193 which includes the former 
communist states, much of sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Central and Latin America 
and South Asia, a downward spiral of economic decline, often exacerbated by corruption 
and mismanagement, has created governments that are at or near the point of collapse 
and that are being challenged, often violently, by their own citizens. Unfortunately, the 
areas that suffer the greatest levels of intrastate violence are also those in which 
economic conditions are deteriorating and governments are failing. The aid patterns of 
the developed world bear some of the responsibility for those failures. Two-thirds of the 
world's 1.3 billion poor people live in countries that receive less than one-third of official 
development assistance. 194 
3. Rise of Fundamentalist Religions 
The inability of developing state governments to cope with population and 
economic pressures has resulted in an increase in the size and influence of religious 
fundamentalist movements. Christian, Islamic and Hindu fundamentalist movements 
appear to be gaining strength in areas where economic conditions have worsened for the 
majority and where the capacity or inclination of state authorities to overcome 
widespread impoverishment and inequity has diminished. 195 In the Middle East, 
Islamic fundamentalist governments now control Iran and the Sudan, and Muslim 
organizations like the Islamic Group and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic 
Salvation Front in Algeria, AI Nahda in Tunisia, and the Hamas and Hezbollah in the 
Gaza Strip and the 
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West Bank seek to replace the secular state governments with theocracies. Although each 
are separate groups, they all maintain ties to one another and support the smaller groups 
such as the Hamas and Hezbollah. 
The rising power and influence of these groups has been the result of their ability 
to provide services which the government no longer is capable or willing of providing. 
They all use strategies which advance the struggle to establish Islamic theocracies 
through wide infiltration of social structures, subsidized services, the control of mosques, 
and the establishment of a secretive armed struggle. 196 The Hamas, a Palestinian group 
in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, has copied the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt by 
building a vast network of schools, the Islamic University of Gaza, medical clinics, 
Koranic classes, and other social services normally provided by the state. In societies 
torn by economic and population pressures and governmental breakdown, these Islamic 
fundamentalist movements fill the void left by overwhelmed governments. 
The problem with the rise of fundamentalist movements is that they not only 
reflect the crisis of state authority, but they also encourage and magnify this crisis of 
authority. As populations continue to grow, the growing inability of governments to 
provide basic services and jobs will encourage the growth of fundamentalist groups. 
Conversely, as these groups assume more and more of the internal roles of the state 
governments, they also increase the possibility of intrastate conflict and religious 
upheaval. The growing strength of these groups was revealed after the October 1992 
Cairo earthquake in which the Egyptian government failed to deliver relief aid, and slum 
residents were in many instances helped by their local mosques. 197 
The rise of fundamentalism in states with more than one religion has already 
produced violence and intrastate conflict. Sudan is racked by a civil war between the 
Iranian-backed Islamic government and the Christian rebels from the southern part of the 
country. In Algeria. the Islamic Salvation Front, despite winning a democratic election, 
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is locked in a struggle for control of the country with the military government. In South 
Asia, the historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself 
now not only in the rivalry between Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India, but also in 
intensifying religious strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and 
India's substantial Muslim minority. 198 Such conflicts make a country increasingly 
difficult to govern, further strengthening the fundamentalist groups and weakening the 
authority of the state governments. 
4. Porous Borders 
Another development that poses a threat to the authority of states is the growing 
porousness of national borders. Whether it is the inability of the United States to stem 
the flow of illegal Mexican immigrants or stop drug smuggling into the U.S .. the 
inability of Russia to curb the blackmarket trade across its borders, or the irrelevance of 
borders in much of Africa, the inviolability of state borders is a thing of the past. While 
sheer numbers have increased the illegal immigrant problem, the increase in air travel 
has overwhelmed the ability of governments to control their borders. For example, in 
1984. 288 million people entered the U.S. ; by 1992 the figure had increased to 44 7 
million. 199 The inability of states to carry out the most fundamental job of government 
- protecting state borders - is an indication of just how far state authority has already 
declined in the world. 
Most interpretations of the end of the Cold War and the widespread disorder that 
has ensued ignore the relevance of the globalizing tendencies of international life to this 
decline in state authority. Increasingly. matters of economic and environmental policy 
raise challenges that are global in scope. 200 Two negative products of this globalization 
of economies have been the steady erosion of state control over trade, and the growth of 
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multinational corporations beyond the control of states. As economist Robert Heilbroner 
sees it, the global nexus of multinational corporations and international fmancial 
institutions has accumulated vast power and influence at the expense of national 
capitalism and state agencies. 201 The growing interdependence between the 
industrialized economies has resulted in steps to integrate them into larger regional units -
as witnessed by the European Community, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and other regional efforts, even while the General Agreement on Tariff and 
Trade (GATT) members struggle to complete the Uruguay Round of global trade 
liberalization. Contributing to this economic integration and the increasing porousness 
of national borders has been the globalization of fmance and trade with the growth of 
multinational corporations. By its very nature, this new globalized international trade has 
produced multinational corporations which are increasingly less attached to the particular 
interests and values of their country of origin. 
The information revolution or "Third Wave"202 technologies have fundamentally 
changed the way in which states trade, communicate, and perceive each other. The 
rapidity and clarity with which ideas and information now circulate through television, 
VCRs. computer networks, fax machines, satellite hookups, fiber-optic telephone 
circuits, and many other microelectronic devices has rendered national boundaries ever 
more porous and world politics more vulnerable to cascading demands. 203 Today the 
whole world, its leaders and its citizenries, instantaneously share the same pictures and 
description, albeit not necessarily the same understandings, of what is transpiring in any 
situation. The RAND Corporation's Carl Builder points out that "the flow of information 
into or out of a nation can no longer be effectively controlled by the state; information 
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is everywhere and accessible. To participate in the burgeoning economic benefits of 
world commerce means adapting practices that undermine state control. 204 In the 
fmancial markets, the computer revolution has revolutionized the transfer of money 
across national borders. Laurence Krause notes the fungibility of money as a 
commodity, stating that it "can be transmitted instantaneously and at low cost, it can 
change its identity easily, and it can be traced only with great effort if at all. These 
characteristics work to the disadvantage of governments in their efforts to tax, regulate, 
and control their economic activity. "205 Given the magnitude of these communications, 
it is hardly surprising that people everywhere have become more analytically skillful, 
more ready to challenge authority, and more capable of engaging in collective actions 
that press their demands. Although the information revolution holds the potential for 
greatly improving the economies of the poorer developing countries, it also has the 
potential for the weakening of state authority by reducing state control over borders and 
breeding resentment in these countries where governments are unable to provide the same 
standard of living enjoyed by the industrial democracies. 
This increasing porousness of state borders has encouraged and been exploited by 
what political scientist Phil Williams calls "transnational criminal organizations," better 
known as international organized crime. The emergence of the "global village" in the 
second half of the twentieth century has fundamentally changed the context in which both 
legitimate and illegitimate businesses operate. This has created unprecedented 
opportunities for international criminal activity. According to Williams, there has been 
a vast increase in transnational activity - the movement of information, money, physical 
objects, people, 
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and other tangible or intangible items across state borders. 206 Whether drug cartels out 
of South America or Asia, or Russian mafia, or Chinese Triads, organized crime has 
become an international problem. 
Part of the reason for the development of transnational crime organizations has 
been the growth in global trade that has accompanied the diffusion of economic power. 
The increase in global trade between 1970 and 1990 was immense. In 1970 global 
imports totalled $331 billion. By 1980 the figure had reached $2 trillion, and by 1990 
had increased to $3.5 trillion. 207 The increase in transnational economic activity has 
made it easier to hide illicit transactions, products and movements because law 
enforcement agencies and customs officers are unable to inspect more than a small 
proportion of the cargoes and people coming into their territories. Money laundering is 
simply one subset of the much larger problem for states of maintaining even a semblance 
of control over global financial networks, which operate according to the logic of a 
global market and are not very responsive to the dictates of state economic policies or 
national legal requirements. 208 
Although organized crime historically has been considered a domestic problem, 
the globalization of economies and the computer revolution have made criminal 
organizations resemble transnational corporations which "treat national borders as nothing 
more than minor conveniences to their criminal enterprises. "209 Since criminal groups 
are used to operating outside the rules, norms, and laws of domestic jurisdictions, they 
have few qualms about crossing national boundaries illegally. In many respects, 
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therefore, transnational criminal organizations are perfectly suited for multinational 
operations. By operating outside the legal international economic system and across state 
borders, they prove the permeability of national borders and penetrate societies that are 
nominally under the control of states. 
One of the best examples of the threat posed by these organizations is the inability 
of the U.S. to stem the flow of drugs across its borders. Illegal drugs have emerged as 
a global commodity of immense significance, as increasingly powerful transnational 
criminal organizations have exploited demand in the industrialized countries. Some 
estimates suggest that the drug trade is worth $500 billion per year - larger than the 
global trade in oil.210 Despite extensive efforts by a superpower with the largest 
economy and strongest military in the world, there is little evidence that the flow of 
drugs into the U.S. has been curbed. This has substantial implications for international 
security. Organizations and networks established to smuggle one commodity can easily 
shift to trafficking in nuclear weapons and technology, as reports of alleged smuggling 
of nuclear material out of Russia reveal. Transnational criminal organizations respond 
to demand on the world market. If the demand for weapons of mass destruction by 
"rogue" or pariah states is great enough, it is highly likely that organized crime will shift 
their resources to capture this market. With the limited capability of state governments 
to respond individually, such a threat would necessarily require an international solution. 
B. RESURGENCE OF ETHNIC/NATIONALIST VIOLENCE 
While economically the trend has been towards integration and more porous 
borders, politically the trend in the world since the end of the Cold War has been toward 
disintegration and fragmentation. World politics has been increasingly characterized by 
levels of violence and unrest from a micronationalism that was not imagined by the 
framers of the Charter, or even by pundits a few years ago. Always the major killer in 
the post-World War II world, resurgence may not be precise tenn to describe this 
phenomenon- perhaps "continuation" is more accurate. In Europe, the collapse of the 
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Soviet Empire left a power vacuum that released submerged ethnic and nationalist 
tensions. One recent study found 60 current and emergent conflicts in Europe, and 
counted another 14 in the Caucasus region of Eurasia alone. 211 
In the developing world, states composed of tribes and ethnic groups artificially 
brought together under state banners by First World decolonizers, besieged by 
multinational corporations seeking to extend their operations and markets, and plagued 
with internal divisions and massive socioeconomic problems have added to the 
decentralizing tendencies in a multi-centric world. 212 This will make the search for 
order no less quixotic today than during the Cold War. In areas such as Afghanistan, 
Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia, conflicts fueled largely by superpower rivalry have 
taken on lives of their own. In other conflicts with no direct links to East-West rivalry -
such as Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, and Sri Lanka - ethnic, religious, and political 
cauldrons seethe. With few states militarily powerful enough to threaten their neighbors 
or take on the United States, the current trend toward fragmentation is likely to produce 
a continuation of ethnic and micronationalist violence and intrastate war. 
1. Ethnic/Nationalist Violence 
The trend toward political disintegration and fragmentation into smaller ethnic and 
nationality-based units is a phenomenon that has become widespread. From the breakup 
of the former Soviet Union to the ethnic and tribal conflicts of Africa, ethnic/nationalist 
violence and civil wars dominate the world scene. The collapse of the Soviet empire and 
the disintegration of its command economies facilitated the emergence of long-suppressed 
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ethnic, religious, and political hatreds and created new ones. In the former Soviet Union 
alone, more than 20 violent conflicts have already resulted in thousands of deaths and 
displaced more than 1 million people. 213 
The lack of correspondence between the territorial boundaries of states and the 
ethnic identification of people has given rise to intense new political conflicts. Today 
less than 10 percent of the world's more than 170 countries are ethnically homogenous 
and only half of the remainder contain more than 75 percent ethnic majority .214 
Besides ethnic hatreds, these conflicts have been the result of ethnic groups that have 
been denied a state seeking to establish one, or of other groups already in possession of 
a state seeking to enlarge it so as to incorporate adjacent territories. Most of these 
conflicts involve ethnic groups whose territorial ambitions are at odds with existing state 
borders. Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Romanians in Transylvania, Hungarians in 
Vojvodina, Albanians in Kosovo, and many other minorities elsewhere have no lesser 
motive than that they would become majorities if they crossed or moved a nearby 
frontier. Ethno-nationalist forces are also evident in the separatist struggles in the former 
Yugoslavia, Georgia, India, China, and Indonesia. Other groups engaged in such 
struggles include the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey and Iran, the Palestinians in the West Bank, 
the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Shan and Karen peoples of 
Burma, and the Basques of Spain and France. These violent ruptures of old or weak 
state structures in the former Yugoslavia and other parts of Eurasia are so far from the 
classical tradition as to become a kind of nemesis to the nation-state assumption on which 
it was based. 
In Africa and other pans of the developing world, the mostly anificial boundaries 
of post-colonial states divided traditional political communities, making the term "nation-
state" a confusing misnomer. With state borders including and dividing numerous 
different tribes, clans, and ethnic groups, the former colonies within Africa and Asia 
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contain few of the characteristics of traditional nation-states in the Western sense of the 
term. Part of Africa's quandary, according to Robert Kaplan, is that although the 
continent's population belts are horizontal (East-West), the borders erected by European 
colonists when they divided up the continent are vertical (North-South), and therefore at 
cross-purposes with demography and topography. 215 Tribal conflicts have plagued 
Africa since before the decolonization movements of the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, 
some authors predicted the rise of sub-national groups and the trend toward disintegration 
in Africa. Rajni Kothari asserted that: 
Nationalism has still not reached its peak in a number of third-world 
countries, but it will do so in the coming years. And this need not always 
be the nationalism of the nation-state, but simultaneously be that of sub-
national units and linguistic and ethnic entities .. .Just at a time when 
transnational and supranational currents will be gaining ground in the 
northern hemisphere, third world countries will be affected by processes 
of disintegration that will seriously affect their capacity to solve pressing 
human problems. 216 
The strength of tribal conflicts within African states was evident throughout the Cold 
War era, with civil wars in the Congo. Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, 
Morocco, Rwanda, and Somalia, to name a few. While the Cold War may have 
intensified these conflicts, the fundamental causes went to differences between tribes and 
clans within these states. 
In 1994, Somalia provides a model for the future of some African states which 
should cause the industrialized countries concern. The Middle East had previously 
provided analysts with the specter of "Lebanonization" as perhaps one of the worst 
epithets in politics, describing the seemingly infinite fragmentation of a country along 
religious and ethnic lines. Somalia has gone further and now exhibits the logical extreme 
in fragmentation; members of a single ethnic group who share the same religion, history, 
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and language but are now split among heavily armed clans.217 In Rwanda, the world 
has seen the extremes to which such tribal violence can reach. During its civil war in 
1994, the majority Hutus massacred an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 minority Tutsis 
before the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front rebels succeeded in defeating the 
government, causing thousands of Hutus (possibly as high as 800,000) to flee the country 
to Zaire. Such hatreds and conflicts are not easily settled or prevented. In 1994 Robert 
Kaplan, in an article about the growing anarchy in Africa, observed that "West Africa 
is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, 
in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real "strategic" danger. Disease, 
overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the 
increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of 
private armies are producing an anarchy unprecedented in the modem world. "218 
2. Shift Toward Intrastate Conflicts 
Many of the conflicts in the contemporary world have a very different character 
from those that the United Nations was designed to address. Above all, those who 
framed the UN Charter had in mind the problem of international war, waged by well-
organized states. Although the problem of interstate war has by no means disappeared, 
for many, civil war - whether internationalized or not - has always been the deadlier 
threat. Although armed conflicts have claimed more than 20 million lives since 1945, 
most of the conflicts in 1994 are occurring within state borders (29 of 30 in 1992), and 
their incidence is not abating. 219 Subsequently, in the overwhelming majority of UN 
Security Council operations today, there is a strong element of civil war and communal 
conflict. 
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This shift from inter- to intra-state war has been a direct result of the reemerging 
ethnic and nationalist tensions mentioned above. Adam Roberts, a professor at Oxford 
University, explains that "the collapse of large multinational states and empires almost 
always causes severe dislocations, including the emergence or reemergence of ethnic, 
religious, regional or other animosities. "220 The absence of fully legitimate political 
systems, traditions, regimes and state frontiers, according to Roberts, all increase the 
likelihood that a narrowly ethnic definition of "nation" prevails. In almost every case 
of major intrastate violence, from the former Soviet republics to Rwanda, ethnic and 
religious conflict has been associated with significant periods of declining Gross National 
Product, the rise of demographic politics, and the intensification of chauvinistic myth 
making. With the explosion in population and economic breakdowns of many developing 
countries, there is little evidence that violent intrastate conflict is likely to decrease of its 
own accord in the near or mid-term future. Gareth Evans, the Australian Foreign 
Minister, notes that the decline in individual living standards and the erosion of good 
governance, with which civil strife is closely linked, will not be quickly reversed in the 
"zone of conflict. "221 
The shift toward more intrastate conflicts in the world presents the United Nations 
with very difficult challenges. The framers of the UN Charter not only failed to envision 
the use of UN forces in intrastate conflicts, but they actually wrote a provision (Article 
2(7)) to prevent the UN from being able to intervene in the internal affairs of its member 
nations. One weakness of An Agenda for Peace is that it fails to explore the special 
problems that beset peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and election-monitoring and 
enforcement efforts when they occur in the midst of bitter internal conflicts where are 
no front lines. Much of the criticism of the use of peacekeeping forces in Somalia and 
Bosnia has focused on the absence of any peace to keep. Adam Roberts identifies three 
characteristics of internal conflicts which make peacekeeping/intervention difficult: 
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1. Internal conflicts tend to be "nasty, brutish and long," and intervention 
requires a willingness to stay what may be a very long course. 
2. Internal conflicts are typically conducted under the leadership of non-
governmental or semi-governmental entities, which may see great 
advantages in the degree of recognition involved with negotiating with the 
UN yet be unwilling or unable to carry out the terms of agreements. 
3. Internal conflicts typically involve the use of force directed against the 
civilian populations, thus becoming especially bitter and posing difficult 
problems related to the protection of dispersed and vulnerable 
civilians. 222 
The first of these characteristics has been critical to the failure of UN peacekeeping 
missions in Somalia and Bosnia. In both of these cases, the United Nations has been 
hamstrung by its inability to build the political consensus necessary to both give the 
operations legitimacy and the political will to persevere. The key to understanding the 
reasons for the inability of the UN to successfully deal with the internal conflicts in 
Bosnia and Somalia lies in the difference between the nature of interstate and intrastate 
wars. 
According to Donald Snow, "insurgent wars are normally wars of total political 
purpose for both sides. One characteristic of such wars is that they are hardly ever 
resolved by negotiation unless both sides exhaust themselves short of decision. "223 The 
problem with international intervention in intrastate wars is that the UN typically enters 
such missions with limited goals, such as restoring the status quo or bringing stability. 
By definition, a limited objective is less important than a total purpose to the person who 
seeks it and is almost certain to be less determined and more unwilling to sacrifice. The 
U.S. operation and pullout from Somalia is a good example of this. While the U.S. 
intervention in Somalia had limited objectives - restoring stability and protecting UN food 
convoys - the UNOSOM II mandate evolved into encouraging political reconciliation and 
nation building, necessarily a long-term process. The asymmetry between a difficult, 
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long-tenn mission and the limited U.S. commitment culminated in the demoralized U.S. 
pullout after taking limited, but unacceptable casualties. Also, since an outsider with a 
limited objective does not require a total victory to achieve their objective, they are more 
likely to seek a negotiated settlement that is unacceptable to either party. The inability 
of the United Nations to end civil wars in Somalia and Bosnia reveals the difficulty of 
mediating a total war using limited responses, objectives, and international will. 
One of the key problems for the United Nations in handling intrastate wars in the 
developing world is convincing the rich industrialized nations that it is in their interests 
to intervene to keep the peace. All conflicts, however, do not threaten all nations 
equally. The new reason usually given for intervention in civil wars like Somalia and 
Bosnia is for humanitarian reasons. Unfortunately, as will be explored in the next 
chapter, different countries have different interpretations of what constitute human rights. 
The danger of intrastate wars lies in the spread of violence to neighboring countries, and 
the disruption that massive refugee flows have on a region. In a continent as poor as 
Africa, such conflicts have the potential for overwhelming neighboring states with 
refugees, disease, economic collapse, and social unrest. Intrastate wars present different 
challenges for conventional military forces. As Vietnam should have shown, use of 
superior conventional forces in a civil war can not guarantee success. Making the United 
Nations stronger and more able to effectively command forces is likely to suffer the same 
outcome if it tries to intercede in internal conflicts with UN forces. Solutions to the 
internal conflicts that are raging around the world require long-tenn commitment by 
states whose interests are threatened. The need, then, is not for better military forces, 
but to strengthen the legitimacy of the United Nations and its ability to build consensus 
among nations, whether for a global response to a conflict or a regional response. The 
violence and instability that have dominated life in the Third World since the start of 
decolonization in the late 1940s will remain until their causes - political, economic, 
social. and national - are addressed. 224 
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C. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
One of the greatest threats to international peace in the twenty-first century will 
be a threat not even foreseen by the framers of the Charter - the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Secretary of States John Foster Dulles, referring to this situation said, "As one 
who was at San Francisco in the spring of 1945, I can say with confidence that had the 
delegates at San Francisco known we were entering the age of atomic warfare, they 
would have seen to it that the Charter dealt more positively with the problems thus 
raised. 225 Although two decades of U.S. efforts to advocate nuclear nonproliferation, 
along with several layers of international constraints, have helped to slow their 
proliferation, the post-Cold War balance finds the principal Third World competitors 
armed with weapons of vastly greater lethality than ever before. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and Russia's emergence as a strategic partner of America, the greatest 
military threat to the United States is the global proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) - nuclear, chemical, and biological - and of the missiles to deliver 
them. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile countries pose a threat to U.S. freedom 
of action to support long-standing friends and interests overseas. The introduction of 
chemical and biological weapons and of ballistic means of delivering them have also 
made the existing regional balances especially dangerous. Moreover, as the physical 
range of missiles expands, the regional powers will almost certainly become able to 
menace the First World as well as one another. 
The problems with generating international efforts to restrict WMD proliferation 
are two-fold. First, nonproliferation efforts have a complicating effect in that they need 
legitimacy to be effective, but if they fail, nonproliferation efforts erode the legitimacy 
of the UN. Second, attempting to restrict WMD's tends to make proliferators more 
active on the world stage. For treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, if countries sign and then violate them, this delegitimizes 
the nonproliferation treaties. This means that the world faces the proliferation of "weak 
115 Quoted in Clark M. Eichelberger, U.N.: The First Fifteen Years (New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1960). 
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threats." These threats are weak in the sense that they pose no immediate military threat 
to the survival of major states, and no substantial threat to the survival of the world, but 
they do have a significant ability to disrupt the functioning of the stable international 
order. The world is threatened, therefore, not with massive destruction in a single war, 
but by smaller, but still substantial, threats from a multitude of sources. 
1. Nuclear Weapons 
What is the extent of nuclear proliferation and why is it a growing concern? Brad 
Roberts, editor of The Washington Quarterly, states that "there is a growing sense that 
the prospects for nuclear weapons proliferation have increased in recent years with the 
demise of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the heightening of tensions in 
the Middle East and South Asia, and the continuing problem with North Korea. "226 
Moreover, the breakup of the fonner Soviet Union and the weaknesses of controls on 
nuclear weapons and materials in its constituent territories have sharply increased the risk 
that a potential proliferator or subnational terrorist group could gain access to nuclear 
material or a nuclear weapon. Since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went 
into force in 1970, the Treaty's five declared nuclear weapons states of the United States, 
Russia, Great Britain, France, and China, have been joined in the Nuclear Club by the 
emergence of three undeclared nuclear states, Israel, India, and Pakistan in the gray area 
between clear possessors and non-possessors. 
The threat of possible future proliferators was brought home to the rest of the 
world in 1991. when revelations about Iraq's extensive clandestine nuclear weapons 
program, which was estimated by experts to be one to two years away from developing 
a nuclear weapon, raised concerns in the world about other NPT non-nuclear states 
pursuing secret nuclear weapons programs. These concerns were reenforced in 1993 
when North Korea, in response to a request by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) to conduct special inspections of suspect North Korean nuclear sites, threatened 
226 Brad Roberts, "From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation," International 
Security 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993): 141. 
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to pull out of the NPT. As the world approaches the NPT Extension Review Conference 
in 1995, there are both encouraging and discouraging signs about the future of nuclear 
proliferation. While China and France have fmally signed the NPT and Argentina, 
Brazil, and South Africa have been removed from the list of threshold states, a new 
nonproliferation focus has emerged: states which have breached their NPT or other 
nonproliferation obligations, or might (Iraq and North Korea, and Iran), and new states 
which have emerged with nuclear weapons on their territory following the dissolution of 
a nuclear-weapons state, the former Soviet Union (Ukraine). For the first time since the 
1960s, there is the perception that growing security concerns in the world with the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles and the downsizing of the U.S. 
military might touch off an increase in nuclear proliferation. 
One of the principal factors that has contributed to the increased concern over 
nuclear proliferation is the information revolution that has made nuclear technology 
available to everyone in the world. Futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler attribute the 
proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how not to the Cold War, but to the coming 
of the Third Wave - with its knowledge-intensive technologies, its corrosive impact on 
nations and borders, its information and communication explosion, its globalization of 
finance and trade - that has pulverized the premises on which arms-control programs 
have until now been based. "227 The information revolution has meant that much of the 
know-how to produce nuclear arms has been disseminated to just about anyone who 
wants it. Says Michael Go loy, a professor of nuclear engineering at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, "What's classified today is how to build a good weapon, not 
how to build a weapon. "228 
Up to the present, most of the international constraints designed to prevent or 
slow proliferation, the Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG) and unilateral export controls, 
have been aimed at controlling the supply of nuclear technology and materials in order 
227 Toffler, War and Anti-War, 199. 
228 Ibid. 202. 
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to prevent proliferation. U.S. policy has come to rely increasingly on export controls 
to regulate the supply of dual-use technologies, that is, technologies with both civil and 
military applications. Since such technologies are dispersed among the industrialized 
countries, export controls must be pursued in coordination with other suppliers. 
According to Brad Roberts and I anne Nolan, in an era of rapid global economic change, 
expanding economic activity, and nearly universal access to technology, material, and 
expertise, there cannot be a narrowly supply-side fix to the problem. 229 Attempts at 
supply-side fixes of the proliferation problem face significant new challenges, including 
the emergence of new suppliers of nuclear materials, chemicals, missiles, and associated 
technologies. The growing number of dual-use technologies tends to make list-based 
export controls even Jess manageable, to sharpen disagreements among suppliers, and to 
stoke the grievances of developing countries who view such controls as obstacles to 
economic development. 
The three primary objectives that motivate states to seek nuclear weapons have 
been identified as security, prestige, and leverage. At one end of the spectrum, mere 
possession of nuclear weapons is sometimes seen as a political and security talisman, 
enhancing prestige and deterring attack from hostile neighbors. This desire to become 
members of the "Nuclear Club" was a key factor in the decisions of Great Britain and 
France to develop nuclear weapons, and continues to be a factor, as Ukraine's reluctance 
to relinquish its inherited Soviet nuclear missiles attests. The most important demand for 
nuclear weapons, however, is for national security. For India, the security threat posed 
by China's nuclear and conventional forces (following China's defeat of India in 1971) 
was a key factor in India's decision to develop its nuclear arsenal. For some new 
nuclear powers, a readiness to threaten or actually use nuclear weapons offers a last 
resort deterrent to conventional military defeat, if not also possible national extinction. 
Such a last resort deterrence doctrine probably remains the dominant rationale behind 
229 Brad Roberts, Chemical Disarmament and International Security; and Janne E. 
Nolan, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World: The Limits of 
Nonproliferation." Arms Control Today (November 1989): 9-14. 
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Israel's nuclear weapons capability, and may also figure prominently in Pakistani nuclear 
calculations. 230 Ultimately, the success in preventing proliferation depends on 
persuading the "have-nots" that their security is enhanced if they forgo the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons. That persuasion must rest on the balance between the risks and 
benefits of nuclear weapons perceived by potential proliferants, as well as the importance 
the nuclear weapon states themselves assign to their nuclear weapons and the political 
leverage they appear to gamer from possessing them.231 
The political and military leverage inherent in nuclear weapons is one 
characteristic which makes them so attractive to Third World countries desiring regional 
hegemony and wishing to deter the U.S. from intervening. In the post-Cold War world, 
where the United States possesses overwhelming conventional military power, some 
Third World states see nuclear weapons as possible equalizers to the U.S. power. The 
majority of Third World countries have nothing similar to the OPEC oil weapon. Lack 
of similar leverage to enable the rest of the Third World to alter effectively the 
distribution of world resources and power can cause these countries to lose faith or tum 
to a weapon that can prove deadlier and more effective than oil: nuclear power. 232 
The danger of nuclear weapons proliferation is that in the hands of an aggressive leader 
nuclear weapons could be used to blackmail neighbors or compel their political and 
economic support. Still another possibility. of particular concern to the United States and 
its allies abroad, is that some new nuclear powers will seek to use the implicit or explicit 
threat to use nuclear weapons to undermine U.S. readiness to deploy forces to protect 
critical interests and allies. Their goal would be to tip the balance of political debate 
against running the risks of intervention. A good example of the likely scenario occurred 
230 Lewis Dunn, "Rethinking the Nuclear Equation: The U.S. and the New Nuclear 
Powers," Washington Quarterly 17, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 8. 
231 Wolfgang Panofsky and George Bunn, "The Doctrine of the Nuclear-Weapon 
States and the Future of Non-Proliferation," Arms Control Today (July-August 1994): 
9. 
232 Kothari, 6. 
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in 1993-94 when Japan and South Korea put pressure on the United States to soften its 
pressure on North Korea over its nuclear power program. Thus, the possession of 
nuclear weapons by a regional hegemon could reduce the ability of the U.S. or the other 
major powers to prevent aggression around the world. 
Another reason for the increased concern in the West over the future of nuclear 
proliferation is the rapidly approaching 1995 NPT Extension Review Conference at which 
its members must decide on how long to extend the NPT. While the conference is 
supposed to merely vote on the length of an extension, there is some concern that the 
conference might vote for a short extension or might be deadlocked. If past review 
conferences are a guide, the vast majority of NPT parties can be expected to 
acknowledge that, overall, the treaty has helped to head off runaway proliferation and 
has thereby added to their security. 233 In the wake of the revelations about the Iraqi 
and North Korean secret nuclear programs, questions are bound to be raised about the 
effectiveness of the NPT. If concerns persist about North Korea, then South Korea, 
Japan, and other countries in Asia could well be less prepared to give the NPT a 
wholehearted endorsement. Troublesome questions are likely to be posed about Iraq's 
ability to pursue an undetected clandestine nuclear weapons program in violation of its 
NPT obligations. If Iraq and North Korea are perceived to be able to circumvent the 
United Nations' demands over the long term, some renegade states might decide to join 
existing or new regimes with the full expectation of cheating. Similarly, if the 
international community is seen to be unwilling to enforce its will over the long term, 
few states are likely to take serious national security risks in opting for negotiated 
agreements rather than armaments programs. 
While security questions are likely to dominate the conference, the status of 
negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), a fissile material cutoff, and negative 
security assurances are likely to be key topics of discussion at the Conference. At each 
of the four NPT review conferences to date (held every 5 years since 1970), the slow 
233 Lewis Dunn, "NPT 1995: A Time To Shift Gears," Arms Control Today 
(November 1993): 15. 
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progress in implementing Article VI and its promise of negotiations towards a CTB and 
nuclear disarmament has been the most contentious issue among delegates. With the end 
of the Cold War, progress has been made in several key areas. China and France have 
become parties to the NPT, and have tentatively agreed to a comprehensive test ban. 
The U.S. and Russia can rightfully point to their progress in reducing their nuclear 
arsenals. Both the U.S. and Russia have agreed on a cutoff of production of fissile 
material for weapons in principle, and the U.S. is assisting Russia in phasing out its last 
operating reactors producing fissile fuels. 234 As a result of decisions by Congress and 
the Clinton administration in 1993, a CTB once again has U.S. support and negotiations 
are now in progress at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (CD). 
One of the positive results to come out of the Iraqi affair was that it altered 
political expectations regarding the breadth of safeguards coverage. Until the Iraqi case, 
the expectation of states was that the IAEA would verify that all declared nuclear 
material could be accounted for. Up to that point, states were more concerned with 
limiting the intrusiveness of the IAEA, and assumed that any undeclared or clandestine 
activity would be detected by other means, primarily intelligence sources. 235 After the 
discovery of Iraq's clandestine program the expectation was extended to providing 
assurance that no undeclared material or clandestine facilities or activities existed in states 
that had ratified the NPT or equivalent non-proliferation agreements with the IAEA.236 
Both in 1992 and 1993, the Board of Governors gave its support to measures aimed at 
increasing the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in states with full-
scope safeguards. These measures included confirmation of the Agency's right to 
conduct special inspections and to have increased access to information, including reports 
234 Panofsky and Bunn, 4. 
235 Lawrence Scheinman, "Lessons From Post-War Iraq for the International Full-
Scope Safeguards Regime," Arms Control Today (April 1993): 4. 
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on relevant exports and imports and new nuclear facilities. 237 The international 
community is, therefore, taking steps to tighten controls on nuclear weapons, but it may 
be too little too late. 
One of the limitations of the IAEA is its shortage of funding and inspectors. 
Prior to the Gulf War, the IAEA had the equivalent of only 42 full-time inspectors to 
check on 1,000 declared nuclear energy plants around the world. 238 By contrast, 
according to Alvin and Heidi Toffler, the U.S. fields 7,200 full-time inspectors to check 
on salmonella in its meat and poultry - 171 for each inspector sent by the world 
community to check the spread of the world's nuclear disease. In effect, the U.S. spends 
two and a half times each year to make sure its chicken and beef are okay than the IAEA 
spends to guarantee nuclear safety on the globe ($473 million versus $179 million).239 
2. Chemical/Biological Weapons 
Despite a 1925 international ban on chemical weapons (CW), the number of 
countries with chemical warfare development programs has increased from seven in 1972 
to twenty in 1988.240 Although only three countries out of the 179 UN members (the 
U.S., Russia, and Iraq) have admitted the possession of CWs, U.S. intelligence officials 
have identified fourteen countries in the developing world with offensive-oriented 
chemical warfare programs in 1991. 241 Many of the these nations have also engaged 
m Roland Timerbaev and Susan Welsh, "The IAEA's Role In Nuclear Arms 
Control: Its Evolution and Its Future Prospects," Nonproliferation Review (Spring-
Summer 1994): 22. 
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Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Additionally, Angola, 
Argentina. Cuba, Indonesia, and Thailand are suspected of possessing or of attempting 
to acquire CWs. See Sauerwein, International Defense Review, (November 1992): 1065. 
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in research in biological weapons, and have acquired ballistic missiles that can be used 
to deliver nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. 242 Given the simple technology 
required to make these weapons, this number could quickly expand. Any country 
capable of building a pesticide, petrochemical or detergent factory would be capable of 
building a facility to produce chemical weapons. Although lacking the power and 
leverage of nuclear weapons, many developing countries are being tempted to acquire a 
"poor man's atomic bomb" which could be used to wipe out unprotected civilians of 
rebellious minorities - such as the 4,000 Kurds killed in March 1988 in the Iraqi town 
of Halabja during the Iran-Iraq war -or to be used as leverage over neighbors. 
The biggest chemical weapon threat comes from the Middle East where the 
physical capability to produce chemical weapons is concentrated. While Iran, Libya, 
Egypt, Iraq, and Israel are suspected of having CW programs, Syria has the largest and 
most advanced chemical warfare program in the Arab world.243 Additionally, Syria 
has recently broadened its long-standing relationship with Iran to include cooperation in 
the acquisition and development of strategic weapons and related technology. Military 
cooperation may include cooperation in the nuclear arena, the joint production of North 
Korean "SCUD-C" and Chinese M-9 missiles, and perhaps the development of chemical 
and biological warheads for these missiles. 244 
During the Cold War, the two main possessors of CW stockpiles, the U.S. and 
the former Soviet Union, were inconsistent in their attitudes towards chemical weapons. 
The U.S. halted production of CWs in 1969, ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol in 1975, 
but then launched a modernization program with the production of binary artillery shells 
242 Testimony by the director of U.S. Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Thomas A. 
Brooks, to the Subcommittee on Sea Power, Strategic, and Critical Materials of the 
House Armed Services Committee, 7 March 1991. 
243 Michael Eisenstadt, "Syria's Strategic Weapons," Janes International Review 
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in 1986, which was stopped in 1990.245 The fonner Soviet Union for the first time 
acknowledged the possession of CWs in April 1987, and accepted the principle of on-site 
inspections. In May 1991 , the U.S. renounced its intention to keep a two percent 
retaliatory reserve of its stockpiles and President George Bush urged negotiators at the 
Conference on Disannament in Geneva to conclude a Convention banning chemical 
weapons. 
The UN General Assembly adopted the 192-page Draft Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development. Production. Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction in November 1992. Banning the use, possession, acquisition, 
production, development, and transfer of chemical weapons, the Convention has two 
objectives. The first is to destroy all CWs and, with some exceptions, all CW 
production facilities declared by the states. The second is to prevent the proliferation of 
new chemical weapons. 246 The ewe mandates a challenge-inspection regime, whose 
language had to be crafted to satisfy the U.S. constitutional prohibition on warrantless 
searches. 
Unfortunately, the Convention has several flaws which may reduce its ability to 
prevent the development of chemical weapons in the world. The principal doubts about 
the Convention have to do with its ability to verify compliance. The Convention calls 
for on-site challenge inspections to be carried out worldwide every year, which has 
produced estimates of total annual inspections as high as 500.247 Kathleen Bailey, an 
authority on chemical weapons proliferation, states that the verification regime for the 
ewe focuses on perhaps the least likely way of cheating: using declared facilities for 
245 Brigette Sauerwein, "Chemical Weapons Convention: Belling the Cat," 
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producing proscribed quantities of specified chemicals. 248 On the other hand, there are 
no effective means of verification that would prevent cheating by diverting commercial 
chemicals, developing nonclassical agents, using covert production facilities, or 
stockpiling hidden reserves of chemical weapons or bulk agents. Detecting diversion of 
common chemicals produced legitimately in large quantities is exceedingly difficult. 
Phosgene and hydrogen cyanide, for example, are used in industry, but can also be used 
as weapons. They are produced in large quantities in many countries. Satellite and 
aerial photography are of little use in fmding clandestine chemical plants. There are no 
unique features that make such facilities identifiable in a picture. The Iraqi nuclear 
example teaches how easily a clandestine weapons facility can be hidden, and a covert 
chemical weapons plant is even more difficult to discover than nuclear facilities. 
Chemical weapons are technologically easy to produce, inexpensive, effective in many 
scenarios, and difficult or impossible to detect. Thus, despite the ambitious hopes of the 
Convention, a chemical weapons ban may prove unverifiable. 
Biological weapons may emerge as the weapons of mass destruction of the next 
decade. In 1972, only four countries had biological warfare (BW) development 
programs. By 1994, reports indicated that eleven countries in the developing world were 
pursuing offensive-oriented biological warfare programs, and the number could be 
larger. 249 The revolution in bioengineering since the entry into force in 1975 of the 
global disarmament regime in this area, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BTWC), has raised concern about the ease with which biological warfare agents can be 
produced, stockpiled, and used in war, and about the new threats posed by novel, highly 
virulent agents. 
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The military significance and threat from chemical or biological weapons is a 
function of circumstance. The chemical and biological warfare capabilities of states of 
the developing world may be strategic in conflict against similar-sized competitors in 
their region if they can be used to achieve massively destructive effects. The threat of 
their use will then operate fundamentally on the perceived choices of the targeted nation's 
leaders. The evidence from the Gulf War may reinforce the desire to obtain chemical 
weapons on the part of those countries that believe chemical deterrence works. History 
shows that chemical weapons have never been used against an opponent in immediate 
possession of the means to respond in kind. 250 This was true at the outset of World 
War I, and in the conflicts between Italy and Ethiopia, Egypt and Yemen, Libya and 
Chad, and Japan and China. Tellingly, both sides in World War II had chemical 
weapons, but agreed not to use them. Only a handful of countries have the option of 
deterring chemical use with nuclear weapons like the U.S. did against Iraq (although 
several are pursuing nuclear weapons). Some countries that do not possess nuclear 
weapons or superior conventional forces may see procurement of their own chemical 
weapons as the only deterrent within their reach against the use of chemicals by their 
neighbors. The lessons of the Iran-Iraq War where Iran lacked any deterrent against 
Iraq's chemical weapons have not been lost on Iran or other countries bordering states 
which are suspected of having chemical weapons. Thus, the number of countries 
pursuing chemical weapons is likely to grow. 
3. Missile Proliferation 
Compounding the threat from nuclear, chemical or biological weapons is the 
emerging proliferation of the means to deliver these weapons over longer distances, 
particularly missiles. Few military systems better illustrate the significant technological 
thresholds that determine the character of threat presented by specific weapons. "In 
general," points out John Harvey, "ballistic missiles add a new level of capability even 
in those arsenals equipped with advanced fighter-bombers because of their speed (hence 
250 Bailey. "Problems with a Chemical Weapons Ban," 249. 
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surprise) and relative insusceptibility to countermeasures (survivability). "251 Yet 
because of their relative inaccuracy, limited payload, short range, and small number, 
some ballistic missile forces in the developing world have had little more than nuisance 
value. With the development of chemical and biological weapons and longer range 
missiles, this is changing. 
Given the dramatically increased military capability that ballistic and cruise 
missiles can provide for relatively small developing militaries, the proliferation of 
missiles is a cause for concern for the world. Particularly disturbing has been the sale 
to the Third World of ballistic missiles such as the former Soviet Union's SCUD-B/C 
and SS 12, and the Chinese M -9 and M -11, and the willingness of these countries to use 
them. In 1991, twenty-two countries in the Third World possessed ballistic missiles or 
were actively attempting to acquire them. Thirteen of these countries had programs to 
design and build ballistic missiles, and at least fifteen had operational missile forces. 252 
One official estimated that by 2000 six of these forces will have intermediate-range 
capability. 253 The threat posed by such weapons was proven during the Iran-Iraq war's 
"War of the Cities" when Iraq fired some 140-150 surface-to-surface missiles at Tehran 
alone. killing an estimated one to two thousand people.254 
Cruise missile proliferation has received slight attention but is more advanced than 
ballistic missile proliferation. According to a 1988 report, 76 countries boasted crew-
served missiles in their arsenals in 1985 compared with only 28 in 1970.255 By 1994, 
anti-ship cruise missiles from the U.S., Russia, China, France, and multiple sources had 
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been exported to virtually every navy in the world.
 Forty-eight navies field cruise 
missiles, including 2000 Exocets and 10,000 Styx surf
ace-to-ship missiles in developing 
countries alone.256 According to John Benedict, 
naval analyst at Johns Hopkins 
Applied Physics Lab, the United States has contribu
ted to this proliferation, as well, 
exporting its Harpoon cruise missile to twenty-one n
ations.257 
Although a majority of these missiles continue to be imported, the 
production 
capabilities of developing nations are improving. Te
n to fifteen countries are already 
producing cruise missiles.
258 
"Eight states (Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, North and South 
Korea, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and possible S
yria) already have some ability for 
missile development and production, including the abi
lity to modify or reverse-engineer 
SCUD-like missiles. Three states (Israel, India, and possibly Ta
iwan) are capable of 
producing more sophisticated missiles. "
259 These capabilities will surely increase over 
the next ten to fifteen years. Accuracy is improv
ing and range is increasing with 
propulsion systems fielding multi-stage systems. Wa
rhead technology may shift from 
basically high-explosive and limited chemical war
heads to submunitions, fuel air 
explosives. or even in some cases nuclear warheads. 
Export controls can, at best, only 
stretch out the development cycle, increasing developm
ent costs and impeding qualitative 
improvements. 
The motivations behind the acquisition of missiles a
re strategic, tactical, and 
fiscal. According to John Harvey and Uzi Rubin, o
nly a minority of states acquiring 
ballistic missiles appear to be buying them for their
 direct role as combat weapons. 
Among these are Pakistan and Iran, whose significa
nt air inferiority relative to their 
adversaries, India and (pre-Gulf War) Iraq, respectively, prompted
 the quest for ballistic 
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missiles as substitutes for air power; Taiwan, Israel, Iraq, and North Korea, which 
acquired missiles for strategic military purposes; and Syria, whose principle motive for 
acquiring the Soviet -made SS-21 seems to be the missiles potential tactical role. 260 
Ballistic missiles may also give certain renegade states an increasing ability to deter, 
threaten, or terrorize the major powers, due in part, to the fact that these states may 
someday acquire missiles with longer ranges than the types of aircraft exported to the 
developing world. For the United States, the threat remains well in the future since no 
countries other than Russia and China are expected to develop the capability to threaten 
U.S. territory with missiles for at least a decade. 261 Europe, however, is already more 
vulnerable to ballistic missiles from Africa or the Middle East. As Europe becomes 
more vulnerable to missile threats from these areas, it may become increasingly difficult 
for European political leaders to obtain public support for intervention in conflicts in the 
developing countries. 
A third reason many developing countries are acquiring missiles is the relatively 
small expense involved. The roughly 400 SCUD and its derivatives fired during the 
1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, for example, are believed to have cost some $1 million per 
missile. for a total cost amounting to just 0.2 percent of the combined military 
expenditures of both countries during that period. 262 In 1985, Saudi Arabia reportedly 
paid $2 billion for 50 conventionally-armed Chinese-built CSS-2 ballistic missiles, which 
represents only about 1.3 percent of its total military expenditures in the last decade. For 
weapons which provide a strategic deterrent value that is difficult to overestimate, the 
cost-benefit calculation would support a decision to acquire missiles. 
The major effort to arrest or slow missile proliferation in the Third World has 
been collaboration among the First World producer nations under the guise of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The goal of this voluntary organization, which 
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contains most but not all missile producers, is to gain voluntary restraint on the export 
of missiles and missile technology. While the MTCR has contributed to slowing down 
missile proliferation, its limitations include (1) that not all producing nations -especially 
not Third World producers - are members, (2) that it represents no legal or treaty 
obligation, and (3) that it allows collaboration on peaceful space programs that utilize the 
same technologies as weapons programs. 263 Unfortunately, by the time that the MTCR 
was enacted in 1987, it was too late to prevent the proliferation of tactical ballistic 
missiles and the technology to make them. The success of the regime has also been 
limited by the exclusion of two major exporters of missiles and technology, China and 
North Korea, from the negotiations leading up to the MTCR. Since the Gulf War, 
however, the MTCr has reportedly "taken on a new life. "264 The membership of the 
MTCR, which started at seven countries, now stands at eighteen, with three other states 
being considered for membership. Israel has passed laws legislating the MTCR 
guidelines; China has provided written assurance that it will abide by the guidelines; and 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin has indicated his nation's intention to fully adhere to the 
MTCR regime. North Korea is now the only nation openly marketing SCUD-Class 
ballistic missiles. 265 While these developments mark progress, the MTCR remains 
limited by the absence of Third World missile producers as members, and by continued 
reports of Chinese and North Korean sales of missiles to the Middle East. 
4. Implications of Weapons Proliferation 
Whether nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, the increasing dispersal of 
weapons of mass destruction threatens to raise a twenty-first century Leviathan. Yet 
curbing this diffusion, to say nothing of deterring the use of or stimulating actual 
reduction of world stocks, is a project well beyond the capacity of a single state or 
263 Snow, 157. 
264 Ibid, 16. 
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alliance of states. Weapons proliferation provides a strong case for collective action over 
unilateral action since proliferation can not be solved by one or a few states, and its 
dangers encompass everyone. The United Nations Special Commission in Iraq 
(UNSCOM) is an example of everyone in the international community buying into the 
NPT regime and it working. While the success of the Gulf War definitely set the stage 
for UNSCOM to work, the war merely provided the opportunity for countries to come 
together. The legitimacy of UNSCOM did not have to continue after the war, but it did, 
thereby showing the potential for international cooperation within the UN and the NPT. 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction despite international regimes and 
conventions prohibiting them poses three dangers to the United Nations and the 
international community: (1) it reveals a growing lack of legitimacy of these 
nonproliferation regimes; (2) it threatens the credibility of these regimes if not checked; 
and (3) it threatens the ability and will of the Security Council to intervene in conflicts. 
The violation of NPT obligations and restrictions by two member states, Iraq and 
North Korea, indicates a very dangerous decline in the legitimacy of the Treaty regime. 
These violations reflect a growing sentiment among the NPT nuclear "have-not" states 
that the NPT is discriminatory since it allows some states to have nuclear weapons while 
preventing others. This is similar to feelings among some developing countries that the 
UN Security Council has become dominated by the U.S. Although the U.S. and Russia 
have agreed to decrease their arsenals, the reluctance of either to destroy all of their 
nuclear weapons merely emphasizes the importance of the weapons to their security. 
Non-nuclear weapon states around the world faced with possible security threats find it 
increasingly difficult to forego the nuclear option. 
Weapons proliferation undermines the international legal regimes related to the 
control of armaments, and the norms they embody concerning the use of such weapons. 
It also erodes efforts to expand those regimes and norms. In the U.S., proliferation is 
likely to sharpen the debate about vital versus peripheral national interests, undermine 
the political support for military intervention or even long-term engagement. If this also 
results in greater uncertainty about the U.S. world role, other developed countries may 
seek to strengthen themselves militarily through acquisition of nuclear capabilities. 
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These challenges, though difficult, are not unmanageable. However, with defense 
cuts by the great powers and reductions in foreign aid, the importance of the UN will 
continue to increase. The key to managing Third World proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction is to rearrange the incentive system that makes these weapons attractive. 
As long as Third World states feel the need to own these weapons, there will be a 
demand for them that will attract suppliers. The most promise, therefore, is to be found 
in diplomatic strategies that reduce tensions in those regions threatened by proliferation. 
In the Middle East and in South Asia and East Asia, changing perceptions brought on by 
the end of the Cold War, the Persian Gulf War, and perhaps by the proliferation process 
itself have generated interest in new approaches to insecurity. There is growing interest 
in arms control and confidence-building measures in the Middle East and South Asia. 
A combination of effective development aid, active nation-building measures, and 
preventive diplomacy will, it is reasonable to hope, contain the level of conflict and 
eventually reduce the root causes as well. 
The key to the success of such diplomatic measures aimed at curbing proliferation 
will be the credibility of the US and the Security Council in reassuring states willing to 
gamble on cooperative measures and deferring states from planning or carrying out the 
exploitation of their military capabilities. Reassurance in the post-Cold War era will 
depend heavily, though not exclusively, on perceptions of the credibility of the U.S. 
deterrent posture, says Lewis Dunn. 266 If traditional American friends like Japan, 
South Korea, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey come to doubt either U.S. will to stand by them, 
or whether the threat of U.S. retaliation would deter nuclear blackmail or attack by 
regional enemies, pressures to seek nuclear weapons would increase. Reassurance in the 
post-Cold War world will depend not only on the willingness of the U.S. and the 
Security Council to deter aggression, but also on the legitimacy attributed to the Security 
Council and the international arms control regimes. If insecure or aggressive states 
perceive these bodies as unrepresentative or dominated by the interests of a few powers, 
266 Lewis Dunn, 15. 
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then they are more likely to disregard their resolutions or demands. The key is that 
reassurance is a long process and will depend on the legitimacy accorded to the UN. 
So we see that the world is faced with serious threats to both external and internal 
peace that raise challenges for the international community not foreseen by the UN 
founders. What is important about this is that merely tinkering with the UN to make it 
stronger will not help it deal with a fragmenting community of fragmenting states. The 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses an even more serious problem for the 
UN because any attempts to curb proliferation will depend on the legitimacy of the UN 
to succeed. If the UN is not perceived as legitimate, then proliferating countries are less 
likely to abide by the demands of the organization. The tricky side of the 
nonproliferation problem is that if international efforts to curb WMD's fail, they will 
erode the legitimacy of the UN and the NPT. The danger posed to the U.S. and its allies 
by such weapons should answer the question of "why do we need a UN?" Since 
weapons proliferation is a problem beyond the ability of any one country to stop 
unilaterally, the ability to sustain an international security regime is in the interest of the 
U.S. This raises the question "what are current challenges to UN legitimacy and its 
ability to build consensus in the world?" 
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V. KEY CHALLENGES TO UN LEGITIMACY 
The critical factor in whether the United Nations succeeds or fails at whatever 
endeavors it undertakes is the perceived legitimacy and credibility attributed to it by its 
member states. Legitimacy, in this sense, can be defmed as the "political authority and 
acceptability" of the organization. The United Nations does not own or control any 
territory; nor does it have its own army or central bank. The UN is therefore totally 
dependent upon the support of its member nations for its survival and success. If the 
United Nations' members perceive the UN as having justified authority - legitimacy -
then they are more likely to abide by its resolutions and sanctions, thereby making the 
UN more effective. Legitimacy can be built up by making the UN not only more 
representative, but also improving its credibility for successfully solving world problems. 
This does not necessarily mean that it needs military forces of its own, but it does need 
to be able to build consensus for action to back up its peaceful diplomacy and to give 
meaningful political weight to military operations taken in its name. 
The big picture from Chapter IV is that from the standpoint of the developed 
countries, the world is becoming a far more fragmented and dangerous place in which 
the countries of the developing world have more and more weapons and more voice in 
the world. This problem is not going away, and is likely to get bigger. The big 
challenge for the world entering the twenty-first century will be to find a way to bring 
this divisive world together. While the need for an international response to the new 
problems is driving the world together, the problem with the legitimacy of the UN is still 
there and getting bigger. 
Recent events in Bosnia have proven the difficulty of obtaining a consensus 
between countries for action, even between NATO allies, especially when the most 
powerful countries are unwilling to commit strong forces for decisive military action. 
Although Bosnia and Somalia have retaught the lessons from the Congo and Beirut about 
the fruitlessness of half-hearted intervention in civil wars, it also showed that even 
organizations with strong standby military forces, like NATO, can be hamstrung by a 
lack of consensus between nations. Giving the UN its own military forces might make 
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it more able to send forces to a conflict sooner, but without improving the United 
Nations' legitimacy and ability to build consensus in the world, the UN will continue to 
plagued by its ineffectiveness. 
While reformers have called for giving the UN its own standing forces as 
prescribed in the Charter, international response has been less than enthusiastic, and the 
UN has simply tried to expand the role of its peacekeeping forces into election 
monitoring, humanitarian missions, and peace-enforcement. The disappointing record 
of the UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Bosnia have revealed a threat to the 
United Nations far more serious than its inability to effectively command military forces: 
an alarming decline in the legitimacy granted the United Nations by countries or groups 
within countries. If the UN is indeed to have an enlarged role in security affairs, its 
decision-making structure and choice of where it intervenes must be seen as legitimate. 
This chapter will examine four key challenges to the legitimacy of the United Nations 
that decrease the organization's ability to respond to today's problems: a Security 
Council unrepresentative of the world's current power structure; the complicating issue 
of state sovereignty and international intervention; the overextension of peacekeeping into 
peace-enforcement; and the growing reluctance of the U.S. and the developed countries 
to accept the responsibilities of world leadership and response to conflicts. 
A. SECURITY COUNCIL REPRESENTATION 
One of the principal challenges to UN legitimacy is that the Security Council is 
unrepresentative of the current realities of power in the world. With the end of the Cold 
War and new-found agreement among previously hostile major powers, the Security 
Council is wielding considerable power and is clearly the single most important organ 
in the United Nations. 267 However, its revival has highlighted the gap between the 
Council and those states within the General Assembly not represented on it. This has 
267 Peter Wilenski, "The Structure of the UN in the Post-Cold War Period," in 
Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., United Nations. Divided World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 441. 
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generated demands that the composition of the Council no longer be dominated by the 
victors of the Second World War, but more accurately reflect the modem world. Other 
criticisms of the Security Council have included: concern that three of the Permanent 
Five powers- France, Britain, and the U.S. -make most of the agenda-setting decisions 
in running the Security Council; irritation, especially on the part of Germany and Japan, 
about "taxation without representation;" and frustration that the views of the non-
permanent members of the Security Council, and indeed of the great majority of the 181 
strong General Assembly, count for little. 268 If its decisions are to retain legitimacy, 
the Security Council will eventually have to adapt to the changing realities of power in 
the world. 
If the United Nations were being created today, it might look far different than 
it currently does. The problem is that the current structure does not reflect the realities 
of the contemporary world, but that of 1945. Like all constitutions written by people 
without the gift of detailed prophecy and acting to meet the pressing needs of the day, 
the Charter of the United Nations was destined to become, with the passing of time, an 
increasingly inadequate description of the organization that developed in response to the 
changing needs, changing interests of members, and the many pressures exercised within 
and upon it. 269 It does not include on a continuing basis the economic superpowers, 
Japan and Germany, or the largest regional powers such as India, Brazil, or Nigeria, or 
relatively wealthy countries like Canada or Italy. 
The principal weakness of the Security Council today is that it has displayed an 
inability to respond successfully to the new challenges to peace in the world since the end 
of the Cold War. Part of the Security Council's problem is that it has failed to adapt as 
the balance of power in the world has changed. If international power were conceived 
as a combination of geography and population, economic strength, and military assets 
and potential, the Security Council would have to expand. If geography were used as 
268 Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security.," 13. 
269 Goodrich, "The UN Security Council," 27. 
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a criteria for Council membership, seven countries exceed 1 million square
 miles of 
territory: Russia, China, USA, Canada, Brazil, India, and Argentina. Populat
ions over 
80 million would nominate: China, India, the U.S., Indonesia, Brazil, Russi
a, Japan, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mexico, and Germany. If we took GNP as a pro
xy for 
economic strength, with $300 billion as a cutoff point, the following countries would be 
considered: the U.S., Japan, Russia, Germany, France, Italy, the U.K.,
 Canada, 
Ukraine, China, Brazil, Spain, and India. Countries on both the population and
 GNP list 
include only three of the five permanent members (the U.S., Russia, and China), plus 
Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India. 
270 If regional powers and geographic distribution 
were considered, only about a dozen of the world's countries would qu
alify for 
consideration for the Security Council under this criteria. By any criteria, the
 Security 
Council's structure does not reflect the realities of power in the world, 
nor is it 
representative of the major countries and regions needed to build a consensus for action 
in the world. 
Another criticism of the Security Council has been that it is dominated by t
he 
Permanent Five members. The exclusive nature of the Council, along
 with its 
increasingly interventionist nature since the end of the Cold War, have
 elicited 
accusations of it being a "Big Power Club" which is pursuing a Western gre
at power 
agenda. UN forays into humanitarian intervention and internal conflicts 
have also 
increased concern in many developing countries about post-colonial colonia
lism and 
dominance by the rich states of the industrial North. The feeling of being ma
nipulated 
by the U.S., Britain. and France, which have dominated the Security Council
 since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, has sharpened recently around the issues of 
Haiti and 
Bosnia. On Haiti, the Clinton administration pressed and cajoled members to back a 
resolution authorizing an American invasion, although several nations had conce
rns about 
establishing a precedent for armed intervention to restore democracy. 
271 In Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina, the pace and level of United Nations operations have been largely dictated 
by Britain and France, which some Islamic countries believe are hostile to the Muslim-
led Bosnia government and unwilling to deal harshly with the Serbs who hold nearly 
three-quarters of the country. 
The country most often accused of dominating the Security Council is the United 
States. "There is already a mounting neurosis that the organization is being "hijacked" 
by the U.S.," says Anthony Parsons of Oxford University. "This anxiety was 
demonstrated in the Security Council in the context of the authorization of the U.S.-led 
coalition in December 1992 to use military force if necessary to distribute humanitarian 
supplies in Somalia. The majority in the Council insisted that the unqualified cane 
blanche of Resolution 678 should not be given, and that mechanisms should be 
established by the Secretary General to keep the Council informed. "272 The perception 
that the Security Council is dominated by the U.S., Britain, and France greatly decreases 
the legitimacy of the Council as an impartial international body, thereby decreasing the 
willingness of governments and non-governmental organizations to obey the Council's 
resolutions. 
There are considerable pressures to alter some of the Charter provisions on 
membership in the Security Council. In 1972, James Barros predicted that the "rigid 
composition of the Security Council's permanent membership in a world political system 
which is never static. and often sees the rise and fall of the power of states, is a 
constitutional defect in the Charter which raises the specter of future difficulties. "273 
The framers of the Charter, however, envisioned not a static but a dynamic institution 
that would evolve over time. A change is by no means impossible: in 1965, by formal 
272 Anthony Parsons, 121 . 
273 Barros. 3. 
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amendment of Article 23 of the Charter, the number of non-permanent members was 
increased from six to ten to reflect the tremendous expansion of states in the General 
Assembly after 1955.274 
Debate continues about changing the composition of the Security Council to 
reflect geopolitics (Japan and Germany) and geographic balance (representatives from 
regions, including Brazil, Mexico, or Argentina; Nigeria, Egypt, or South Africa; India, 
Indonesia, or Pakistan). Japan and Germany are candidates which figure on nearly all 
lists for Council membership. Both countries are irritated at their lack of representation 
on the Council, seeing it as an example of "taxation without representation." Japan's 
economic power is undisputed and it is the second largest contributor to the United 
Nations' budget (after the U.S.).275 Germany's preoccupation with domestic issues 
arising from its unification in 1990, and the long-standing caution lest Germany appear 
overly assertive in the sensitive sphere of international peace and security, have meant 
that its leaders have kept a low profile on the expansion issue. As Germany increasingly 
asserts itself in Europe, it is likely to become more vigorous in pursuing a 
reconsideration of its role in the multilateral system. The exclusion of these two 
powerful countries has encouraged them to use other forums, such as the G-7 group of 
industrial countries, thereby weakening the legitimacy of the UN by bypassing the 
organization. Richard Butler, Australia's UN representative, notes, however, that "if you 
want to amend the UN Charter, you have to have Security Council passage, two-thirds 
majority in the General Assembly and ratification in national parliaments. I do not think 
there would be a two-thirds majority just for adding Germany and Japan, since the 
developing world would see that as merely adding two more countries from the 
north. "276 
274 Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," 13. 
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The frustration of the great majority of the 181-strong General Assembly at their 
lack of representation and influence in the Council bas become increasingly evident at 
the United Nations since the end of the Cold War. Observed Clovis Maksoud, the Arab 
League's fonner observer at the United Nations, "As the General Assembly has been 
marginalized in the last two, three years, the developing nations of the south feel their 
input at the United Nations is almost irrelevant. "277 Besides the 63 countries which 
responded to Secretary General Boutros-Ghali' s proposal for a Security Council review 
conference in July 1993,278 a total of 17 countries used the debate on "An Agenda for 
Peace" to call for restructuring the Security Council, some calling for elimination of the 
veto as well. 279 An even larger group demanded an increased security role for the 
General Assembly in order to check the Council's activism, and some challenged the 
fairness and impartiality of Council decisions. 280 
Opposition to the expanding Security Council writ arises more often from 
resentment of its exclusivity than from a dislike of specific actions. Razali Ismail, 
Malaysia's chief delegate, said there was a growing estrangement between a few nations 
that make the big decisions and the others who are called on to carry them out: 
The major powers are not prepared to put out the adequate numbers of 
soldiers for peacekeeping, for example, so they count on us. Malaysia 
has 2, 700 soldiers on various fronts. We are in Somalia, in Angola, in 
Bosnia. Politically, it is no longer tenable for all of us to supply the 
troops - to pull the trigger, as it were, for the U.N. - without having the 
right to say something about the process of decision-making and what 
peacekeeping is all about. 281 
277 Ibid. 
278 Thomas Weiss, "Intervention: Whither the United Nations?" p. 117. 
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As a permanent member of the Security Council, the U.S. has voted for a rash of new 
peacekeeping missions over the past two years. Although the U.S. took the lead in 
supporting UN peacekeeping in Iraq, Cambodia, and Somalia following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the death of 18 U.S. Rangers in Mogadishu quickly resulted in a 
rethinking of U.S. policy in Washington. In the wake of the Somalia withdrawal, the 
U.S. contribution to U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world is meager. In May 
1994 the U.S. had 714 troops in three missions: the former Yugoslavia republic of 
Macedonia, western Sahara, and Israeli cease-fire lines. Thirty other countries- led by 
France with 6,603 troops deployed - had more peacekeepers on UN duty. 282 Among 
the developing nations, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico and 
Brazil are considered candidates for membership to the Security Council as regional 
powers with influence in the developing world. 
If the difficult hurdles of the Permanent Five vetoes and getting an amendment 
of the Charter ratified by two-thirds of the General Assembly can be overcome, perhaps 
the greatest practical risk in enlarging the Security Council is that decision-making would 
be more difficult. The behind-the-scenes negotiation of the texts of resolutions would 
become even more complex and tedious. Within the United Nations, there is 
considerable resistance, especially among the Permanent Members of the Council, to 
tampering with the Council just at the time it is showing it can work. As the geopolitical 
and geoeconomic realities change, however, the legitimacy of the Council's decisions will 
be undermined. The challenge is thus to ensure that any change to the Council's 
structure both accurately reflects current global power relationships and is implemented 
in such a way as to minimize any reduction in the speed and efficiency of the decision-
making process. Douglas J. Bennet, the Clinton Administration's Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Organization Affairs, notes that "to have this come out right, one 
has to come to a conclusion that everybody regards as legitimate. "283 
282 Meisler, p. Al8. 
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One approach to Council refonn under consideration would establish a second tier 
of five "alternating seats" between the pennanent and elected Council members.284 
Thus key regional countries might be paired, for example: (1) Europe: Gennany and 
Italy, (2) South Asia: India and Pakistan/Indonesia, (3) Pacific: Japan and the Republic 
of Korea, (4) Latin America: Brazil and Argentina/Mexico, and (5) Africa: Nigeria and 
Egypt. Only one would serve at a time, rotating annually or in two year cycles, but the 
potentially most helpful regional powers would thus be pennanently drawn into the work 
of the Security Council. The advantage of this proposal is that it would make the 
Security Council more representative without making the institution unwieldy. 
Failure to provide a credible response will continue to erode the Security 
Council's legitimacy. Since its decisions are not self-executing but require vigorous 
compliance by member-states, legitimacy matters. Perceptions of illegitimacy lead a 
large number of states to non-compliance or outright opposition, and their actions could 
nullify any measures the Security Council might attempt, threatening a return to the 
paralysis of the Cold War years. The international community can pretend that the 
potential for paralysis-by-veto no longer exists, and it can keep bringing more and more 
issues to the Security Council in the hope that all will go well. The alternative is for the 
Council to seriously begin laying the groundwork for a General Charter Review 
Conference to improve the legitimacy of the Security Council. 
B. SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES 
Complicating all of this is the issue of sovereignty. The legitimacy of the United 
Nations is increasingly threatened not only by the static membership of the Security 
Council, but also by the expansion of UN peacekeeping operations into missions which 
violate the traditional twentieth century concept of state sovereignty. The illusion of a 
new world order, alongside often violent disorder in many states, has produced a kind 
284 Lee, Pagenhardt, and Stanley, p. 22. See also Barbara Crossette, New York 
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of "new interventionism," as Stephen Stedman of John Hopkins characterizes it.285 
This outlook combines an awareness that civil war is a legitimate issue of international 
security with a sentiment for crusading liberal nationalism. Of immediate concern to the 
Security Council is how to react to situations of massive violence, humanitarian 
emergencies, breakdowns of authority, and gross abuses of human rights. The new 
interventionists wed great emphasis on the moral obligations of the international 
community to an eagerness for a newly available United Nations to intervene in domestic 
conflicts throughout the world. 
According to Stedman, many eager advocates of this new doctrine lack sufficient 
sense of the dilemmas, risks and costs of intervention. They often fail to take account 
of the special dynamics of civil war or the realistic limitations of the United Nations as 
the chosen vehicle for action. 286 The precepts of this doctrine chafe at traditional 
notions of sovereignty, remain contradictory and are leading international actors toward 
largely uncharted domain. This raises fundamental questions concerning the balance 
between national sovereignty and international responsibility, and about the nature of the 
United Nations' basic mission. Member states, many of which have ethnic skeletons in 
their own cupboards, are understandably reluctant to face such issues in general terms, 
or to create new legal criteria and precedents for international intervention. Increased 
support for intervention in the internal affairs of predominantly Third World states for 
humanitarian reasons raises fears in many developing countries who see sovereignty as 
the last guarantor of their independence. This conflict between a Western-dominated 
United Nations' agenda and the differing views and concerns of the poorer developing 
countries poses a serious threat to the legitimacy of the United Nations. 
285 Stephen J. Stedman, "The New Interventionists," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 1 
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1. Changing View of Sovereignty 
For much of the twentieth century and especially during the Cold War, the United 
Nations championed the idea of sovereignty, primarily because most less-developed 
countries (LDCs) were sensitive to outside interference in their internal affairs. Most 
non-Western countries raised the banner of state sovereignty to protect themselves from 
the unwanted interference of larger states, and the United Nations repeatedly upheld this 
principle in Security resolutions. Humanitarian crises were not seen as providing outside 
states with legal grounds for taking forceful action against an abusive state to assist the 
victims. The concerns of the great powers that actions would be for political gain were 
undergirded legally by the strength of the non-intervention provision in the UN Charter 
(Article 2(7)). 
Of all the controversies concerning Charter interpretation, the most persistent has 
been that revolving about the effect of paragraph 7 of Article 2, Chapter I of the Charter: 
Nothing contained in this present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the Charter. but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 287 
A review of the negotiations leading up to the creation of the United Nations (see 
Chapter II) shows that the Charter was designed by its framers to prevent the 
Organization from interfering in the affairs of each State, and to ensure that it could 
intervene only on the explicit request of a govemment.288 Article 2(7) embedded the 
doctrine of non-interference in the UN Charter, making it one of the strongest redoubts 
of state sovereignty in current international law. 289 With Article 2(7) thus restraining 
it from intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, the UN has 
traditionally been reluctant to become involved in what are ostensibly internal or 
domestic affairs, and its efforts have been belated and hesitant. 
287 See U.N. Charter. Russell and Muther, Appendix A. 
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The international nonn has, therefore, long been against intervention in another's 
domestic domain. Several developments since the creation of the UN have led to an 
erosion of this nonn. James Rosenau writes that "trends toward the relocation of 
authority are bound to contribute to the erosion of sovereignty. "290 In view of the 
centrality of Third World countries in the UN system, it is useful to note that the 
undennining of the sovereignty principle began with its redefinition in the decolonizing 
processes of the fonner European empires after the Second World War. In using self-
detennination as the sole criterion for statehood, irrespective of whether a fonner colony 
had the consensual foundations and resources to govern, a number of sovereign states 
were created, recognized, and admitted to the UN even though they were unable to 
develop their economies and manage their internal affairs without external assistance. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the UN began to reverse the nonn of non-interference by 
censuring the white governments of South Africa and Rhodesia for their policies of 
apartheid. The erosion of the sovereignty principle has rendered more subject to 
interpretation what the United Nations' mandates are. A vacuum has come to surround 
the sovereignty principle in a sense that the boundaries that divide the affairs of states 
and those of the UN are no longer clear-cut. Javier Perez de Cuellar, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali 's predecessor as Secretary General. remarked that the world was "clearly 
witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that 
the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and 
documents. "291 There are two reasons for this shift in international attitudes, especially 
in Western nations. One is the end of the Cold War, which eliminated one of the main 
purposes of the norm of nonintervention: the prevention of conflict among great powers 
trying to impose their own models of legitimacy on other countries; and the increasing 
290 Rosenau, 19. 
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acceptance of the protection of individual rights as an international norm with the growth 
of democracies. The latter tenet is in conflict with the principle of the inviolability of 
national sovereignty. 
The basis of the shift in the United Nations has been the interpretation of Article 
2(7) as allowing interference in the domestic affairs of states if Chapter VII enforcement 
measures were deemed necessary. 292 The Permanent Five members of the Security 
Council and the Secretary General have taken the lead in supporting this new 
interpretation of sovereignty. In the Security Council's 31 January 1992 Summit 
Declaration definitions of new threats to international security included "non-military 
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian, and ecological fields. "
293 
Here the United Nations is moving well beyond traditional definitions of international 
threats involving civil wars or the aggression of states. In fact, some at the United 
Nations have gone so far as to see that body as an international police force to protect 
the environment, avenge human rights abuses, stop humanitarian tragedies, and even 
right perceived social and economic wrongs. Sir Brian Urquhart, former U.N. Under-
Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, proposed a UN police force deployed 
to end random violence and perform armed police functions. 
294 The new interventionist 
trend has been exemplified by Boutros-Ghali and others in the UN leadership who have 
stated that the United Nations has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of nation-
states to correct human rights abuses. 295 He is unclear about how the United Nations 
plans to right all these wrongs with its peacekeeping forces, but the point is 
unmistakable: the United Nations has the right to use force against a sovereign nation, 
not because it has invaded another, but because it mistreats its own people. Given the 
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fact that many of the UN member-states are ruled by dictators, gaining an effective 
consensus on human rights in the United Nations in the near future is likely to prove 
very difficult. 
2. New Humanitarian Rationale for Intervention 
The interventionist trend in the United Nations has produce a new rationale for 
intervention: humanitarianism. The new interventionists advocate "a humanitarian order 
in which governments are held- by force, if necessary - to higher standards of respect 
for human life. "296 They contend that "the protection of ethnic, religious, and other 
minorities endangered by conflict and alienated from a hostile government is now 
increasingly a recognized obligation of the international community. "
297 To adherents 
of this approach, sovereignty is no longer a tool for creating international order, but a 
political constraint. Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has become 
actively involved in internal problems in El Salvador, Haiti, Croatia, Bosnia, Cambodia, 
Mozambique, Angola, northern Iraq, and Somalia. The problem with humanitarian 
interventions like that in Somalia is that everyone wants to do "something," but no one 
wants to accept the tremendous costs and commitment necessary to reestablish order in 
those countries. 
While proponents of this new involvement see this as an indication of future 
operations. it is important to note that the interventions in northern Iraq, Somalia, and 
Bosnia were notable because they did not involve the consent of the governments 
involved. Actions taken by the United Nations in response to Iraqi attacks on its Kurdish 
population in northern Iraq in 1991 have been seen as setting important precedents for 
humanitarian security. In April 1991 , alarmed by Iraq's persecution of its Kurdish 
minority and the mounting humanitarian and political costs of the Kurds' flight into 
296 Francis M. Deng and Larry Minear, The Challenges of Famine Relief: 
Emergency Operations in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), 
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neighboring Turkey and Iran, the Security Council adopted the unprecedented Resolution 
688. This resolution established a sweeping writ for international humanitarian action 
when human rights abuses were perceived. Overlooked, however, were the special 
circumstances that made the northern Iraqi operation an unlikely model for future 
collective responses. While UN Resolution 688 established a legal precedent, its 
practical relevance may have been moot: UN protective forces entered Iraq only after 
Operation Desert Storm demolished Iraq's capacity to resist. In short, humanitarian 
intervention could work in Iraq because it followed, not preceded, the most successful 
UN enforcement mission ever. 
The United Nations decision on December 4, 1992, authorizing the deployment 
of military force to provide humanitarian relief to starving Somalis was the culmination 
of year-long pressures in the West. Many of the same chorus of congressional leaders, 
political pundits, television commentators, and print journalists also clamored for U.S. 
military action to stop Serbian aggression. In tum, U.S. and UN intervention was urged 
in Liberia, East Timor, Sudan, Zaire, and Haiti as well. 298 In Iraq, Somalia, and 
Bosnia in 1993, the U.S. found what first seemed like a compelling substitute for the 
clear rationale of American intervention during the Cold War. The U.S. was drawn into 
each place to alleviate the suffering of civilians in what appeared to be a noble and low 
cost cause: humanitarian intervention. Only when 18 American soldiers were killed in 
an ambush in Somalia in mid-1993 did policy makers seriously begin to recognize the 
political and military risks entailed in half-hearted "humanitarian operations." 
3. Problems with Interventionist View of Sovereignty 
The principle problems with the new interventionist view of the United Nations 
is that interference in the domestic affairs of its member-states is fraught with a lack of 
consensus over sovereignty and by the danger of multiple interventions and overload. 
298 Stedman, 2. 
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The crux of the problem is that intervention in the domestic affairs of states is counter 
to the letter and intent of the UN Charter, and is therefore much more difficult to build 
a consensus for in the United Nations. 
One of the selling points used in the U.S. Senate debates over ratification of the 
Charter was that it would not be able to interfere in the United States' internal affairs. 
In 1945, the great powers codified this attitude with the veto, a provision that protects 
them even better than any domestic jurisdiction rule ever could. The strength with which 
countries have held onto their traditional view of sovereignty is shown by China, which 
in spite of its veto, still constantly cites the internal affairs restriction to fend off demands 
for democratization and protection of human rights. 299 Such ambivalence is even 
stronger among the veto less small states that make up the bulk of the General Assembly. 
One of the causes of the ambivalence of many states towards humanitarian 
intervention is the lack of consensus on a definition of human rights. While the 
importance of the individual appears to have increased in countries throughout the world, 
there is a notable difference in the rights and expectations of individuals between 
countries and cultures. A strong criticism of UN intervention to protect human rights 
is that the United Nations (read the Western-dominated Security Council) is attempting 
to impose its view of human rights on the rest of the world. The difference between the 
Western definition of human rights and much of the rest of the world has caused a 
backlash by developing countries which are wary of broad definitions of rights many of 
their citizens do not have. Proponents of intervention for humanitarian purposes claim 
that there is a consensus about intervening to protect people who are abused by their 
governments. The problem is in defining what constitutes abuse and what human rights 
the UN will protect. The dangers seen by many developing nations are the precedents 
this sets for future intervention. 
This is relevant to the United States because while its definition of human rights 
differs from many developing states, the UN definition differs from that of the U.S. A 
299 Terry L. Deibel, "Internal Affairs and International Relations in the Post-Cold 
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number of UN documents purport to explain the concept, but their definitions remain 
vague and contradictory. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United 
Nations has adopted a very broad notion of "rights," declaring in part, "Everyone who 
works has the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring himself and his family 
an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means 
of social protection. "300 Such rights are not only different from traditional U.S. 
interpretations of individual liberty, they are incompatible with it. As a Security Council 
member with a veto, the U.S. can protect its sovereignty if it disagrees with the UN 
definition of human rights. 
For most developing nations without a veto, the new humanitarian intervention 
policy causes great concern over the UN using it to justify intervention. Canada's 
Ambassador to the UN, Louise Frechette, made the point that "developing countries in 
particular are wary of UN mandates to intervene without the consent of the host 
government. "301 "Even though most wanted intervention in Somalia," she said, "they 
would have opposed it if directly polled, for fear that consent would be taken as approval 
of a principle in support of intervention." Many southern countries are concerned that 
"humanitarian" Security Council resolutions, like those on access of international 
humanitarian organizations to parts of Iraq, and on intervention in Somalia, could be 
used against them. Most less-developed countries have been zealous defenders of the 
principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty, and they have been joined en bloc, 
for obvious historical reasons, by the Latin American states. In particular, China has 
long held to its central principles of sovereign equality of states and non-interference in 
internal affairs. Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng struck a discordant note at the January 
1992 Security Council Summit when he insisted that China would consistently oppose all 
external interventions in the internal affairs of sovereign states "using human rights as 
300 Jeffrey Gerlach, 234. 
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an excuse. "302 The stridency of Li's speech and China's desire to lead the developing 
countries suggests that the world could see the emergence of the Chinese veto on human 
rights issues. 
In today's circumstances the U.S. and its junior partners must guard against a 
return of the notion that what is good for Washington is good for all. In particular, too 
intrusive a policy towards the domestic jurisdiction of states which do not measure up 
to Western criteria will make such states - China being the leading example - doubt 
whether the UN is serving their interests. Fresh divisions will open, and the backlash 
will reduce the effectiveness of the whole organization. 
In addition to lacking a consensus supporting humanitarian interventions, if the 
UN decides to use its power for humanitarian ends it will set dangerous precedents for 
UN intervention, and will face the risk of multiple interventions overseas in a variety of 
different scenarios. Almost by definition, its purposes will be difficult to achieve, and 
it should expect its costs to be high and in many cases unanticipated. Calls for declaring 
the preservation of all human life to be a vital interest of the United States would require 
Washington to intervene in scores of places throughout the world. 303 Americans may 
hope that governments around the world respect the rights of their citizens, but that hope 
disregards not only current international conditions, in which barbarism is widespread, 
but virtually the entire history of human existence. 
The difficulty of finding a consensus within the UN about sovereignty, human 
rights, and humanitarian intervention threatens the UN with the loss of support of its 
member-states, and hence, its legitimacy. The UN only functions to full capacity when 
all members believe that it is working in their national interest. The United Nations 
cannot be any more successful than international politics and powerful international 
players allow. The United Nations can never be an independent political force on the 
302 Tad Daley, "Can the U.N. Stretch To Fit Its Future?" Bulletin of the Atomic 
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world scene. At best, it will be an accurate reflection of the competing interests of 
sovereign nations. For all the current talk about the purported anachronism of states and 
national sovereignty, it is instructive to remember that the United Nations is indeed a 
body of states dedicated to the notion that the sovereign unit of international politics is 
the nation-state. The internal affairs convention and the prohibitions that accompany it 
have not lost their utility in the post-Cold War world. As Congressman Lee Hamilton 
(D-Ind.) wrote, "The principle of nonintervention has played an important role in 
maintaining international peace and stability. It should not be cast aside lightly. "304 
C. PEACEKEEPING OVEREXTENSION/MISSION CREEP 
The debate over sovereignty and intervention in the domestic affairs of states is 
closely tied to the rapid growth in the number and type of peacekeeping missions begun 
since the end of the Cold War. Although UN peacekeeping was a product of the 
stalemate in the Security Council during the Cold War, the end of that war did not result 
in a decline in its use, but a sharp increase. While Operation Desert Storm exemplified 
a new era of cooperation between the major powers, the success of past peacekeeping 
efforts, especially during the late 1980s, marked it as the tool of choice for dealing with 
all of the new challenges to peace that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Harvey Sicherman, president of the Foreign Policy Institute, notes that "in a way, the 
U.S. has been experimenting anew with the Wilson approach over the past two years, 
envisioning a vast expansion of UN peacekeeping to "right every wrong" and using 
sanctions as the major tool of enforcement against aggression. "305 However, this desire 
to have the UN take care of all problems in the world has not been matched by the 
willingness to provide it with the necessary resources. 
The problem with the expansion of peacekeeping missions is that it has stretched 
UN resources to the limit, resulted in half-hearted support of peacekeeping forces being 
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in peace-enforcement missions for which they were ill-prepared, and overlooked the 
essential dependence of the UN on the support of its members. Although the UN 
peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Somalia seem to make a case against UN 
involvement in intrastate missions, a key factor in these missions has been the lack of 
great power consensus and support for how to solve them. The missions may or may 
not be doable by the UN, but when they are done in a half-hearted manner without a 
clear strategy and decision to succeed, such operations lack staying power essential to 
such missions. 
The resurgence in enthusiasm for intervention in civil wars, humanitarian crises, 
and nation-building is reminiscent of the early years of the 1960s and the controversial 
Congo peacekeeping mission and the Vietnam war. Speaking in 1962, Senator Henry 
Jackson spoke out against overextending the United Nations, stating that he had "serious 
doubts about current suggestions to provide UN presences to help halt infiltration of 
guerrillas across frontiers, and to help halt internal subversion instigated by a foreign 
power. "306 The same problems that hounded intervention forces in the Congo (1960-
64) and in Vietnam have resurfaced in the UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia and 
Bosnia. While the U.S. has backed away from peacekeeping since Somalia, the problem 
of UN peacekeeping overextension and mission creep into peace-enforcement spotlights 
the tradeoffs that the UN makes when it shifts from a neutral peacekeeping role into a 
non-neutral enforcement role. 
1. Traditional Peacekeeping 
Part of the problem with the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia was that the 
UN broke a key rule of peacekeeping: remain neutral. It was not the use of force in 
Somalia that doomed the operation, but the use of force asymmetrically on one side. As 
long as the U.S./UN peacekeepers were seen as not taking sides, the situation was 
manageable. When the UN changed the mandate of the mission to include capturing 
306 Henry Jackson, 48. 
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Mohammed Aidid, one of the most powerful clan leaders, the whole situation took a tum 
for the worse because the peacekeepers were no longer seen as neutral. 
Peacekeeping, not mentioned in the UN Charter, was originally developed during 
the post-war decolonization period as a means of filling the power vacuums caused by 
decolonization, and of reducing the friction and temperature, so that an effort could be 
made to negotiate a permanent settlement of post-colonial conflict situations in Palestine, 
Kashmir, Congo, Cyprus, and elsewhere. 307 From 1956 on, especially in the Middle 
East, peacekeeping proved a useful method of disengaging the combatants after a conflict 
and establishing a neutral buffer zone between them. Throughout the history of 
peacekeeping, it has maintained certain characteristics seen as essential to its success. 
The most relevant previous example of peacekeeping was the 3000-strong League of 
Nations International Force set up at the end of 1934 to ensure that the Saar plebescite 
(to decide whether the Saar should join France or Germany) was conducted 
appropriately. Bowen suggests that "the secret of its success lay in the fact that the force 
represented a 'neutral' or truly international force which was able to remain aloof from 
the political issues of the plebescite and thus obtain the respect and support of the 
population. "308 From their beginnings, therefore, peacekeeping forces obtained their 
legitimacy and success by their neutral, international nature which kept them above the 
conflict. 
As mentioned above, the United Nations created the first large-scale peacekeeping 
force in 1956 in response to the Suez canal crisis and the deadlock in the Security 
Council. Lacking any constitutional basis in the UN Charter, traditionally, peacekeeping 
forces were sent only with the consent of the country or countries in which they were to 
be stationed. Unlike combat units, peacekeeping forces are not designed to create the 
conditions for their own success on the ground. These conditions must preexist for them 
307 Urquhart, "The U.N. and International Security After the Cold War," 91-2. 
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to be able to perfonn their role. Sir Brian Urquhart, a man who was prese
nt at the 
creation of UN peacekeeping in the 1940s and 1950s, defmed peacekeeping as: 
The use by the United Nations of military personnel and fonnations not 
in a fighting or enforcement role but interposed as a mechanism to bring 
an end to hostilities and as a buffer zone between hostile forces. In effect 
it serves as an internationally constituted pretext for the parties to a 
conflict to stop fighting and as a mechanism to maintain a ceasefrre. 
309 
The then UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Marrack G
oulding, 
defined it as "United Nations field operations in which international personnel,
 civilian 
and/or military, are deployed with the consent of the parties and under UN com
mand to 
help resolve actual or potential international conflicts, or internal conflicts w
hich have 
a clear international dimension. "3
10 Traditional peacekeeping essentially attempted to 
overcome a coordination problem between two adversaries by ensuring transpare
ncy and 
compliance to agreed upon rules. The keys to peacekeeping has always b
een the 
agreement of the disputants to the United Nations' role and their neutrality. 
Important to note is that United Nations peacekeeping has been most effectiv
e 
when its role involved only mediating and observing peace successfully broug
ht about 
by other parties. The Suez crisis confirmed the UN in its most fruitful line of e
ndeavor: 
the stationing of international peacekeeping forces between mutually hostile an
tagonists 
at that crucial moment in a dispute when both sides perceive disengagement as p
referable 
to continued hostilities. 311 In El Salvador, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, a
nd other 
Cold War crisis zones, the UN has proven effective to different degrees in fa
cilitating 
the establishment of peace and order once a cease-fire has been established. As 
the Cold 
War ended, the warring factions backed by the Soviet Union lost their patron a
nd were 
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forced to give up fighting and accept the democratic process. The UN was called in 
afterwards to help implement agreements already reached by individual states. These 
operations showed that when a situation called for classic peacekeeping - agreement 
between warring parties who have reasonable command and control over those with 
weapons- the UN can do the job. UN experience in Namibia and El Salvador showed 
that the organization could play a role in ending civil wars after both parties had reached 
public agreement on ending hostilities. 
Besides any immediate calming effect, UN peacekeeping activities have, often 
with reasonable success, served a two-fold purpose. The first is that of helping manage 
situations which cannot yet be resolved, because either the international community, or 
those closely involved in the problem, or both, are not yet able to agree on a feasible and 
just solution. This seems to have been the case in Cyprus, Kashmir, and Israel/Palestine. 
Where there has been no fundamental agreement, however, peacekeeping is more likely 
to become part of the problem inasmuch as it can provide an excuse not to tackle actual 
peace-making. The success of classic peacekeeping has proven to be a mixed blessing, 
insofar as it has increased support for the institution, but has also encouraged an 
expansion in the number and type of missions given to peacekeepers, without a clear 
understandings of the ramifications of the new missions. 
2. Expansion of Peacekeeping Missions 
The expansion in the number and type of peacekeeping missions since the end of 
the Cold War has placed a premium on the legitimacy of the UN, while at the same time 
damaging that legitimacy by crossing the line of neutrality. Despite the success of 
Operation Desert Storm and its vision of great power coalition forces as prescribed in the 
UN Charter, the predominant mechanism now used by the United Nations for conflict 
control is peacekeeping. Unfortunately, there are concerns that the UN is simply 
incapable of playing the role that the new interventionists demand of it. The organization 
is currently overextended and underfunded. More peacekeeping operations were initiated 
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in the nine years from 1985 (20) than in the United Nations' previous forty (13).312 
This unwillingness of the UN, and more specifically, the members of the Security 
Council which authorized them, has spread UN forces more thinly around the world and 
reduced the ability of the UN to keep forces in place, thereby implying a lack of 
commitment and will to persevere. The estimated cost of peacekeeping grew from $750 
million in 1991 to $2.9 billion in 1992.313 As of March 1994, the United Nations ran 
17 peacekeeping missions with 72,000 troops and police at an annual cost of $3.2 billion, 
of which member nations had contributed only $2 billion, with $900 million in 
arrears. 314 With the United Nations' burgeoning commitments, the bill for 
peacekeeping operations is much higher than ever before, and is more than the regular 
budget of the UN. 315 There is, therefore, a split between calls for intervention around 
the world, and the willingness of its largest contributors, especially the U.S., to incur 
increasing costs for its operations. 
The crux of the problem is that the UN has attempted to take on overly ambitious 
peace-enforcement missions using the same peacekeeping forces it used before, while 
lacking the support of all of its members. According to Thomas Weiss, the three UN 
peacekeeping missions begun in 1992 - Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Somalia - are so 
different in scope and mandate that they can be characterized as peacekeeping operations 
only by stretching analytical categories to the breaking point. 316 These new kinds of 
operations are qualitatively and quantitatively different from their predecessors: the 
consent of the parties cannot be assumed, and the levels of military effectiveness that 
may be required from UN forces go far beyond the parameters of a traditionally lightly 
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anned and ad hoc peacekeeping force, as do the dangers. The most recent missions have 
been far more complex than the old missions, requiring more troops, equipment, and 
support structures. Their scope now includes the disarming of factions, the return of 
refugees, temporary administration (in Cambodia), assisting humanitarian relief, and the 
organization and supervision of elections. The common theme for all of these new 
missions is the critical importance of a United Nations that is perceived as legitimate, 
neutral, and possessing the ability to build consensus for UN action necessary to give it 
staying power. 
One of the most damaging aspects of the expansion of peacekeeping missions 
relates to the unreal expectations of peacekeeping built up in the Western media and 
elsewhere. Marrack Goulding stressed that "peacekeeping is not a magic wand: it can 
only succeed in conditions where the parties wish to cooperate. It needs to be related to 
peace-making attempts to find lasting solutions to the underlying causes of the 
conflict. "317 The overextension of the UN has resulted in a dispersal of its slim 
resources, thereby reducing its chances of success. The failures of the UN from this and 
its overly ambitious missions has thus been compounded by unrealistic public 
expectations around the world. One of the most controversial aspects of the new 
missions is that they have involved internal conflicts or civil wars, which have raised 
sovereignty questions, as well as questions about the wisdom and legitimacy of 
intervention in internal conflicts. 
3. Shift from Peacekeeping to Peace-Enforcement 
This shifting from traditional peacekeeping missions to peace-enforcement has put 
a premium on the legitimacy of the UN and its will to persevere. When legitimacy and 
persistence are problematic, it makes these missions much more difficult to carry out, 
thereby negatively reflecting on the UN. It is like police in an inner city who are face 
with difficult problems of gangs, drugs. violent crime, and many others. The degree to 
which the police are perceived as being not neutral or lacking staying power directly 
317 Marrack Goulding, The Times (London), 1 October 1992. 
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affects their ability to succeed in their job of keeping the peace. The shift from 
peacekeeping to peace-enforcement missions has been driven by the shift from interstate 
conflicts to intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold 
War and the information revolution, there is little to distract the world from the ethnic 
conflicts and humanitarian tragedies that is shown on televisions around the world. This 
has contributed to an increase in enthusiasm for intervention in the internal affairs of 
other states for "humanitarian" purposes, as mentioned above. While the goals may be 
noble, the intervention of the UN in civil conflicts has proved difficult, costly, and 
unsuccessful in Bosnia and Somalia. Lacking any peace to keep, peacekeeping forces 
have seen their missions expand into peace-enforcement, or warfighting, operations for 
which they were ill-equipped because the lack of U.S. leadership and will to build 
consensus for action has doomed such half-hearted measures. 
One assumption often made by proponents of UN intervention in civil wars is that 
civil war today is more prevalent, violent, and threatening to international security than 
in previous eras. 318 They tend to believe that active international intervention is 
necessary to bring a semblance of order to the post-Cold War world, based on the 
dubious presumption that the Cold War's end makes internal violence somehow more 
tractable. Today's civil wars should not be expected to be more amenable to negotiation. 
They will remain among the most difficult conflicts to settle politically. In the twentieth 
century about 18 percent of civil wars ended with the elimination or unconditional 
surrender of one party. 319 The end of the Cold War peels away one layer of conflict 
from civil wars, but it also significantly reduces their ability to influence former internal 
allies. 
Peace-enforcement in civil wars is more difficult than peace-enforcement in 
interstate wars for several reasons. One of the principle differences is that civil wars 
often require a long-term presence as an army of occupation, making the occupying force 
318 Stedman, 3. 
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vulnerable to attack, and requiring a long-tenn will to persevere. As the Somalia case 
reveals, the U.S. lacks this will when its vital interests are not perceived to be at stake. 
Also, there are no clean civil wars: enemies are rarely concentrated, visible, and 
vulnerable; and it is often difficult to distinguish between civilians and soldiers or 
enemies and allies. Brian Urquhart notes that "the tragedy in Bosnia has shown that 
international organizations are not able to deal effectively, and when necessary forcefully, 
with violent and single-minded factions in a civil war. "320 While UN troops may carry 
international legitimacy, internal parties will still command the asymmetries of civil war: 
parties win by not losing; the will of those who intervene will wane over the long tenn 
if resource and human costs run high; and intervention will be one of many for outsiders, 
whereas internal actors will be singleminded in their dedication. 321 
In domestic conflicts the consent of all parties is likely to remain a compelling 
requirement. It was clearly shown in non-UN undertakings, in Lebanon in 1983-84, and 
more recently in Liberia, that without the consent of all parties grave risks are involved 
and the results can be disastrous. The problem with intervention in civil wars, as in 
humanitarian interventions, is that the peacekeepers are likely to encounter detennined 
opposition which has political goals that the peacekeepers may not be a position to grant. 
The U.S. belatedly discovered in Somalia that if the political goals of the warring 
factions are ignored - if they are seen as a politically neutral - then no peacekeeping 
operation sponsored by the UN or any other multinational organization is likely to 
succeed. Peacekeeping will meet resistance by local fighters who have more to lose than 
the UN forces, and more to gain if the UN fails. 
The UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960-1964 was the most controversial 
of all UN peacekeeping operations and has often been cited as an example of the legal, 
humanitarian, and political pitfalls of peacekeeping, especially when it moves into peace-
enforcement. It taught that attempting to keep the peace in civil wars was hazardous, 
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and virtually impossible to contain, let alone resolve. 322 The Congo operation is also 
seen as an example of a UN operation failing to enact peace and order due to a 
misguided peace-enforcement effort. The shift of the Congo operation from 
peacekeeping to peace-enforcement shattered the consensus within the UN that originally 
led to the United Nations' involvement. The lessons from the Congo operation were, 
therefore, that UN peacekeepers should stay out ofcivil wars and peace-enforcement, and 
that the UN could not create what did not already exist: a willingness on the part of the 
warring parties to negotiate a peace. 323 
While there may be a cause for the U.S. and UN to step into civil wars for 
reasons of international security, the goal of intervention must be clearly defined. Only 
a combination of coherent strategy, sufficient leverage and a keen sense of timing will 
allow a third party to bring peace. Stephen Stedman asserts that "most civil wars 
become amenable to settlement only after they have played themselves out with 
ferocity. "324 A short-term emphasis on cease-fires may only prolong conflicts and 
mitigate against parties perceiving that their survival depends on political settlement. 
It is in the gray area between peacekeeping and all-out warfighting that the UN 
has gotten itself in serious trouble. The trouble stems from the fact that the United 
Nations has misapplied perfectly good tools to inappropriate circumstances. The reason 
for this predicament is that although the Security Council members have been reluctant 
to use their own forces for coalition enforcement operations (with the notable exception 
of Desert Storm), they have been reluctant to provide the Secretary General with the 
resources necessary to a Chapter VII use of force assignment. The result is that the 
Secretary General has managed enforcement operations with tools better suited Chapter 
VI peacekeeping ventures. According to John Ruggie of Columbia University, "the 
United Nations has merely ratcheted up the traditional peacekeeping mechanism in an 
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attempt to respond to wholly new security challenges. The result is that the majority of 
the nearly 70,000 blue-helmeted peacekeepers now out in the field serve in contexts for 
which peacekeeping was not intended. "325 The distinction between peacekeeping and 
peace-enforcement is becoming further blurred by the increased use of "humanitarian" 
issues as a reason for intervention. In Bosnia, it was widely feared that a change from 
peacekeeping to peace-enforcement could, as happened in the case of ONUC, undermine 
the political acceptance of the original peacekeeping force. 
This growing misuse of peacekeeping has not only strained the United Nations 
materially and financially, but it has brought the world body to the point of outright 
strategic failure by putting at risk its impartiality and legitimacy. Inis Claude warned 
that "there is nothing to gain and much to be lost by stretching the concept of 
peacekeeping to cover missions that must engage in full-scale military operations to 
frustrate governments or other armed entities that are determined to fight for their 
objectives. "326 In carrying out their mandates, peacekeepers have benefited from the 
legitimacy and impartiality that the UN can provide, and from the commitment of the 
international community to peacekeeping. The British army, drawing from its experience 
in Bosnia and its long tradition of "imperial policing" has developed a new tactical 
doctrine analyzing the dangers of peacekeepers sliding into peace-enforcement missions. 
The multinational force in Beirut, and more recently UNOSOM II in Somalia have 
demonstrated what seems likely to happen if a peacekeeping force crosses the line of 
impartiality divide between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. If perceived to be 
taking sides, the force loses its legitimacy and credibility as a trustworthy third party, 
thereby prejudicing its security. The forces' resources will then become ever more 
devoted to its need to protect itself. It actually joins the conflict it was there to police 
and is likely to become embroiled in activities that are irrelevant to the overall campaign 
325 John G. Ruggie, "Wandering in the Void: Charting the UN's New Strategic 
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aim. 327 The use of peacekeeping forces for peace-enforcement duties risks not only the 
success of the operation, since peacekeepers are not equipped for enforcement operations, 
but also their effectiveness as peacekeepers in that operation as well as future operations. 
If a peacekeeping mission can easily be made into a peace-enforcement mission, nations 
around the world will be even more wary of allowing UN forces within their borders, 
thereby reducing their utility in their primary role. 
4. Dependence of UN on Support of Members 
The trend in UN operations has been toward more interventions in intrastate 
conflicts and peace-enforcement operations overlooks the fact that the UN depends on the 
support of its member nations for its effectiveness and power. The roots of the United 
Nations' ineffectiveness in peace-enforcement and humanitarian interventions lies not in 
its design, but in its basic character: It cannot conduct military operations on its own. 
That is the business of sovereign states. States, not multinational organizations, have the 
authority to raise and deploy troops. Their authority springs from their political 
legitimacy; that legitimacy - stemming from a common history and a sense of common 
destiny - cannot be transferred by fiat to an international organization. 
As policy makers ponder the wisdom of expanding the United Nations' role of 
peacekeeping, they should remember one fact: the United Nations remains a mere 
instrument of nation-states, and its success or failure depends, as always, not mainly on 
the United Nations itself, but on the degree to which sovereign nation-states believe that 
international cooperation suits their own national interests. This fact defines both the 
limitations of and the opportunities for the United Nations as a peacekeeping body. The 
problem with civil wars and peace-enforcement is that it is much more difficult to build 
support and a consensus for action than for interstate aggression. In Bosnia, differences 
between the Permanent Members of the Council have become increasingly pronounced 
over the civil war and the use or non-use of force, leaving serious doubts about the 
327 Mats R. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping," 
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general advisability or even viability of peace-enforcement. 328 The Security Council 
has therefore made frequent paper threats while lacking either the capability or the will 
to carry them out, eroding its own credibility in the process. 
Although conventional wisdom appears to be that peacekeeping is evolving toward 
a much greater use of force in interventions without the consent of the parties, it should 
not be forgotten that any peacekeeping operation depends on the ability of a disparate, 
often distracted, international community to forge the political consensus and the will to 
act together. As Norman Cousins has written, the international community is still more 
an arena than it is a community. It will not be easy, he continues, to muster broad 
political support for major military interventions against the wishes of one or more of the 
significant parties to a conflict; and this kind of broad support will be a prerequisite to 
action because the major powers are increasingly constrained. 329 
Peace-enforcement will continue to hurt the legitimacy of the United Nations as 
long as the Security Council and the operations it orders are perceived as not being 
neutral, and as long as such operations lack the will and support to provide them with 
staying power. Among the developed nations, the inability of the UN to successfully 
carry out peace-enforcement leads to a perception of an inefficient, ineffective 
organization that could involve their forces in poorly planned missions around the world. 
Convincing nations to put the lives of their soldiers on the line in far away places when 
national interests are not at stake is far more difficult than gaining support for 
peacekeeping. In developing countries, apprehension about UN interventions in their 
internal affairs decreases the political acceptability and justifiability - in other words, the 
legitimacy - of the United Nations, and hence, its effectiveness. The developing 
countries, therefore are the most apprehensive group about the new trends in UN policy. 
Some are worried about the potential interlinking between peacekeeping and peace-
328 Morphet, 233. 
329 Ernie Regehr, "The Future of Peacekeeping," in Alex Morrison, ed., The 
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enforcement and the increasing fmancial burdens imposed by the proliferation of 
peacekeeping bodies. Leland Goodrich once wrote that "it would not be realistic to 
expect that states would be willing to vest in any international authority the power to 
impose a settlement in disputes and situations where important national interests are in 
conflict. Certainly there is little likelihood of the major powers agreeing to such a 
limitation on their freedom of action. "330 Peace-enforcement and intervention in 
internal conflicts are seen as giving the UN powers which many nations are not yet 
willing to relinquish. The reality of the importance place on sovereignty by developing 
countries will override any rhetoric in the UN supporting human rights and a stronger 
UN. 
D. RELUCTANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACCEPT RESPONSffiiLITIES 
One of the key features of the post-Cold War era has been the continuing 
reluctance of the Permanent Five powers on the Security Council to accept their military 
responsibilities. The United Nations' reluctance to intervene decisively in Bosnia, 
Somalia, and Rwanda has had much more to do with an absence of political will in the 
Security Council to provide the necessary resources than any perceived constraints 
imposed by international law. 331 One of the U.S. administration's basic principles in 
dealing with the conflict in Bosnia was that no American ground troops would be 
deployed until after an agreement had been signed. In spite of the recriminations across 
the Atlantic. American and European policies have reflected a common interest 
throughout the conflict in the former Yugoslavia: political will has never existed for 
anything other than the limited objective of alleviating the humanitarian consequences of 
the conflict. 332 
330 Goodrich, 614. 
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A distinctive pattern regarding intervention has thus emerged in the international 
community: agreement in principle, paralysis in practice. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the UN Security Council has become a font of resolutions authorizing international 
action. But the United Nations lacks the means to carry all of its resolutions, and its 
members lack the will to do so. During the Cold War the international community was 
divided on what to do. Today, however, it cannot reach a consensus on how to 
apportion the costs of doing what all rhetorically agree ought to be done. The ultimate 
way of mitigating suffering is ending conflict. The United Nations' critical weakness, 
therefore, is its inability to develop a will to act. An understanding of why the Security 
Council members are reluctant to act may be useful to finding ways in which the UN 
could improve this weakness. 
1. Lack of Threats to Vital Interests 
It is undeniable, and very welcome, that there is more agreement among states 
about international security issues now than there was during the Cold War. There 
remain, however, fundamental differences of both interest and perception between states. 
These may not be enough to prevent the Security Council from reaching decisions on key 
issues, but they can frustrate efforts to tum decisions into actions.333 While differences 
remain, threats to vital interests of the major powers have been greatly reduced. Regions 
that seemed vital during the Cold War have lost their importance. For the moment, the 
forces that have historically driven the governments of the powerful to intervene beyond 
their borders have vanished. As the initial response to the horrors in Rwanda starkly 
demonstrated, it is becoming more and more difficult to get the United Nations' member 
states to intervene forcibly anywhere, at least when vital interests are not seen to be 
immediately involved. The unhappy reality is that, in the absence of threats to vital 
333 Adam Roberts, 12. 
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perceived interests, it is extraordinarily difficult for democratic states to sustain domestic 
support for distant and risky military operations overseas. 
334 
The lack of threats to vital interests has also made countries more reluctant to 
transfer control of their forces to international command in peacekeeping missions. 
Reasons for this include a natural concern about the command of troops being put into 
the hands of an international body that might employ them, risking their lives in an 
operation that was distant from home and controversial there, and that might be 
mismanaged. 335 It may also be due to broader doubts about the UN's capacity to 
manage a world tom apart by a huge range of conflicts. Also, whereas traditional 
peacekeeping operations have enjoyed broad support within the international community, 
the possible expansion of UN military activities, as proposed in "An Agenda for Peace" 
has provoked controversy. Outgoing UNPROFOR commander Indian LtGen Satish 
Nambiar warned that "peace is not something that can be imposed by diplomats and 
political leaders and enforced by foreign troops. There is no reason why men and 
women from far away countries should shed their blood on behalf of communities 
unwilling to come to terms with each other. "
336 
2. Defense Cuts 
Throughout the world, the end of the Cold War and budgetary constraints have 
resulted in declines in defense budgets. This has made the major powers less willing and 
able to use their forces in expensive military actions. As defenses have been cut, the 
major powers have been less willing to act unilaterally, and have looked to multilateral 
actions to reduce the costs of intervention. For the most part actions taken under UN 
auspices have involved either methods that seek to control events from afar (economic 
sanctions, arms embargoes, air exclusion zones, brokering ceasefires) or involve a 
334 Evans, 18. 
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limited military presence with the consent of the parties. However, the overall record 
of such methods is patchy. One reason for the tendency to use low-risk methods is that 
the countries that have had a principal role in carrying out UN Security Council mandates 
have been reluctant to embark on actions that involve a strong probability of casualties 
or failure. 337 
Neither the American public nor the UN member states are prepared to play the 
role of world policeman if it entails a reflexive military response to every incident of 
violence or repression around the world. Rather, they want a strategy that first 
encourages peaceful conflict resolution and includes intervention criteria that can be 
applied with a fair degree of consistency. A problem arises, however, if the U.S. and 
its allies bring to the UN only those issues on which they are unwilling to act but that 
also garner considerable media attention, leading them to pressure international 
organizations to assume the burden in a very public fashion. It creates a no-win situation 
for the UN which cannot be expected to resolve difficult collective security challenges 
in which the major powers are unwilling to play their part as the eventual enforcers of 
international will. Dag Hammarskjold, who was a brilliant and devoted Secretary 
General of the UN, clearly saw the dangers in overrating the peacekeeping power of the 
organization. In a letter to journalist Max Ascoli, he once decried the tendency to force 
the Secretary General into a key role in great power disputes "through sheer escapism 
from those who should carry the responsibility. "
338 The same abrogation of foreign 
policy responsibility spoken of by Hammarskjold in the late 1950s is repeating itself 
today. The great powers are increasingly reluctant to accept the responsibilities inherent 
in their Security Council seats. 
337 Ibid. 19. 
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3. Public Opinion 
For the U.S. what lies behind intervention in the post-Cold War era is sympathy. 
Sympathy is a powerful human emotion and a precious one. Whether it can- or should-
be a decisive motive in the conduct of foreign policy, however, remains doubtful. 
Americans approved of the dispatch of troops to Somalia to relieve suffering under the 
misunderstanding that the forces would be able to steer clear of local politics. The public 
believed that the interventions would be costless, especially our most valuable currency: 
American lives. 339 Protecting beleaguered minorities or starving people will enjoy 
public support at least at the outset of humanitarian operations. One must recall that in 
the early stages Vietnam enjoyed overwhelming support. But when an operation bogs 
down and particularly, when there are casualties that the public regards as 
disproportionate to the gains, that support will rapidly fade. 340 
The Bosnian and Somalian cases illustrate a fundamental dilemma that is likely 
increasingly to confront not only the U.S. but also other troop contributing countries: 
how to explain to publics at home why lives should be put at risk when there is no 
compelling vital or national interest involved. Subsequent developments in Somalia and 
Western policies in Bosnia suggest that humanitarian principles alone provide an 
insufficient justification for long-tenn involvement, particularly if it is to entail both 
casualties and major economic costs. The American involvement in Somalia suggested 
that the American public's extreme sensitivity to casualties has created a situation where 
American vulnerability has come to feed on itself. As one observer of UN affairs 
pointed out shortly after the killing of 18 U.S. soldiers in Mogadishu in 1993, "anyone 
wanting to provoke trouble knows that attacking American troops is the best way to go 
about it." 341 The U.S. Congress has exacerbated this problem by requiring "exit 
points" telling Congress when troops will be pulled out of peacekeeping missions. The 
339 Mandelbaum, 16. 
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most obvious flaw in the notion of "exit points" was aptly spelled out by former 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger: "If you have a clear exit point in a place like 
Bosnia, it is like telling the parties that when our people get killed, we will leave. And 
that is exactly what opponents of our presence would like. Instead of reducing the 
danger to our forces, it invites attack. "342 
The Security Council has the military power to respond to threats to peace around 
the globe. The UN has a successful tool for helping to calm conflicts down: 
peacekeeping. What the UN lacks is the ability to develop the political will and 
consensus for action necessary to give UN actions legitimacy in the world. Opponents 
of peace-enforcement and intervention in internal conflicts call for preventive diplomacy 
and peace-making to prevent conflicts from erupting. Preventive diplomacy depends on 
quick, decisive action. Information and tools to respond to crises are necessary but 
insufficient without a finn decision and the demonstrated will to use them. 
The common theme among the current challenges to the legitimacy of the UN in 
the world is that the raised expectations for the UN at the end of the Cold War have 
actually accelerated the downward spiral in UN legitimacy. The growing power and 
influence of the Third World has produced more demands for a voice in the running of 
the world. The unrepresentativeness of the Security Council has therefore damaged the 
credibility and legitimacy of the UN. The combination of strong rhetoric for 
"humanitarian intervention" in conflicts around the globe have raised expectations, but 
it has also lacked the consensus among either the developing world countries who fear 
violations of their sovereignty, and among the rich countries of the North who are 
increasingly reluctant to match words with full support. The half-hearted support for UN 
peacekeeping and the perceived U.S. withdrawal from fulfilling its leadership role in the 
world have resulted in a UN which lacks staying power. This has, therefore, produced 
a UN which is perceived by a growing number of states as unrepresentative, inefficient, 
weak, intrusive, and failing at its task of providing for any countries' security. The 
problem is that the problems described in Chapter IV are not going away and are driving 
342 Ibid, 39. 
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the world together in efforts to respond. The legitimacy of the UN, therefore, is 
becoming more difficult to sustain at a time when such legitimacy is essential for solving 
the world's problems. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Nearly half a century after its Charter was signed, the United Nations 
organization and system created "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war" falls far short of the founders' vision. The end of the Cold War and the unblocking 
of the Security Council, however, have enabled progress towards the United Nations 
envisioned by its founders seem possible. Consciously or unconsciously, it is against the 
baseline of 1945 expectations and aspirations that current UN performance is being 
measured. As Thomas Franck notes, "The hopes born in San Francisco in 1945, and 
which continued to be nourished during the flrst decade of the organization's existence, 
may have died in the hearts of the American public but appear to linger in our collective 
memory. "343 The end of the Cold War was, therefore, seen by many as providing the 
opportunity for the United Nations to flnally work the way it was intended. Using 1945 
as a baseline for the UN organization, however, overlooks the changes that have taken 
place in the world balance of power and the types of problems to which the UN is being 
asked to respond. 
A. GROWING NEED FOR A LEGITIMATE UN 
The challenge facing policymakers is that the growing number of problems in the 
world requiring an international response has increased the need for an international 
mechanism, while at the same time challenges to the legitimacy of the UN are also 
growing. It is often observed that the Security Council is flnally fulfllling the role the 
UN Charter assigned it. In fact, although the Security Council increasingly acts as a 
kind of global hotline for emergency response, the distress calls are not at all what the 
Charter's framers had intended. In the framers' world, threats to peace were expected 
to sweep across borders, not erupt within them. Yet since the end of the Cold War, the 
pent-up hatred and frustration of nationalist, ethnic, religious, and other forces have 
343 Franck. 7. 
153 
exploded, "splitting the nation-state atom"344 and sending shock waves across the 
international system. Paul Thies notes that "the most distinctive feature of the latest 'new 
world order' is not to be found in the withering away of war, but in a widening gap 
between the conditions of international life in the advanced democratic states versus those 
in the Third World. "345 Overpopulation, advanced weaponry' nationalist rivalries, and 
disputed borders suggest an increased danger of preemptive and preventive wars among 
Third World states. 
The threats these Third World conflicts pose to the developed countries of the 
North are growing. The increasing dispersal of weapons of mass destruction threatens 
to raise a twenty-first century Leviathan. With greater numbers and longer ranges, the 
ballistic missiles arsenals in the developing world will soon be able to threaten not only 
U.S. forces overseas, but also U.S. allies in Europe and Asia as well, thereby making 
U.S. and allied coalition intervention much more dangerous and tenuous. Yet curbing 
this diffusion is a project well beyond the capacity of a single or alliance of states. The 
extreme improbability that supply-side controls can ever be leak-proof draws attention 
to the demand side, which will require strong, coordinated collective action if 
proliferation is to be curbed. With confrontational politics driving competition for 
nuclear and other weapons on the Korean peninsula, in South Asia, and in the Middle 
East, only collective action supported by U.S. leadership holds the potential for reducing 
tensions in these regions that offers the best hope for long-term arms control. 
While the problems of the world requiring an international response are 
increasing, the legitimacy of the UN is increasingly under challenge. The promise that 
seemed so bright at the end of the Cold War has been dulled by the recent UN 
peacekeeping difficulties in Somalia and Bosnia. Despite continued great power 
cooperation in the Security Council, the UN has been frustrated by its inability to build 
more support within the United Nations for responding decisively to a world disorder 
344 Fromuth, 344. 
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best summed up in a single term: fragmentation. The perceived ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency of the United Nations has produced a UN reform debate between the 
organization "tinkerers" who want to rearrange the UN, and those anti-UN reformers 
who want to ignore the organization because they see it as unimportant. The 
presumption behind each of these approaches is that the UN legitimacy is either 
automatic or unimportant. While both sides of the reform debate deal with the question 
of whether the UN is either the right tool or the wrong tool for responding to conflict, 
neither side appears to address the question of what the UN can uniquely add to conflict 
resolution. While most would agree that the UN could bring legitimacy or effectiveness 
to an operation, the organizational reformers tend to overlook the question of UN 
legitimacy. This thesis attempts to show that UN legitimacy is neither automatic nor 
unimportant, but rather that the decline in UN legitimacy will be a critical challenge to 
the United Nations' effectiveness as it enters the twenty-first century. 
Most reform proposals for the United Nations tend to ignore the changes that have 
occurred in the world since 1945. The balance of power and the number of states in the 
world has drastically changed in the nearly fifty years since the end of the Second World 
War. Although the United States still retains its position as the preeminent economic, 
political, and military power in the world, there has been a natural diffusion of power 
to a large number of countries. The world is no longer dominated by a few great powers 
with a majority of the military and economic power and population. Instead, the 
explosion in the number of states and the expansion of economies around the globe has 
increased the number of nations expecting a "voice" in world decisions at the United 
Nations. 
The crisis in UN legitimacy is therefore two-fold. In the developed countries, the 
UN is seen as inefficient, costly, and ineffective - therefore, a bad investment unless 
reformed. As a result of this decline in legitimacy, developed countries, particularly the 
United States, have grown more reluctant to provide troops to the UN for peacekeeping 
operations or to pay its share of UN dues or peacekeeping costs. Developing countries 
see the UN as a forum which should give them a voice in world affairs. The growing 
perception among many countries, however, that the UN is dominated by an antiquated 
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Security Council based on an outdated 1945 power structure has contributed to the 
decline in UN legitimacy. While improving the ability of the UN to respond to conflicts 
around the globe should be the overall goal, attempts to make the UN stronger are bound 
to fail if the bigger problem of a declining UN legitimacy and ability to build world 
consensus is not addressed first. 
B. WHY BOTHER WITH THE UN? 
What the world needs, therefore, is an organization which can forge unity and 
support for international action. While the United Nations can not solve all problems, 
it does have a unique value as a world forum in which all nations of the world are 
represented. No other organization or institution has the potential for building 
international consensus, legitimacy, and support for action. Leland Goodrich points out 
that "the UN has not always been able to work out mutually acceptable accommodations 
of conflicting interests and demands, but the availability of such a forum for mobilizing 
opinion and exercising political pressure has served to some extent to lessen tensions and 
to encourage the use of peaceful procedures instead of methods of violence. "
346 If the 
United Nations did not exist, the world would need to invent some kind of organization 
to do the things that it can do. Then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold told the 
British Parliament in an address on April 2, 1958 that "we should recognize the United 
Nations for what it is - an admittedly imperfect but indispensable instrument of nations 
in working for a peaceful evolution toward a more just and secure world order. "347 
The world needs to realize that the United Nations is imperfect and partial, and that its 
legitimacy within the world is tenuously tied to the support given to it by its member 
nations. If the UN was seen as an indispensable instrument even during the Cold War, 
it has become even more so with the difficult new problems of the post-Cold War era. 
346 Goodrich and Simons, 603. 
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Why is the role of the United Nations as a world forum so important? The 
disorder that has erupted in the world since the end of the Cold War is placing great 
strains on the international system. External and internal conflict and fragmentation 
within the state system has been accompanied by a diffusion of power to the Third 
World, especially with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Reconstructing 
the world order has become even more difficult than during the Cold War. With all of 
the great powers reducing their military forces under economic and political pressures, 
individual powers lack the necessary resources, will, and public support to stabilize the 
world unilaterally. This makes the need for some type of effective international response 
more critical. The credibility of the UN is being tested and found wanting in the former 
Yugoslavia and Somalia, as it was in Angola after the 1992 election. Many of the 
Security Council's decisions on conflict resolution at present lack either the legal and 
political strength to make them respected (legitimacy), or the means to implement them. 
While reforms concentrating on making the UN stronger might give better means to 
implement its resolutions, the effectiveness of the UN will still be limited if its actions 
are not seen as legitimate by those countries called on to respond to a resolution or carry 
them out. The danger to the United Nations of this decline in legitimacy is that if this 
trend is not reversed, both the credibility and relevance of the world organization as the 
agent for maintaining peace and security will be more and more in doubt. 
B. CRITICAL TRADEOFF BETWEEN FORUM AND MILITARY COMMAND 
While anti-UN critics tend to ignore the significance of the UN in the world 
system, organizational reformers ignore an equally severe problem. Leaping directly into 
the debate over details of organizational charts, standing forces, operations centers, and 
intelligence sharing, they obscure a critical trade between the United Nations' ability to 
develop the legitimacy and international support for an action and its ability to effectively 
command action. To understand this tradeoff, we must remember that organizations are 
not all purpose activities, they exist to maximize the capability to do certain things, at 
the cost of the inability to do others. Reformers assert that the UN can be both a world 
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forum and effectively command military forces in enforcement operations. The critical 
question one should ask is what role is the UN uniquely able to carry out? 
The UN is an organization and is not immune to this central problem in 
organizational design. I argue that, at least in the medium run (2-10 years), efforts to 
increase the United Nations' ability to act efficiently and effectively in order to command 
military forces will come at the expense of its ability to build legitimacy, consensus, and 
the collective will to act and to persevere in action. As mentioned above, the UN is 
unique in its ability to serve as a world forum. No other universal forum exists. his 
not unique in its capabilities for effective collective military action. 
The question which must be addressed is, does the world lack the capability to 
effectively integrate and support operations, or does it lack the ability to develop the 
international political consensus necessary to both give an operation legitimacy and to 
sustain the political will to carry an operation through? When framed in relative terms, 
the answer is clear. For the foreseeable future, nation-states will be far better equipped 
to carry out military operations than the United Nations is likely to be. By its basic 
character, the UN cannot conduct military operations on its own. States can carry out 
military actions better than the UN because they have been practicing the art a lot longer 
and they have the domestic political support necessary. As Michael Mandelbaum states, 
"State authority springs from their political legitimacy; that legitimacy cannot be 
transferred by fiat to an international organization. "348 It makes little sense to try to 
make the UN do what states can do better. The UN may be able to carry out military 
operations eventually, but it will take a long time to get as proficient as states. This 
points to the United Nations' need to be able to build coalitions to carry out military 
operations. The central challenge faced in worldwide efforts to manage conflict is not 
an inability to organize and sustain action, rather it is a lack of will, consensus, and 
political legitimacy. The world polity lacks a system for generating "will" and the real 
consensus for action necessary for truly legitimate, long-term efforts at peace 
enforcement and conflict resolution. 
348 Mandelbaum. 10. 
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To summarize, the world is faced with growing international problems requiring 
an effective international response. As recent events in Bosnia and Somalia indicate, no 
international response is likely to be successful unless the UN and its actions are 
perceived as legitimate. At the same time, the legitimacy of the UN is increasingly 
under challenge and will continue on a downward spiral unless something is done to 
legitimize the United Nations' structure and operations. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UN REFORM 
The world can not afford to ignore the United Nations. At the same time, if we 
are to reform it, our reform proposals must be guided by the Hippocratic Oath, which 
says "first, do no harm." As mentioned above, organizational reform proposals to 
strengthen the United Nations would do little to improve the legitimacy of the UN while 
putting at risk the perception of the organization as neutral and impartial. Any UN 
reforms must, therefore, address the fundamental problem of how to improve the 
organization's ability to handle the problems of today and the next century. The focus 
behind all of these recommendations is on increasing the legitimacy of the UN. 
1. Expand the Security Council 
One of the most important goals of this reform would be to increase the voice of 
the countries of the developing world. The principal way in which this could be done 
would be to expand the Security Council to make it more representative of the world's 
powerful countries. Currently, the Council is not representative of the power balance 
in the world. In economic power, Japan and Germany are obvious choices, but oil states 
such as Iran or Saudi Arabia have a strong claim for seats. Regional powers such as 
India, Brazil or Argentina, and Nigeria all should be included in an expanded Security 
Council. Adam Roberts of Oxford University stresses that "if the United Nations is 
indeed to have an enlarged role in security affairs, its system of decision-making must 
be seen as legitimate. "349 In theory, the members of the UN agree to accept and carry 
349 Adam Roberts, "The U.N. and International Security," 12. 
159 
out the decisions of the Security Council. In practice, the Security Council cannot 
impose its will on the members in the way this statement implies. The vast majority of 
the world's approximately 181 nations are not represented on the Security Council. 
Since most of the conflicts and threats to peace are in the developing world, the UN 
needs to be seen as legitimate by these countries. Failure to expand the Security Council 
will delegitimize the UN, further eroding its ability to respond to the new problems of 
the world. 
In order to update the Security Council without making it unwieldy, the Security 
Council should adopt the current proposal in the United Nations for establishing a second 
tier of "alternating seats" between the permanent and elected Council members. These 
five alternating seats would bring key regional countries into the Security Council on an 
alternating basis, but without a veto. The regional pairings would include: (1) Germany 
and Italy; (2) India and Pakistan/Indonesia; (3) Japan and Korea; Brazil and 
Argentina/Mexico; and (5) Nigeria and Egypt/Iran. These countries would alternate 
every two years, and the potentially most helpful and powerful regional powers would 
be drawn into the decision-making process of the Council, thereby increasing the voice 
of these countries and the legitimacy of the UN. 
2. Strengthen the United Nations' Consensus Building 
One of the ways in which the UN could improve the legitimacy of some of its 
operations would be to avoid rhetoric concerning human rights and democracy as reasons 
for interventions around the world. While the UN should support these concepts, both 
are very problematic since different countries have different beliefs and definitions of the 
terms. All the rhetoric about human rights merely exacerbates rifts between the rich 
industrial nations of the North and the developing countries of the South, damaging the 
ability of the UN to build consensus for action. Using such rhetoric hurts the ability of 
the UN to build unity in the world by alienating countries in the developing world needed 
to help solve new problems - such as China and Iran. In a sense this approach to 
security leads us back to the first principles of the UN Charter. In the work of 
broadening the world's security consensus. whether it deals with nonproliferation or 
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terrorism, or regionally destabilizing civil wars, the answer is the same that our 
membership in the UN and other international institutions has always required. It is the 
toilsome task of nurturing an international society of common values to inform and 
vitalize the orderly world. The United Nations is not going to forget about human rights, 
nor should it. The more important question is whether the UN going to do things to 
improve human rights or is it going to just talk about it or take half-hearted measures? 
Improving the human rights of people in various cultures around the globe will require 
a long-term view of the problem. The UN must decide to actually work on improving 
human rights, meaning that it must be able to build support for its vision of human rights 
if it hopes to gain the commitment of member nations to improving them. 
3. Establish Criteria for Peacekeeping Missions 
A third recommendation is to establish criteria for sending peacekeeping missions 
into countries in order to avoid the "band-aid" approach and half-hearted support seen 
for peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Bosnia. The key point here is that the UN has 
limited resources, and it cannot successfully deal with every problem in the world. 
Those missions that the UN does take on, however, it must be successful at. The United 
Nations has provided a means for governments to appear to be doing something without 
really doing anything. The urge to "do something" in troubled regions around the world 
must be resisted unless the measures taken have a reasonable chance of success. The 
moral of Somalia and Bosnia should be that hollow gestures can turn out to be worse 
than no action at all. Just as there are domestic problems that fall outside the purview 
of the federal government, so there are foreign problems that are better addressed by 
local or regional entities than outsiders, who may have neither the depth of knowledge 
nor the commitment to the long haul to solve the problem. The problem with the UN 
attempting to respond to all conflicts, therefore, is that it spreads its peacekeeping forces 
out too thin, inviting failure which damages the credibility and legitimacy of the UN. 
What kind of criteria would be established? The Security Council should 
establish a UN office with the sole responsibility for monitoring world events, predicting 
possible hot spots, reviewing possible responses, and determining whether peacekeeping 
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or coalition military forces would be required. Also, votes in the Security Council for 
peacekeeping missions should be tied to the fmancial and personnel costs of the missions. 
Countries that voted for a peacekeeping mission would be required to provide forces and 
commit funds before any peacekeeping mission would be deployed. If no consensus was 
possible or the Security Council voted against sending in UN peacekeepers, then the UN 
should not send in UN peacekeepers. The UN needs to be either more discriminate in 
its choices, or lower the goals of the missions. Thomas Pickering notes the United 
Nations' limitations, stating that "we should look to the UN to deliver a part of the 
security solution at best. How large a part may depend upon its ability to develop two 
key elements of any new approach to security: legitimacy and flexibility. "
350 
An important reason for setting up criteria for deploying peacekeeping forces is 
to prevent the use of peacekeeping forces for half-hearted peace-enforcement operations. 
The problem with the current use of peacekeepers for enforcement operations is that it 
allows the Security Council to avoid making any difficult decisions about building 
coalitions to provide necessary force. More important, the use of peacekeepers in peace-
enforcement operations threatens the legitimacy of peacekeepers. lnis Claude points out 
that "it is essential to retain a clear distinction between those approaches that involve 
evenhanded treatment of the parties engaged in conflict and those that involve tilting to 
one side or the other. There is nothing to be gained and much to be lost by stretching 
the concept of peacekeeping to cover missions that engage in full-scale military 
operations. "351 If a conflict is deemed to require the use of force, the Security Council 
should vote on building a coalition of forces strong enough to be successful. If the 
Security Council cannot come to a consensus to act, or if the most powerful countries 
veto any action, then the UN should not take action since it lacks the political support 
necessary for the operation to be successful. In deciding when to send in military forces, 
the UN would be wise to remember a quote from Vera M. Dean in 1946: 
350 Pickering, 98. 
351 Claude, 17. 
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As long as there is life on earth, there will be disorder, there will be 
constant changes in the relations of human beings with each other. Our 
task is not to prevent all conflicts among nations, but to make sure that 
when conflicts do arise they are settled by peaceful means, not by 
war.Js2 
The United Nations was designed with the intention that conflicts would be settle by 
peaceful means frrst, and then if the UN was unsuccessful, by force. 
In conclusion, the United Nations is faced with new challenges and problems 
which require an international response. Reform debates calling for making the UN 
stronger overlook the more critical problem of declining UN legitimacy. While UN 
effectiveness needs to be improved, reforms calling for making the UN stronger will 
prove fruitless unless challenges to the legitimacy of the organization are addressed first. 
What must the U.S. do to make the United Nations more useful? For the reasons 
explained above, the U.S. cannot police the world or stop all of the world's problems 
unilaterally. It needs an effective UN to help build consensus for collective action. If 
the UN is to be seen as important and legitimate, the U.S. must act as if the UN is 
important. This means that if the U.S. says that the UN should respond to a crisis, then 
the U.S. should participate, and make the commitment to stay until the end. Half-beaned 
measures and support for UN resolutions - sanctions, no-fly zones, embargos -prolong 
problems without solving them. The U.S. needs to realize that it may have to give up 
some power and influence to the United Nations in the short-term in order to solve the 
new problems of the world in the long-run. 
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